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Over the last three decades, art production has seen an international proliferation of 
collaborative and socially engaged artistic tendencies. By departing from the realm of 
aesthetics, these practices draw their material from political categories, modes of social co-
existence and activism. The social reorientation of art practice problematises the distinction 
between the artistic and the political, presenting thus new challenges for art history and 
criticism. This thesis examines the historical logic and implications of this new 
societalisation of art and proposes a framework for its interpretation within the category of 
art. 
The origins of the “social turn” in contemporary art practice are explored in the crises of 
artistic production in modernity, catalysed by the transition of art economies to the regime 
of the market. The two historical developments in art practice I focus on are the politicisation 
of the early twentieth century avant-garde artwork, and the sublimation of the aesthetics of 
genius into a model of democratic authorship in Marcel Duchamp’s readymade practice. By 
advancing an interpretation of politicisation and societalisation as artistic responses to 
cultural-economic phenomena, the political implications of contemporary practices are 
posited as the new material of art discourse. Engaging with the propositions of Nicholas 
Bourriaud, Grant H. Kester, and Claire Bishop I explore the “social turn’s” artistic 
negotiations of artistic labour and materiality, artistic and social antagonism, as well as its 
conceptualisations of community. The politicisation of contemporary socially engaged 
practice is interpreted in the context of the search for artistic legitimacy which nonetheless 
carries significant political ramifications, as it exposes art to the heteronomy of 
neoliberalisation. 
My thesis adopts a materialist approach based on Marxist analysis of economic and political 
phenomena. To prevent, however, the complete absorption of artistic propositions by 
economic pressures, I synthesise my materialist approach with an understanding of the 
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As an art historian I have always been intrigued by practices which appear to deny 
their association with art. This negation, implicit or explicit in varying degrees, revitalises 
the discipline as it forces it to address its existential questions. How can we separate art from 
non-art in the post-aesthetic era, what is the social role of the artist, what is the relation 
between artistic and political practices; the “social turn” unfolding since the 1990s has 
forcefully posed these questions to art historians and artists. To be sure, these are not newly 
emerging problems but issues that art has been wrestling for over a century. To the extent, 
however, that they force analysis out of its self-referential cul-de-sac and its, at times 
superfluous, particularisms, they represent welcome repetitions. 
I started exploring the issue of art’s social reorientation around the time that Athens 
was announced as the co-host city for documenta 14. Granted, I was already interested in 
the debates around relational aesthetics, activist art practices and so on, but I had a rather 
binary perception of the art practices involved. In my mind these were either reduced to 
renditions of the 1960s retreat of the artisanal or understood as entirely political phenomena. 
However, coming personally from Greece and having an experiential knowledge of its 
peripheral status and minimal contribution to the international scene of contemporary art, 
there was no other way to interpret the documenta decision if not on account of the country’s 
long economic and political crisis. What this decision therefore suggested was that 
contemporary art might be consciously gravitating toward the political as a way to derive 
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In 1996 Jean Baudrillard was denouncing the “comedy” of art. Art had not merely 
become the ad nauseam recycling of itself. Nor the anticipation of its judgement, its 
flattening and ironic inversion into self-indulgent proposition, in an endless, cynical 
performance of the absence of meaning. 
That was not the problem with art— or rather, that was simply one part of it. It was 
the entire world that had become “art” that was the problem. It was the entire world that had 
become a maze of transparent surfaces, completely open and empty: “transaesthetic.”1 Art 
was performing meaninglessness in a world already devoid of meaning. “Hyperrealist, cool, 
transparent, marketable.”2 A world without depth, a bottomless world, the world of 
“relentless visibility.” A world reduced to a dictatorship of images.3 
What was art supposed to do? For Baudrillard, every answer had become a non-
sequitur. Art was not the helpless victim of a flattened world; it was a co-conspirator in that 
world’s creation. Like an ideological front business for a global racket, art was tasked with 
producing the unapologetic and expedient mimesis of the world’s emptiness and unreality,  
to the point that this world’s characteristics become too outrageous to mistake for true. After 
all, a lie this big cannot possibly be a lie; there has to be something more underneath. For 
Baudrillard, what the contemporary condition of art spelled out was the definite and 
irrevocable suspension of any belief in its productive relationship to its publics. Art 
reproduced itself like a superstition, a mode of self-perpetuating through the systematic 
manipulation of public illusion— like all governing disciplines of capitalism. What 
Baudrillard confronted in “The Conspiracy of Art” was the naked reality of an artworld at 
the historical moment when the production of belief that sustains it has completely 
abandoned all pretences to involve anyone but those already invested in its reproduction: 
art’s insiders. Cynically weaponising the absence of legitimating belief into an artistic event, 
the artworld was rehearsing an age-old strategy of deflection and subterfuge according to 
which the defiant confession of wrongdoing evinces an underlying world of innocence. 
————— 
 
Parallel to Baudrillard’s apocalyptic artworld of ruthless “insider trading” there was 
gradually emerging a new conception of art; a move seemingly away from the marketability 
of Neo-expressionism, or the cynicism of the Young British generation. Seeking to reinvent 
                                                             
1 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), 25 
2 Ibid., 26. 
3 Ibid., 25. 
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meaning through revivifying its entanglement with the social world, this new model of art 
practice embraced audience participation and aspirations of social transformation as its 
guiding principles. In 1991 Suzanne Lacy coined the term “New Genre Public Art” to 
describe a lineage of artists and collectives working with audiences on issues “directly 
relevant to their lives.”4 In 1993 Culture in Action, a large-scale exhibition in Chicago, 
moved directly to neighbourhoods to engage and produce art from within inner city 
communities. A few years later, Nicholas Bourriaud entered the scene with exhibitions such 
as “Traffic” (CAPC musée d'art contemporain de Bordeaux, 1996), and the breakthrough 
that followed the publication of “Relational Aesthetics” in 1998, and more importantly its 
English translation of 2002.5  
Gradually, similar ideas about art’s openness and social responsibility were not only 
widely acknowledged by the institutions of contemporary art but became the very material 
that undergirded the programming of large international exhibitions. The evolution of 
documenta during the last two decades is illustrative of this social reorientation. Starting 
with documenta 11 in 2001-2002, Okwui Enwezor divided the exhibition in five platforms— 
most of which took place away from Europe, away from the cultural imperial centre. These 
platforms became workshops for the exploration of democracy, colonialism and 
globalisation.6 This sense of centrifugality also underpinned the “migration of forms” of 
documenta 12. There, Roger M. Buergel and Ruth Noack attempted to de-europeanise the 
institution’s outlook on contemporary aesthetic and political culture by drawing connections 
between Western and non-Western artists and artforms. In line with this emerging tradition, 
Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev decentralised documenta 13 (2012) through relocating acts in 
Kabul and Alexandria, two places undoubtedly embodying a certain “realness” of the 
political— the former still suffering the unhealed wounds of the Western invasion of 2001, 
and the latter experiencing the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Finally, a few years later Athens 
appeared on the global map of contemporary art— and that on the basis of a seemingly 
endless economic crisis. As Adam Szymczyk, the artistic director of documenta 14, asserted, 
                                                             
4 Suzanne Lacy, “Cultural Pilgrimages and Metaphoric Journeys,” in Mapping the Terrain: New Genre 
Public Art, ed. Suzanne Lacy (Seattle; Washington: Bay Press, 1995), 19. 
5 “Traffic” featured the majority of artists around who Bourriaud developed the ideas elaborated in Relational 
Aesthetics. 
Nicholas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods (Dijon:  Les Presses du 
Réel, 2002) 
6 The first platform, ‘Democracy Unrealized,’ took place in Vienna in March 2001 and continued in Berlin. 
Platform 2, ‘Experiments with Truth: Transitional Justice and the Processes of Truth and Reconciliation,’ 
took place in New Delhi. The third Platform, ‘Creolit and Creolization,’ was held on the West Indian island 
of St Lucia in the Caribbean. Platform 4, “Under Siege: Four African Cities, Freetown, Johannesburg, 




underlying the decision to stage the international exhibition in Athens and Kassel was the 
“necessity to act in real time and in the real world.”7 Implicit in Szymczyk’s statement is the 
conviction that the contemporary artist can no longer operate in idyllic homelands; Kassel 
separates art from the real world, and crisis emerges as a currency of contemporary art. 
Claire Bishop has concisely described these tendencies as constituting a certain “social 
turn” of art,8 counter-mirroring in a way the “cultural turn” in politics and social sciences 
during the 1970s. For Nicholas Bourriaud the practices falling under this “social turn” 
constitute the latest and current stage in a history of art that saw art move from the mediation 
of the relationship between mankind and god to that between mankind and object, to finally 
arrive at the sphere of inter-human relations.9 The intensity with which this phenomenon 
unfolded has been reflected in the proliferating nomenclature aiming to register and describe 
aspects of it since the 1990s. New Genre Public Art, socially-engaged art, relational and 
post-relational, dialogical aesthetics, Arte Útil— if the multiplicity of terms emerging in 
recent decades signals anything, it is this growing interest in an art which does not merely 
thematise but draws its possibility in social engagement, responsibility, collaboration.  
The 1990s have been acknowledged as the crucial decade for this turn. As Grant H. 
Kester has pointed out, while socially extraverted art practices have existed for decades, they 
have historically been relegated to the margins of the artworld, as an undercurrent very often 
artistically and commercially unrecognised. In the 1980s, Kester notes, the artists and artist 
groups pioneering practices of social engagement, collectivity and activism existed rather 
separately from the “serious,” or commercially successful, art of contemporary art’s 
institutions. The social and artistic interventionism of ACT UP, Group Material and others 
formed thus a stark contrast with the “authenticity” of the return to painting and the various 
neo-expressionist tendencies of the era, as well the appropriative strategies— critical or self-
indulgent— of postmodernism. This schism has only appeared to be closing since the 1990s: 
Rirkrit Tiravanija, Thomas Hirschhorn, Santiago Sierra, artists who nowadays enjoy 
considerable institutional recognition, have moved to the public— organic or reconstructed 
in varying degrees— space, addressing audiences which are also directly involved in the 
                                                             
7 Adam Szymczyk, “Iterability and Otherness— Learning and Working from Athens,” in The documenta 14 
Reader, eds. Quinn Latimer, Adam Szymczyk (Munich: Prestel Verlag, 2017): 17-43, 26. 
8 Claire Bishop, “The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents.” Artforum. (February 2006): 178-183. 
Erik Hagoort has employed the term “art of the encounter” to describe the social reorientation of art practices 
since 1990, citing thus Bourriaud’s use of the term in “Relational Aesthetics,” a term adapted by Louis 
Althusser’s “materialism of the encounter.” 
Erik Hagoort, Good Intentions: Judging the Art of the Encounter (Amsterdam: Foundation for Visual Arts, 
Design and Architecture, 2005) 
9 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, 112. 
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production of the work.10 Since the 1990s socially engaged, participatory art practices are 
no longer isolated, underground tendencies relegated to development outside or in parallel 
with contemporary art’s institutions but “growing and ubiquitous.”11 
This turn has also been clearly captured in a radical reorientation of the discourses of 
contemporary art. Writing in 2006 Claire Bishop observed that it was not just the character 
of the artwork that was undergoing a process of societalisation, it was also the language used 
for its description that was under revaluation. Indeed, in the modern era artists have been 
experimenting with social contexts for over a century. Never before, however, did the 
language of the critic change so drastically to reflect that. Works might have been described 
as obscene, shocking, transcendental, or pointless. They were not ethical, solidaristic, 
effective or socially responsible. They were not considered or assessed in terms of their 
social impact or the moral-social intentions of the artist; or, at least, these did not constitute 
the priorities of the critic. That the reorientation of contemporary art’s subjects and methods 
has been unfolding in sync with the emergence of a new critical language signifies changes 
comprehensive and far-reaching. 
 
DEPOLITICISATION IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND NEOLIBERALISM 
Before I start outlining the key propositions and questions that structure the framework 
of my study, it would be necessary to briefly explain my nomenclature. As already 
suggested, the proliferation of the collaborative, intersubjective, politicised practices since 
the 1990s which comprise the focus of the present discussion was naturally accompanied by 
the emergence and popularisation of a variety of terms for their description. As these terms 
originate in the writings of theorists, the decisions of curators and the methods of artists, 
they gradually become attached to practices that express different motivations and ideas 
about the artistic and the social and their models of interaction. For instance, relational art 
has come to designate a specific type of practices: more often than not institutional, 
thematising the socio-communicative and often convivial elements of social life. Dialogical 
aesthetics on the other hand, as it emerges from a more activist tradition of art production, 
comes to refer to direct and non-hierarchical engagement with non-artist communities with 
emphasis on art’s potential for intersubjective and social transformation. The abundance of 
terms and their often nuanced distinctions complicate therefore the practices’ effective, 
concise and unambiguous codification. In this work I have consistently and consciously 
                                                             
10 Grant H. Kester, The One and the Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global Context (Durham; 
London: Duke University Press), 8. 
11 Nato Thompson, “Living as Form,” in Living as Form: Socially Engaged Art from 1991-2001, ed. Nato 
Thompson (Cambridge; Mass: MIT Press, 2012), 19. 
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shown preference for the terms “social turn” and “socially engaged practices.” Both terms 
are adequately general— yet not obfuscatory— and unassociated with a specific model of 
practice. Although Bishop first employed the term “social turn” to critically reference the 
broader phenomenon of the substitution of aesthetic for social and ethical criteria in 
contemporary art discourse, my use is less charged and simply aims to describe these 
practices in terms of a historical tendency. 
The primary objective of my work has been to advance an analysis of socially engaged 
practices not merely as products of a broader relativisation of the iconographic pursuits and 
methodologies of artistic practice in recent decades— that is, not merely as outcomes of 
contemporary art’s regime of pluralism—  but as legitimate artistic and political phenomena. 
As a descriptive term, “legitimate” has a triple meaning here: firstly, that practices are not 
arbitrary but can be understood through the examination of specific transformations in the 
history of artistic production; secondly, that they are practices which aim at artistic 
legitimacy rather than the destruction of art as an institution; thirdly, that the adjectives 
“artistic” and “political” have historically evolved and operate in a continuum. These three 
propositions will be expanded on below. 
 The discussions that comprise the body of my work do not lay claim to a universal 
character; my work is specifically focused on European and North American art examples 
of this process of societalisation in contemporary art production. As a consequence, these 
practices are contextualised in relation to the institutional history of fine art as well the 
characteristics of Western-type liberal democracy. This does not mean that the “social turn” 
is a phenomenon unique to the socio-cultural characteristics of those nations generally 
classified as advanced capitalist democracies. In fact, Anthony Gardner’s “Politically 
Unbecoming: Postsocialist Art against Democracy” of 2015 proposes that after the Fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 and 1991 
respectively, there has been a global expansion of an aesthetic of “democratisation” in art 
production. Nevertheless, this “democratic” aesthetic has not been interpreted uniformly 
across different cultures. For instance, Gardner identifies a certain scepticism toward 
Western professed democratic ideals among Central and Eastern European artists, whose 
artistic subjectivity was formed in actually existing socialism— or in the shadow of its 
disintegration— compared to the more unambiguous celebrations of democratic life found, 
for example, in relational art practices.12 Overlooking such context-dependent 
                                                             
12 Gardner traces this ambiguity toward liberal democracy in the work of Ilya Kabakov and Thomas 




differentiations in artistic responses and strategies would further totalise an, admittedly, 
already totalising project. To therefore contextualise Western European and North American 
practices we would need to explore the specific political, economic and cultural contexts 
they are embedded in.  
Even though the literature on neoliberalism is vast— neoliberalism represents a new 
“nexus rerum” of political discourse— and far exceeds the scope of the present study, we 
could attempt a compact description of its economic characteristics as comprising the regime 
of deregulation, financialisation and anti-inflationary monetary policy which gradually 
corroded and ultimately overturned the postwar Western Keynesian consensus in recent 
decades. Foucault’s seminal analysis presented in his lectures at the Collége de France 
between 1978-9 extended this analysis of neoliberalism beyond a simple economic framing 
to its interpretation as a comprehensive economic, political and moral system of government; 
in other words, a new governmental rationality.13 Following and building on Foucault’s 
analysis, Wendy Brown’s “Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution” of 
2015 centres neoliberalism on the absolute domination of the “homo economicus” over the 
“homo politicus;” neoliberalism presents “the vanquishing of liberal democracy’s already 
anemic homo politicus,” in a process with devastating consequences for democratic 
institutions and subjectivities.14 Neoliberalism constitutes thus a “hollowing out” of liberal 
democracy and a “turning inside out” of the liberal democratic social contract— processes 
which are not enforced strictly hierarchically but abetted by the intensification of 
competition as the governing logic of inner and outer life.15 
There is certainly no denying that the bracketing off of popular political participation 
through neoliberalism’s enshrining of power in globalised financial structures, combined 
with a systematic production of eager, self-governing subjects render most references to 
democracy almost euphemistic. Those problems notwithstanding, Brown’s description of 
the default state of the political determination of the individual in liberal democracy as 
anemic— that is, anemic already before its neoliberal dismantling— carries significant 
implications about the possibility of the political in liberal democracy to begin with. While 
Brown refuses to drive these implications to their logical conclusion— that neoliberalism 
extends and intensifies liberal democracy’s depoliticising logic— Antonio Y. Vázquez-
                                                             
Anthony Gardner, Politically Unbecoming: Postsocialist Art Against Democracy (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London, England: MIT Press, 2015) 
13 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. Michel 
Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 
14 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 
35. 
15 Ibid., 18. 
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Arroyo has instead argued that liberal democracy and neoliberalism do not represent 
contradictory political philosophies. This does not mean that there are no quantitative and 
qualitative distinctions between the two political concepts but that liberal democracy has 
historically paved the way for neoliberalism by virtue of its fundamentally depoliticised 
framework. Liberal democracy’s propensity toward depoliticisation is not accidental but 
structural— it inheres in the autonomisation of the political and economic sphere in 
capitalism. The autonomisation of the two spheres does not necessarily entail their complete 
separation but should be understood in a more Weberian sense, as the establishment of 
different “principles of action and norms” proper to each.16 Once domains of technically 
equal importance— yet disunited in terms of governing logic— collide, there is only one 
historical law that can predict how their conflict is resolved: “between equal rights, force 
decides.”17 
The framing of liberal democracy and neoliberalism as a continuum of intensifying 
depoliticisation runs of course contrary to the Foucauldian genealogy of neoliberalism. That 
is, for Foucault and by extension Brown, neoliberalism asserts itself as a new 
governmentality through the displacement of exchange by competition as the basis of private 
and social life. And this is no longer competition in descriptive but normative terms: the 
economisation of life permeates all aspects of inner and outer life to the point where 
individuals can only represent themselves through capital: as human embodiments of capital. 
For Foucault and Brown, this comprehensive process of human capitalisation in 
neoliberalism signifies a perversion of liberal prehistory; a premise which, as it becomes 
evident in Brown’s work, threatens to collapse analysis into a defence of liberal democracy 
against its perversion. 
This is, however, denying the problem of the “already anemic homo politicus” of 
liberal democracy which Carl Schmitt had already in the first decades of the twentieth 
century underlined as the fundamental condition of liberal democracy— a position that I will 
discuss in detail in Chapter 4. Approached from the perspective of depoliticisation, 
neoliberalism is revealed as the intensification and catalysation of economic and political 
ideas that emerge out of the autonomisation of the economic and the political in capitalism, 
which is in turn schematised in the internal contradictions of liberal democracy as “the 
doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.”18 To be clear, this does not 
                                                             
16 Antonio Y. Vázquez-Arroyo, “Liberal Democracy and Neoliberalism: A Critical Juxtaposition,” New 
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17 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 
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18 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and The Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 42. 
16 
 
invalidate the important insights that Foucault and Brown offer. The incisive observations 
on the “entrepreneur of the self” as well as neoliberalism’s moral-political processes of 
devolution and responsibilisation, which are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, are productive 
in their own right— regardless of grand genealogical claims— and operative in my analysis 
of liberal democracy as an antipolitical form. 
 
ON ARTISTIC AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
What is then the significance of socially engaged practices as legitimate artistic and 
political phenomena? It would be helpful to start unwrapping this proposition by first 
clarifying its second term, the “political.” As will be shown, this will eventually unlock the 
second term, the “artistic;” echoing in a sense their relationship of seeming inextricability 
during the “social turn.” This relationship should be approached at two levels. The first one 
is the politicisation of artistic activity in relation to competition within the artistic field: the 
starting premise for my analysis, therefore, is the nature of artistic struggle as always 
unfolding in relation to the “whole economy,” as Pierre Bourdieu has highlighted.19 This 
proposition does not seek to reconstruct a variation of a vague Rancièrean “politics of 
aesthetics” but to underline that, fundamentally, artistic struggles are always struggles 
between holders of quantitatively and qualitatively different capital. Axiomatically then, the 
present discussion sets as a precondition of all analysis the sociological insight that artistic 
positions are always informed by the pursuit of recognition in the artistic field, the 
possibilities of which are in turn always related to the historical conditions of the artist. The 
codification of the artist’s political agency as the re-inscription of political and economic 
antagonisms into the field of artistic production, which in turn mobilises artistic propositions, 
politicises art while at the same time prevents its collapse into political action. After all, 
artists interact, negotiate or subvert political structures, yet for their activities to be 
recognised as art, they need to be addressing positions occupied inside the shared symbolic 
space they compete over— that is, artists evoke, challenge and deconstruct ideas and 
methodologies that are recognised as competing over the status of art. To give an obvious 
example, when Andy Warhol presented silkscreens of Campbell soup cans in 1962, it was 
not the soup but painting itself that was under attack. 
These are the basic conditions which underpin my analysis of the historical avant-
garde movements of the early twentieth century, discussed in detail in Chapter 1. The 
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historical avant-garde as a category of relevance to contemporary socially engaged practices 
has in fact been severely overlooked among the “primary” writers of the “social turn.” 
Kester’s focus on art’s non-exploitative relations with its non-artistic co-producers leads him 
to discard the avant-garde as a useful category and disavow any possible connections to his 
model of “dialogical aesthetics.” In Kester’s writings, modernist autonomy and the historical 
avant-garde do not simply lack a working distinction, ignoring thus the contribution of Peter 
Bürger’s seminal “Theory of the Avant-Garde” of 1974, but in reality converge in their 
shared enmity toward the non-artist— be that spectator or participant.20 Bourriaud’s attitude 
is, on the other hand, slightly more ambiguous: the avant-garde vacillates between noble but 
outdated idea and totalitarian system of thought. Although relational aesthetics are still 
theoretically positioned within a general project of social change— restoring the social bond 
from its state of “standardised artefact”21 in his own words— Bourriaud delimits relational 
art practices in the realm of “microtopias,” unlike the “imaginary and utopian realities” of 
the avant-garde.22 Finally, Bishop cites Futurist serate, Soviet Proletkult and Parisian Dada 
urban explorations, that is, experiments in avant-garde performance, as the prehistory of the 
“social turn,” which is a position I will return to in Chapter 2, but references the avant-garde 
more symbolically than as a system with specific implications for the institution of art.  
Contrary to these, dismissive or vague, underutilisations of the category of the avant-
garde, writers such as John Roberts have attempted to reconstruct its contemporary radical 
potential. This nonetheless lies, according to Roberts, in a “suspensive” status after its 
suppression by the National Socialist and Stalinist reaction.23 Through an antihistoricist 
construction of the category as “research project” rather than as a category delimited by its 
original historical conditions, Roberts proposes that avant-garde revolutionary potential still 
theoretically persists in certain contemporary political practices insofar as they entail the  
liberatory promise of a Hegelian first and second negation; that is, the new possibilities 
created through the sublation of art’s autopoietic, commodity status and the negation thereof 
in the artwork’s entanglement with historical struggle. Even though my discussion borrows, 
admittedly stripped of its radical political potentialities, a key insight that Roberts provides— 
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that of the avant-garde reconfiguration of “autonomy as the critique of autonomy”24— the 
avant-garde does not figure as a revolutionary category in this discussion. Instead, my 
attention to the avant-garde takes the form of its theorisation as a crucial historical 
formulation of a new politicising energy concentrated in the avant-garde artwork. This 
politicising energy is, most importantly, produced through the tension between artistic 
recognition and the desire for the overcoming of those conditions which appear to foreclose 
it. As will be discussed in Chapter 1, in the history after the avant-garde this energy 
contributes to the reorientation of critical artistic practice toward the analysis and 
politicisation of the relations it is embedded in. 
Arguably, my ambiguity toward a revolutionary reading of the avant-garde’s 
(post)existence can be partly attributed to a conscious bias for its Central and Western 
European movements, compared to the Soviet avant-gardes of Constructivism and 
Productivism. This might appear to be a controversial decision as Constructivism, on the one 
hand, enjoys a certain prominence in Peter Bürger’s work, while Roberts describes the neo-
avant-garde expansion of artistic activity to “environmental technique and socially 
interventionist practice” as a “secondary Productivism.”25 Nevertheless, this is a decision 
ultimately dictated by my focus on socially engaged practices in Western Europe and 
America. As such, it has been crucial to consider the crisis of the modern artist and its 
relevance to the advance of artistic and political propositions in a sociohistorical context not 
wildly dissimilar in terms of art’s production and distribution relations.  
Western and Soviet avant-garde artists operated in vastly different professional fields, 
occupied different positions vis-à-vis political power, and ultimately faced entirely different 
challenges, as Boris Groys has pointed out. Firstly, in comparison with the avant-garde 
artists of the capitalist West who were wrestling with specific crises endemic to the 
transformation of the artistic field into an impersonal market economy, Soviet avant-gardists 
                                                             
24 Roberts arrives at this formulation adopting Stewart Martin’s dialectical reading of Adorno’s Aesthetic 
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were only minimally exposed to the pressures of the market, and that as a consequence of 
New Economic Policy’s relaxation of central planning between 1922-1928.26 Secondly, 
unlike their Central and Western European counterparts, the late 1910s and 1920s Soviet 
avant-gardes were post-revolutionary and politically affirmative phenomena. Even though 
Soviet avant-gardists had to navigate a political-cultural environment that was rife with 
competing visions for Soviet post-revolutionary culture, and often exhibited a certain distrust 
toward new forms and ideas— a distrust which ultimately culminated in their total 
marginalisation with the prescription of Socialist Realism as the official style in 1934— they 
were programmatically aligned with the project of the construction of the communist state.27 
In that sense, the Soviet avant-gardists were on the side of political power, broadly defined.28 
This puts them at odds with their European counterparts whose work was a reaction against 
the political environments they operated in, but was also, very importantly, made possible 
primarily thanks to the relative neutralisation of political relations of power— also known 
as toleration— characterising bourgeois democracy; this is, of course, a consequence of 
liberal democracy’s political framework of depoliticisation that was discussed earlier. 
Without accounting for the dimension of political toleration and its role in the eventual 
standardisation of critique as a central characteristic of cultural production, it becomes 
difficult to parse the (self)critical advance of art since modernity. 
Bourdieu, in his sociological analysis of this history starting in mid-late nineteenth 
century, has compellingly argued that the influx of new professional artists, the decline of 
the state-academic system, and the increasing marketisation of art economies led to the 
intensification of the antagonistic relations between the classes of consecrated and 
unrecognised artists. As the former appeared to largely retain their privileges inside the 
“market of symbolic goods” during the transition to high and late capitalism,29 the latter, 
Bourdieu points out, were incentivised to develop aesthetic propositions and competing 
systems of recognition based precisely on the inversion of the predominant economic logic. 
In Bourdieu’s analysis, this is schematised into a turn to a model of “restricted” production, 
as opposed to capitalist “large-scale” production. The modelling of artistic production after 
                                                             
26 Boris Groys, The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond, trans. Charles 
Rougle (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 23-24. 
27 This tension was often, at least partly, the result of the recodification of pre-existing political competitions 
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28 Boris Groys, “The Russian Avant Garde Revisited,” in The Idea of the Avant Garde: and What it Means 
Today, ed. Marc James Léger (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 168-173. 
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the abstraction of the “restricted” meant that the marginalised or dissident artist of modernity 
asserted a claim to legitimacy through the production of art that did not target a wide 
audience, sacrificed temporal for eternal rewards by bracketing off superficial economic 
concerns, and advanced through the strategic accentuation of difference.30 What is important 
in Bourdieu’s analysis is the formulation of artistic modernism as emerging through a crisis 
precipitated by the violation of the “numerus clausus” that formerly safeguarded the rarity 
of the artistic profession.31 
Since the 1960s, the comprehensive integration of the arts in the national economies 
of Western capitalist nations, and the professionalisation of artistic education and practice 
which followed art’s “industrialisation” have gradually created, as Gregory Scholette has 
extensively argued, “an oversupply of artistic labour” so vast and sidelined that could be 
understood as comprising a second art economy.32 Scholette cites staggering numbers: the 
2005 US census found two million Americans declaring “artist” as their main profession 
while another 300,000 listed “artist” as their second job. Meanwhile, European Union 
numbers in 2004 showed 5.8 million fine artists, employment in the arts increased by 
150,000 in the United Kingdom between 1993-2003, the German cultural sector showed 
growth of 3.4% between 1995-2003— a period in which the growth of the general workforce 
remained stagnant— while surveys in Canada projected the number of artists growing at a 
triple rate compared to the national workforce between 1991-2000.33 The demographic 
explosion of artists during recent decades, whose puny opportunity for institutional access 
has been further compounded by the relativisation of art’s own rules— as reflected by the 
transition to the post-medium, post-aesthetic era— paints a picture in fact surprisingly 
reminiscent of Bourdieu’s modernism. In both eras we have a similar violation of a “numerus 
clausus” related to the transition to a different regime of accumulation— industrial 
capitalism and post-Fordism respectively— and a similar crisis of cultural legitimacy: the 
decline of the state-academic authority on the one hand, and the post-Duchampian deepening 
of the move from a normative to a descriptive-institutional regime of art. 
Perhaps then, the “social turn” could similarly be understood as occurring along a 
second historical artistic inversion of the perceived order of economic logic. If, as 
Baudrillard suggested earlier, the 1990s reveal with blinding clarity the inscription of 
contemporary art’s relentless visibility in finance, in a regime wherein the reach and leverage 
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of the art dealer come to overshadow art’s toxic historical irrelevance— its ad nauseam 
repetition of life’s eternal present— then the societalisation of art in recent decades could be 
understood as an attempt to rediscover art’s legitimacy in what contends to symbolically 
inverse this order. The departure from object production, the democratic utility, and the 
ethical, communal characteristics of the “social turn,” discussed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
respectively, represent then an artistic imagining of the inversion of art’s quantifiability and 
investibility, the contestation of its fetishistic disavowal of all social function, and a protest 
against the ruthlessness and moral disinterestedness of commercial exchange. Unlike, 
however, Bourdieu’s historical inversion, the “social turn” presents now the paradox of a 
“restricted production” through art’s societalisation. The reasons for that become intelligible 
insofar as we recognise neoliberal “large-scale” production as encompassing profoundly 
alienating and atomising social processes, which, nonetheless, depart from the 
undifferentiated subject of Fordism and reproduce themselves through an attentiveness to 
the creative and affective world of the individual. In that sense then, the “social turn” could 
signify an inversion of the inversion. 
Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s inversion is always an attempt to protect artistic production 
from the heteronomy of the fields enveloping it— the fields of power and class relations; 
that is to say, the governing political and economic pressures artistic production is subject 
to. In this light therefore, the “social turn” could be understood in the context of art’s new 
forms of autonomy, advancing further the avant-garde heritage according to which art can 
be considered advanced only insofar as it entails the examination of the matrix of relations 
it is embedded in. There lies the usefulness of Roberts’s formulation of “autonomy as the 
critique of autonomy.” 
What this underlines is that the politicisation of art is not only a political but also an 
artistic decision. The evocation and use, therefore, of political categories constitutes a claim 
to artistic legitimacy as it always is, on the one hand, underpinned by specific antagonisms 
in the artistic field and, on the other, generative of new artistic propositions: the form of the 
socially engaged artwork is the specific configuration of its politicisation. This has profound 
consequences on art’s discourses as it formalises that ultimately the political critique of art’s 
outcomes in relation to the wider socio-economic structures it interacts with is also an artistic 
critique. That the judgement of art is spoken in political and moral terms is primarily a 
reflection of the specific characteristics of this new claim to legitimacy, and not the insidious 
aftereffect of postmodern aesthetic deflation or a pathology of contemporary art criticism.34 
                                                             




MEDIUM UNSPECIFICITY AND FRAMEWORK 
As my proposition for a reading of the “social turn” as a legitimate artistic 
phenomenon—explainable by the political recodification of pressures and antagonisms in 
the field of artistic production— will have made evident, my analysis approaches the 
practices of the “social turn” as phenomena that can be mapped in the history of fine art. 
This separates my discussion from other important contributions to the field which approach 
contemporary socially engaged and participatory practices primarily from the perspective of 
their cross-pollination with theatre and performance, such as Shannon Jackson’s “Social 
Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics” and Jen Harvie’s “Fair Play: Art, Performance 
and Neoliberalism.”35 This distinction by no means seeks to undermine the validity of 
different approaches; after all, as Jackson herself underlines, the multiple pathways to the 
analysis of contemporary socially engaged practice is a reflection of its own “medium-
unspecificity.” This means that the types of engagement that audiences develop when 
exposed to a work of socially engaged art and the frameworks deployed for its interpretation 
are largely dependent on one’s educational background, or even cultural preferences.36  
For a researcher, the variance in responses accommodated by the multidisciplinary and 
post-medium character of these works has serious impact, as it effectively determines the 
directions that research will take. In that regard, my historical contextualisation of the “social 
turn” largely in relation to the history of fine art and especially painting has led me to 
different questions than, for instance, Jackson’s framing of social practices in the trajectory 
of a cultural-philosophical mistrust of art’s infrastructures would. However, as painting has 
been the exemplary artistic discipline upon which the system of art’s autonomy has been 
based— something already reflected by the painters’ early exit from the guild system during 
the Renaissance— it is in painting where the tensions between ideas of the artist as 
autonomous or heteronomous producer can be recognised for all their intensity. In my 
historical discussion therefore, the mapping of the stylistic and social evolution of art 
practice— always in relation to the historical transformations of the social role of the artist— 
has been premised primarily on painting, and in following Thierry de Duve’s position, on 
the emergence of the readymade as its continuation and abandonment.37 
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The truth is that establishing a framework is an inherently subtractive process. Once 
the original premise has been put forward, analysis enters a spiral of exclusions. This process 
often sidelines important aspects that deserve their own place in a critical discussion; my 
own study is certainly guilty in this regard by extending a problem whose foundations were 
already laid in the “primary” texts of the “social turn” since the 1990s. This problem consists 
in a certain indifference toward the sexed dimensions of socially engaged art’s 
intersubjective and affective dimensions. As Helena Reckitt points out, this indifference is 
prevalent in Bourriaud’s contributions, but also evident in the critical responses that followed 
the popularisation of the discourse. Bourriaud’s relational artist is in fact a “universal figure, 
unmarked by sex, race or class,” a conceptualisation which is subsequently projected onto 
relational practices themselves by attempting to erase any non-universalising overtones. 
Such is the case of Christine Hill, as Reckitt remarks, whose emulation of female service 
roles is stripped of any critical implications and abstracted into a gesture of generosity. 
Likewise, Reckitt argues, Bishop’s 2004 critique of Bourriaud’s consensual and convivial 
model, which I discuss in Chapter 4, does not recognise the gendered overtones of 
Bourriaud’s erasure of antagonism; that is, the relation of conviviality with the stereotyping 
of femininity along the binary of agreeableness and disagreeableness.38 In a sense then, that 
my work employs these debates as starting points for analysis means that, corresponding to 
their framing, it also incontrovertibly shares and reproduces some of their flaws. 
There is, however, another reason, significantly more impactful for this omission, and 
it relates directly to the specific historicisation I propose. Exploring the origins of art’s 
societalisation in the political, economic and cultural transformations of the nineteenth 
century and their inscription in the field of artistic production, the politicisation of artistic 
practice out of this predicament in the movements of the historical avant-garde, and the 
connections between Charles Baudelaire and Marcel Duchamp as the teleology of “man of 
the world,” means that ultimately my history is one steeped in a world of male artists and a 
world whose material, political and cultural economies are ultimately governed by men. It 
is undoubtedly hard to imagine what Rirkrit Tiravanija’s series of cooking and serving Thai 
curry would have been without precedents such as Alison Knowles’s Make a Salad (ICA, 
London, 1962). But Make a Salad— or Food for that matter, run by Carol Gooden, Gordon 
Matta Clark and Tina Girouard between 1971-4— are made historically possible by the 
collapse of the binary of interiority and exteriority that follows the readymade and liberates 
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artists from their historically demarcated roles and identities. This historical transformation 
results in what Roberts has described as art’s “adisciplinarity;” namely, the regime of art 
production that, after the abandonment of art’s historical craft-specific and disciplinary 
constraints, empowered the artist to navigate a range of different socioeconomic categories 
and roles which, most importantly, are institutionally intelligible as artistic propositions. 
This by no means implies that in the integration and performance of these various social 
roles and positions, the classed and gendered aspects of the artist disappear or have no impact 
on artistic intention and interpretation. What it means is that my analysis is mostly focused 
on the institutionalisation of non-artistic labour and its origins which ultimately open up the 
way for the inscription of affective, intersubjective and gendered forms of labour into the 
Bourdieusian “space of possibles;” that is, open up the way for their recognition within the 
horizon of possible strategies that correspond to the available positions in the artistic field.39 
Knowles’s extensive engagement with the readymade throughout her career as well as her 
collaboration with Duchamp in 1967— a collaboration which poetically produced 




My thesis is conceptually divided in two parts: a historical and a contemporary one. 
To outline the structure of my work in broad terms, the historical discussions presented here 
aim to foreground the conditions that have made the wider “social turn” possible as a set of 
artistic phenomena, while the contemporary ones highlight and examine its social, economic, 
and political implications; as explained above, these two dimensions are intertwined in the 
artistic-political continuum of socially engaged practice. Fully aware of the vast numbers of 
questions that contemporary socially engaged practices involve and problematise, and 
consequently the impossibility of their conclusive treatment, I have attempted to schematise 
my work through the selection of five topics, each of which corresponds to a chapter. Every 
chapter foregrounds a specific debate, artist, or writer, who in turn serve as a platform for 
the exploration of the wider implications of art’s entanglement in capitalism, modern and 
contemporary. In this final part of my introduction I will briefly lay out the thematics of each 
chapter and outline the main questions that I have attempted to address. 
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The first chapter, titled “Avant-garde, and the Origins of Politicisation,” provides a 
historical framework for my work by engaging with the position of the modern artist in the 
bourgeois society of Western capitalism. I explore the formation of artistic identity in 
relation to two major and interrelated antagonisms which emerge out of the passage to 
liberalism as the predominant Western economic and cultural worldview after the eighteenth 
century. These are the clash between the ideologies of genius and liberal conformity, and the 
tension between artist and market, which can in turn be translated into a tension between 
artist and audience. The central question here is how do these conditions figure in the 
politicisation of the avant-garde artist of modernity? Could politicisation be understood as 
an immanent phenomenon of the contractual and unexceptional liberal worldview and the 
highly competitive environment of the market? If that is the case, what insights can this 
provide with regard to the persistence of forms of politicisation of art practice throughout 
the century? Could the heritage of the historical avant-garde also entail a specific politics of 
artistic recognition? 
The second chapter, titled “The Birth of the Democratic Artist: From Baudelaire to 
Duchamp,” starts off as a response to Claire Bishop’s framing of the prehistory of art’s 
contemporary societalisation in experiments in avant-garde performance, as opposed to the 
history of painting and the readymade.41 This is claim that I contest, demonstrating instead 
that the fundamental conditions for this reorientation unfolding throughout the twentieth 
century and leading up to our times are emerging already in the nineteenth century. As 
evidenced in Baudelaire’s writings, the nineteenth century had already posed the central 
question that all critical art since then is forced to grapple with: how can artistic activity 
navigate the interdependency of the social role of the artistic subject and the socio-technical 
conditions of the work once modernity reveals the volatile relationship thereof? This is a 
question that Duchamp as the teleology of the “man of the world” attempts to answer.  
Following next, “Delegation and Dematerialisation” is the first chapter where the 
practices of the “social turn” are directly engaged. There are two main questions addressed 
here. The first one concerns, in more general terms, the manipulation of artistic and non-
artistic labour with reference to the expansion of the authorial character of the artwork 
throughout the twentieth century. The second question emerges from the intersubjective 
character of socially engaged art, which inevitably directs the discussion of artistic labour 
and its delegation to the question of immateriality as an artistic and political gesture. By 
examining Nicholas Bourriaud’s framing of immateriality as a strategy of resistance in 
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“Relational Aesthetics” I attempt to highlight its renewed significance when examined 
against neoliberalism’s dissolution of the distinction between production and social 
reproduction, and the promise of universal creativity. 
Chapter 4, titled “The Democratic Life of Antagonism,” extends the problematisation 
of the implications of socially engaged practice by engaging with the opposition to 
Bourriad’s convivial and consensual model. Following Bishop’s polemical essay 
“Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” of 2004, which juxtaposed an ideal of radical 
democracy, as articulated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, to liberal consensus 
politics, I turn my attention to the examination of antagonism as an artistic and political 
strategy, using the case of Santiago Sierra as a point of reference. For antagonism to be 
dislodged from the banality of its everyday evocation and revealed for all its implications, 
we need to engage with its seminal political articulation in the work of Carl Schmitt. 
Schmitt’s insights seriously complicate antagonism’s facile conscription in any democratic 
project and perhaps allude to a more productive interpretation of the gambit of the 
antagonistic artist. 
While Chapters 3 and 4 were mainly focused on practices that take place in the spaces 
of art’s institutions, my research for the final chapter, titled “The Moral Community,” turns 
toward community-oriented social practices. To navigate those, I foreground Grant Kester’s 
model of “dialogical aesthetics” and his concept of the “politically coherent community.”42 
Kester’s framework of theory and practice helps illuminate the moral and ethical dimensions 
of artistic conceptualisations of community, underlining thus the observable rupture between 
aesthetic ideas of practice and art’s reclaiming of social responsibility. This inevitably raises 
the question of the relation between moral and aesthetic value systems and their often 
conflictual articulation in socially engaged practices. If we accept that the moral 
disinterestedness of aesthetic art sustains the dominion of artist over audience, then the non-
hierarchical, collaborative ethics of Kester’s proposition makes possible the empowerment 
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AVANT-GARDE, AND THE ORIGINS OF POLITICISATION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter sets itself the task of outlining the historical conditions under which art 
in modernity became concomitant with a language of sociopolitical critique. In this 
examination of the relationship between art and the political, I locate the origins of the 
contemporary conception of art as social intervention and activism in the historical 
politicisation of artistic activity by the avant-gardes of the early twentieth century. The 
origins of this transformation are explored in the constitutive contradictions of a bourgeois 
artistic field, formed in parallel with the liberalisation of Western societies from the late 
eighteenth century onward. In my analysis I identify two particularly impactful changes 
beginning to take shape during that era. Firstly, the tension between artist and audience 
during the displacement of the traditional systems of legitimation through patronage by the 
art market. Secondly, the intellectual shift toward rationalisation and conformity which 
corresponded to modes of social organisation based on the separation of powers, the rule of 
law, and the division of labour.  These are the conditions that underlie the modern artist’s 
crisis of recognition, negotiated in the acceleration of stylistic evolution. The dimension that 
I set out to explore is how different conceptions of art can emerge in response to changes in 
the self-image of artists, and the ways that the bourgeoification of art and life in nineteenth 
century liberal societies affected the formation of artistic self-image. 
The discussion of liberalism I present here is inevitably reductive and incomplete. The 
reason for that is that I approach liberalism from the perspective of its effects on Western 
capitalist societies. In that context liberalism is presented as the political morality which 
established a legal and intellectual framework of protections against the unregulated power 
of central authority. In its rationalisation of the discourse of natural rights, roughly described 
by John Locke’s trinity of “life, liberty, and estate,”43 it instituted a modicum of formal 
equality; absolute power and heredity become harder to justify once a consensus on certain 
inalienable rights has been established. Even though at times the liberal moral conviction for 
legitimate and impartial authority went as far as Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s separation of 
sovereignty, which included the entire population, from executive government,44 liberalism 
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was not monolithically emancipatory. The freedoms it established were in reality far from 
universal and were fully enjoyed but by a relatively small subset of the urban populations of 
Western societies.45 Other times the universalisation of its principles was instrumentalised 
toward the justification of extremely asymmetrical and oppressive systems of government 
in the name of universal improvement.46 Domenico Losurdo has in fact argued that the 
history of liberalism coincided in many ways with the rigidification of relations of 
subjugation; colonialism and racial slavery were phenomena which flourished in parallel 
with the development of liberal thought. In light of these contradictions, Losurdo proposed 
that liberalism be understood as a dialectic of “emancipation and dis-emancipation,” rather 
than an unequivocally liberatory project.47 The middle classes, whose ascendance to power 
liberalism accompanied and legitimised, included groups of people whose prosperity hinged 
historically on the dehumanisation of entire populations. Accumulation always presupposes 
a delimitation between a class of exploiters and exploited which, in the case of slavery and 
colonialism, was essentialised.48 
My intention is not, therefore, to contribute to the mythologisation of liberal thought. 
If there were truly historically progressive characteristics in liberalism these actually lay in 
the secularisation, and thus neutralisation, of the non-negotiable powers of Church and 
Crown. It was only through this process of sublimation of authority that the eventual 
judgement of power through a moral-rational prism became possible. Liberalism, as a 
worldview synergistic with capitalism, established margins to be colonised but at the same 
time paved the way for the critique of its justificatory mechanisms, as these were no longer 
drawn directly from theology. As Karl Marx eloquently described this process of 
secularisation of the bourgeois worldview: “Locke supplanted Habbakuk.”49 On that 
account, liberalism, as it manifested in Western capitalism, coincided with the expansion of 
economic, political and cultural participation, as well as the flattening of certain, previously 
intransigent, hierarchies.  
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At the same time, the impersonal, conformist and commodified nature of nineteenth 
century bourgeois societies produced a disenchanting and highly competitive environment 
which quickly became a source for artistic differentiation; a cultural environment the identity 
of the modernist artist was formed in opposition to. This was the basis for the creation of the 
self-critical dispositions of modernism as they were expressed in the acceleration of stylistic 
change during the second half of the century. I look at the stylistic evolution of modernist 
art as a diagram of differentiation which reflects the pressure for recognition under 
conditions of increased awareness of historicity. This is a predominantly sociological 
approach, largely indebted to the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which examines the internal 
politics of the artistic field, and how artists’ search for a distinct social position impacted the 
history of style.50 The important contribution of Bourdieu’s cultural theory is its codification 
of artistic propositions and manoeuvres (“position-takings” in Bourdieu’s terms) in relation 
to the internal and external pressures that artists are subject to as participants in a professional 
field rather than as self-sufficient, independent carriers of (aesthetic) ideologies. It is these 
pressures and artists’ responses to them that ultimately concretise artistic propositions. This 
relationality of the artist becomes particularly salient with the passage of art economies to 
market regimes during the second half of the nineteenth century, as that unfolded in step 
with the collapse of centralised legitimation mechanisms for cultural production. Under 
these conditions which Bourdieu has brilliantly summarised as the “institutionalisation of 
anomie,”51 modern artists become competitors in a fierce game with no security or 
straightforward path to recognition and consecration. 
The creeping crisis of legitimation that Bourdieu outlines as the generative condition 
of artistic modernism became a fertile ground for the modern permutations of artistic 
“thymos.” This is a concept that I borrow from Francis Fukuyama’s Neo-Hegelian history 
of liberalism, which is arguably a rather unusual source for a discussion on the avant-garde. 
Thymos originally presented one of the components of the psyche in Plato’s tripartite 
construction, but in Fukuyama’s writing it came to represent an all-too-human, universal 
desire for recognition. Fukuyama based his exploration of recognition on Alexandre 
Kojève’s interpretation of the Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic. In Kojève’s reading, Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s parable from the “Phenomenology of Spirit” symbolised the 
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essence of history as the struggle for recognition. Kojève then proceeded to argue that the 
history of humankind can be understood as the struggle of the slave to bridge the gap with 
the master— that is, to be recognised as equal: “the historical dialectic is the dialectic of 
Master and Slave.”52 With the new liberal order inaugurated by the Napoleonic state and the 
institutionalization of formal equality, Kojève, and by extension Fukuyama, announced that 
history entered its final stage. 
It should be nevertheless highlighted that my employment of the concept of “thymos” 
does not carry such extraordinary and far-reaching implications; it is instrumental rather than 
ontological. It neither describes a metaphysics of identity formation and action on the basis 
of an abstract desire for recognition, disembedded from material or psychological 
motivations,53 nor a Geist-like undercurrent of human history; my perspective remains 
fundamentally materialist. Here thymos comes to describe the response of the modern artist 
to that moment of crisis when the relative incongruity between material and non-material 
capital acquisition became impossible to reconcile: the historical moment when cultural 
ideas of prestige could not be recodified into material gain, and material gain came to 
contradict established ideas of prestige and recognition. In my analysis this moment occurred 
when the pre-democratic constitution of the artist collapsed into the disenchanted, 
contractual bourgeois worldview. Thymos is therefore a metonymy for the alienation of the 
artist in nineteenth century liberal societies. 
From that perspective, thymos contributes to the “decynicising” of the Bourdieusian 
artist type of modernity as it reintroduces alienation into what would otherwise be an 
overarchingly mechanistic or calculating struggle for recognition and prestige. And in that 
regard, it helps reinstate the political motivations of artists in an account which tends to 
relegate those to marginal significance. At this point, it is important to underline that the 
suppression of artists’ political intentions is the other side of Bourdieu’s de-idealising 
sociology of art,54 and is therefore a problem that needs to be addressed for any analysis of 
the avant-garde to avoid collapsing into a diagram of mere intensifying claims to distinction, 
dictated simply by a knowledge of the field or personal interest. 
This is not, however, a problem that is unique to sociological approaches. In reality, 
the discontinuity between the avant-garde as a history of stylistic experiment and a 
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programme of political action is at the heart of various art-historical (or literary) approaches. 
Famous examples include Clement Greenberg’s interpretation of the avant-garde as an 
introspective process of self-definition according to the formal predicates unique to each art, 
embracing thus an emphatically apolitical avant-garde,55 or Renato Poggioli’s emphasis on 
the cult of novelty, rhetorically positioned against bourgeois civilisation yet in a symbiotic 
relationship with it.56 On the one hand, therefore, we are faced with the identification of 
modernism and avant-garde through the exclusion of the political turn of the early twentieth 
century, and on the other, with the production of an artistic-political avant-garde that is 
qualitatively a more advanced stage of nineteenth century alienation. This amounts to a 
failure to produce a unified theory that can account for the transition from the aesthetic 
introspection of the nineteenth century to the political extraversion of the early twentieth.   
This is a problem that Peter Bürger’s seminal “Theory of the Avant-Garde” of 1974 
successfully overcame. Bürger’s avant-garde posited the aesthetic self-referentiality of the 
late nineteenth century (the regime in art that Bourdieu has defined on the basis of how a 
form is represented rather than what the form is) as a critical mediation of art’s autonomous 
status in bourgeois society, and therefore as a necessary step before the avant-garde assault 
on this autonomous status. The deepening of political dissociation of the nineteenth century 
became then the precondition for its eventual negation in Dadaism, Surrealism and 
Constructivism.57 Bürger’s theory evidently tied the avant-garde to specific radical political 
commitments— in effect, its success, judged on the basis of Bürger’s criteria, would amount 
to the overcoming of class society. Nevertheless, as the urgency of the political overrode all 
issues of recognition as crucial parameters in the process of politicisation, his theory 
collapsed into the opposition-collusion dialectic: the post-World War II rediscovery of early 
twentieth-century radicalism has nothing to offer but an affirmation of capitalism’s 
propensity for co-option and neutralisation.  
Yet, there is a lesson to be found in the politics of the avant-garde that is not limited 
to its political efficacy, and is still salient today. I want to argue instead, that by incorporating 
the problem of recognition and social position in modernity in the anti-institutional practices 
of early twentieth century avant-garde practices— by synthesising therefore Bourdieu’s and 
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Bürger’s perspectives— we can arrive at a conception of politicisation that is not limited to 
the temporary or permanent, opportunistic or genuine allegiance to a political cause. That is, 
we can arrive at a conception of politicisation as an integral aspect of art practice that was 
crystalised by the historical avant-garde and corresponds to a greater problem of artistic 
legitimation in modernity. When the artist of the avant-garde politicises artistic activity, they 
are rebelling against society but also devising a new role for themselves. This is the model 


























1.2 THE FORMATIVE ANTAGONISMS OF MODERN ART 
1.2.1 THE PROBLEM OF GENIUS IN LIBERALISM 
Friedrich Schiller’s “Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man” of 1794 constitutes 
not only one of the earliest associations of the fields of politics and aesthetics in the modern 
era but a comprehensive inquiry on the socio-politically transformative character of art. In a 
most lucid passage, the philosopher declared: “the most perfect of all works of art—the 
building up of true political freedom.”58 Naturally, Schiller’s conception of art as a political 
entity is not commensurate with the transparent politicisation most familiar to the reader of 
modern or contemporary art. Its political character does not correspond to the praxis of a 
militant, politically engaged artist-activist. According to Schiller, art instead comprises the 
realm wherein the antithetical drives of sense and form— that is, sensuousness and reason—
are unified: art in its highest form brings harmony to the two fundamental conflicting 
impulses of humanity. This synthesis activates art’s fundamentally utopian character: 
Schiller imagined art as constituting the sphere of moral, social and political utopia. Even 
though Schiller’s ideal is rather removed from a fully defined and realisable macroscopic 
social reality, it still manifests a new conception of creativity— free, not subdued by need 
or practicality, always in search for beauty— that has an intrinsically transformative socio-
political nature.59 With Schiller, inner and aesthetic harmony are projected onto the political: 
That we must indeed, if we are to solve that political problem in practice, follow 
the path of aesthetics, since it is through beauty that we arrive at freedom.60 
The maturation of bourgeois culture in the West in the nineteenth century, followed 
by the expansion of liberal ideals, complicated the social role of artists beyond the abstractly 
pedagogic and socially ameliorative position outlined by Schiller. The crux of the problem 
lay in the new socio-political and economic conditions that artists were forced to navigate in 
the ascendant bourgeois societies of the century. With the gradual marketisation of art, the 
financial survival of the modern artist was no longer dependent on the aristocratic patron or 
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the church. Instead, the legitimisation of the modern artist hinged upon individual 
recognition under conditions of a relatively anonymous market. As a result, the established 
social position of the artist in proximity to the representatives of institutional power of the 
ancien régime became increasingly uncertain. The nineteenth century saw the gradual 
formation of a new artistic field that rendered artists’ self-identification with an aristocratic 
elite no longer tenable. This did not simply result in extensive economic uncertainty but also 
to the loss of a recognisable and exceptional social position. This new predicament was 
exacerbated by the salience of the foundational myth of artistic genius; leading up to the 
nineteenth century, the primary source of artistic legitimacy had evolved in relation to a 
concept structured on fundamentally non-democratic ideas.  
As Arnold Hauser has shown, the centrality of genius in the judgement of artistic 
excellence began to take hold in the late fifteenth century Renaissance art discourse. The 
concept of artistic genius posited art as the creation of a distinct, exceptional and autonomous 
personality that channels creative forces irreducible to tradition and rules. Liberated from 
the collective practice of the medieval guild tradition, the new artist of genius was the active 
host and beneficiary of a God-endowed talent which is instantiated, yet not fully expressed, 
in the artwork. The Renaissance conception of the artist highlighted the dichotomy between 
the old, collaborative model of craft to the highly individualistic art of genius.61 With this 
transition, artistic self-actualisation shifted from the performance of transferrable skills to 
the expression of innate, exclusive characteristics that could neither be possessed broadly 
nor imitated. Even historical figures who pioneered a model of the artist as a man of research 
and experiment adopted the rhetoric of genius fully: Leonardo da Vinci, the Renaissance 
embodiment of art’s allegiance with natural philosophy, once famously declared that 
painting “cannot be taught to those not endowed by nature.”62 The logic of genius predicated 
art as the expression of a unique biological basis. The entrance into modernity was thus 
marked by the elevation of genius as the necessary infrastructure of the “genuine” artist; this 
artist-type was the construct of a firmly pre-democratic culture. 
The affinity of genius and art had been well established in the discourse of art by the 
mid-eighteenth century. Denis Diderot acknowledged the possibility of genius in other 
spheres as well, such as language and philosophy, but it was predominantly art that provided 
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the model for his exploration of the concept.63 With Immanuel Kant, however, art became 
the exclusive domain of genius. In the “Critique of Judgement” of 1790 Kant proposed that 
the presence of genius is not simply an indicator or intensifier of art’s quality— something 
desirable but not essential to its production— but the foundation of its very existence. His 
propositions leave absolutely no doubt: “fine arts must necessarily be considered arts of 
genius,”64 and “fine art is possible only as the product of genius.”65 
In Kant’s aesthetics, genius is thus elevated as the precondition and source of fine art. 
At the same time, (fine) art comprises the products of human activity that cannot be governed 
by any “determinate rule;” it cannot come to existence simply through a process of learning 
or imitation, both of which characterise the development of technical skill or scientific 
method.66 If genius constitutes the basis of fine art, and works of fine art are instantiations 
of an innate talent which cannot be taught or transferred through conventional epistemic 
methods, fine art becomes a talent for originality.67 Kantian aesthetics entrenched genius 
specifically within the sphere of art,68 and highlighted originality as one of its quintessential 
qualities.  
The centrality of the aesthetic of genius as a unique talent for originality reflected a 
distinctly modern interest in the new: it reflected the formation of a “regime of novelty,” as 
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Andreas Reckwitz has described it, where the artwork could no longer exist as a soulless 
manifestation of technical expertise, but now had to embody certain innovative, progressive 
qualities.69 At the same time, the theorisation of genius— and by extension, originality— on 
the basis of innate, non-transferrable talents was profoundly at odds with the political, 
economic and cultural restructuring of the nineteenth century. Liberal societies of the time 
were moving toward a more socially-conditioned conception of ability; one that did not 
enclose ability in strict heredity, but acknowledged the impact of “habit, custom, and 
education.”70 This idea was also reinforced by the extensive social organisation of 
industrialised societies on the social division of labour where specialisation made work far 
less expressive: entering modernity, there can be observed a certain tension between the 
adulation of genius in aesthetics and conceptions of human ability in broader socio-economic 
thought. 
With the gradual decline of the institutions which entrenched the idea of excellence 
into a privilege of birth, and the expansion of individual rights and civil liberties, the societies 
of the nineteenth century became the social space where equality and excellence had to 
confront each other. Liberal thought, moving away from the permanence of the older order, 
embraced the dynamism of intellectual, moral and economic improvement at a personal, as 
well as societal or national level. What the inscription of individual and social life in the 
possibility of improvement led to was the de-essentialising of prestige and economic power; 
these could no longer be justified as the exclusive property of a specific caste but were 
theoretically attainable broadly through industriousness and virtue. The notion that 
accomplishment is predestined—the exclusive privilege of certain unique biological 
characteristics— was undercut by the unravelling of the hereditary boundaries between 
social classes.71 The co-presence of the aristocratic belief in the ascriptive nature of 
excellence and the de jure egalitarianism of the bourgeois worldview was not merely a 
paradox that the modern artist had to grapple with, but a dissonance absolutely formative of 
the modern identity. 
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1.2.2 MODERN ARTIST AND AUDIENCE 
The tension between the principles of singularity and equality was exacerbated as the 
material conditions behind the emergence of the tension itself reconfigured the social edifice. 
The ascendance of the bourgeoisie as the new ruling social class in the nineteenth century 
entailed the decline of the traditional aristocratic patronage system and its gradual 
replacement by the market.72 What this meant was that the value of the modern artist was now 
increasingly dependent on the judgement of the new bourgeois art audience. Certainly, it 
must be noted here that the academic exhibition of art was still the predominant avenue for 
recognition well into the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, and especially in France, the 
spectacular character of these exhibitions gradually corroded the exclusivity of judgement 
enjoyed only by an artistic aristocracy. To offer some perspective: from the years 1830 to 
1848 the annual visitors at the Paris Salon were more than one million.73 With this level of 
exposure to a burgeoning new audience, art’s judgement was no longer the non-negotiable, 
exclusive prerogative of a cultural-political elite, and became over time a matter that 
involved an audience of journalists, art dealers, collectors, and even laypersons. By the turn 
of the century this process had been completed; the Salon had splintered into competing 
organisations with the academic artistic aristocracy having lost most of its leverage.74 
The crisis of the Salon, and the consequent displacement of a strict academic peer 
selection system, meant that the judgement of artistic genius now constituted the space 
wherein formerly inscrutable qualities were increasingly subjected to the scrutiny of an 
empowered public. Reckwitz has described this phenomenon as materialising in the 
opposition between the “logic of the producer” and the “logic of the audience:” a climate of 
“permanent controversy within the bourgeois artistic field over who is the legitimate judge 
of an artwork’s novelty value.”75 The coveted prize was, of course, who gets to have the 
definitive say over the quality of the artwork. This created a double bind for artists. On the 
one hand, the modern artist was forced to produce something that meets or creates market 
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demand; in market conditions production for a bourgeois audience is obviously inescapable. 
On the other, openly acknowledging or, even worse, capitulating to the audience’s taste 
signalled the utter degradation of an artist’s work as it signified that the privilege of 
judgement has been irrevocably surrendered. Operating inside an impersonal, competitive 
and expanding market, modern artists were caught up in a dynamic of continuous innovation 
over the judgement of which they maintained increasingly less control. 
The porosity of the surface separating art and audience had been observed already from 
the mid-late eighteenth century; for Johann Wolfgang Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, it was 
an unfortunate consequence of the expanded bourgeois participation in cultural life. 
Improved literacy and economic ability had led to an unprecedented expansion of the social 
base of cultural production and consumption, to the point where significant parts of urban 
populations were actively fashioning themselves as artists or critics. The explosion of 
dilettantism was thus a uniquely bourgeois phenomenon, and for both philosophers, it posed 
an existential threat to the purported eternal ideals of art. The new proximity between art and 
bourgeois social life was a process of contamination and degeneration to mediocrity; this is 
how the “average” artist, as opposed to the artist of genius, was born. Schiller, in his essay 
entitled “On the Necessary Limits in the Use of Beautiful Forms” of 1795, attempted to 
produce a typology of this new relation. He thus postulated that the “genuine” artist 
embodies genius and mastery; the “genuine” artist produces aesthetic representations, 
always balanced by the pursuit of truth. On the other hand, the dilettante embarks on 
endeavours that lack a moral quality: the dilettante’s pursuits are driven exclusively by a 
self-interested, superficial striving for beauty alone.76 
Nevertheless, the philosophers’ correspondence reveals a deeper, more nuanced 
understanding of the phenomenon and its implications.77 Rather than being treated as 
atypical or as a mere sign of cultural decline, these exchanges embed dilettantism in a 
specific historical dialectic: 
Dilettantes are of little use to themselves, to the artist, and to art. Indeed, they 
cause a lot of damage. And yet man, the artist, and art cannot do without an 
enjoying, insightful, and to a certain extent practical participation.78 
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As Paul Fleming points out, Goethe recognised that in that specific historical moment, 
dilettantism— the artistic activity of non-artists— had effectively become integral to art; its 
grounding in a vibrant, energetic socio-cultural environment propelled it forward.79 At the 
same time, however, as larger parts of the new, educated urban populations were crossing 
the line between art enthusiast and self-identified artist, the distinction between genius and 
mediocrity became almost impossible. Goethe, therefore, appears to have been appreciative 
of the social expansion of art as a potential creative force, but extremely cautious regarding 
the shallowness of its products; dilettantism was, in a sense, manifesting as the negative 
mirror of modern art’s vitality. The dangers that it presented extended beyond the simple 
deterioration of the standards of artistic production; as the societalisation of art disrupted the 
clear hierarchies necessary for the formulation of universal, top-down aesthetic programmes, 
the threat of dilettantism was, in fact, becoming existential.80 
Moreover, as Goethe and Schiller observed, the movement between artist and 
dilettante was not unilinear; the effects of dilettantism were not limited to the reinvention of 
non-critics as critics, and non-artists as artists. In reality, the two spheres were locked in a 
process of interpenetration: the expansion of the culturally productive demographic base in 
bourgeois societies risked transforming everyone into a dilettante. Flattening hierarchies of 
taste, dilettantism was normalising unregulated and superficial engagement with art.81 The 
friction between amateur and professional— and by extension, between audience and 
artist— should not, therefore, be understood as the struggle between two extreme, 
entrenched positions but dialectically. The result of this process was not the rigidification of 
artist and audience in defence of doctrinaire aesthetic-ethical positions but their gradual 
osmosis. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this antagonism engendered a variety of 
hybridised formulations on the educational and sociological grounding of the modern artist. 
And by the time we arrive at Baudelaire’s time, dilettantism had assumed the characteristics 
of an aristocratic resistance to the colonisation of creativity by moralism and 
purposiveness.82 
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The modern artistic field was, therefore, fundamentally antagonistic. On the one hand, 
the expansion and empowerment of the bourgeois art audience delegitimised the universality 
of aesthetic authority; taste no longer embodied the statute of a central authority, the cultural 
preferences of an elite or the deliberations of an exclusive professional community. On the 
other hand, the inability of historical institutions to withstand the steep increase in the 
numbers of practicing artists created a fiercely competitive and uncertain environment.83 
Operating in a system based on the public sale of art, the community of artists were subject 
to the particularly onerous realities of the artistic profession: they were exposed to the 
insecurity and risks associated with conventional forms of labour, while lacking the means 
to mitigate those. Navigating an environment of shifting tastes within a system driven less 
and less by direct patronage, artists had now no guarantee that their, unquantifiable and 
lacking use-value, work would satisfy any needs and, thus, be absorbed by the market.84 In 
other words, the bourgeois stage of art threw into sharp relief modern artists’ position as 
“hybrid” labourers: neither fully autonomous, as they were reliant on the market, nor 
heteronomous, as they were positionally unable to enjoy the benefits of production tied to 
the satisfaction of concrete or pre-established demand.85 This fundamentally alienating 
contradiction lay at the heart of the bourgeois institution of art; the very same economic 
conditions underpinning the development of art as an autonomous institution were now 
summarily deconstructing its foundational myths. In the bourgeois artistic field the promise 
of art as “purposiveness without purpose,” and artistic labour as “play” were gradually 
revealing themselves as untenable illusions. 
 
1.2.3 THE SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION 
As a major consequence of the new material conditions of art, the ideas safeguarding 
the stability of artistic identity were severely contested. For the modern artist the tensions 
written into the bourgeois artistic field disrupted the continuity between self-image and 
social position. The heart of the problem lay in the firmly pre-democratic character of the 
ideas and values constitutive of the artist. These ideas and values were now violently 
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subjected to a process of bourgeoification, and its conformist imperatives of productivity, 
efficiency and rationality. Under these conditions, the recodification of pre-existing cultural 
ideas of prestige into material gain became increasingly difficult. The predicament of the 
identity of the modern artist was therefore symptomatic of a wider socio-cultural shift. The 
dissociation of artist and cultural-political authority, as well as the creeping democratisation 
of art into a market economy led to the dissolution of those specific conditions that fostered 
the exceptional nature of artistic identity. This shift— the social and cultural institution of 
egalitarianism— has of course been one of the hallmarks of Western liberal modernity.  
Francis Fukuyama provides an interesting perspective here: the rationalisation of 
social and economic life in liberal societies advanced in step with the suppression of the 
thymotic components of human identity. What this means is that the standardised, 
contractual nature of social life in bourgeois societies was largely incompatible with social 
and cultural formulations rooted in the desire for recognition as exceptional or superior: these 
were instead the ideas that describe “megalothymia.” In Fukuyama’s analysis of the modern 
politics of recognition, bourgeois hostility towards megalothymia was not merely the 
product of vague resentment. On the contrary, its political origins lay incontrovertibly in 
megalothymia’s centrality to the existential legitimisation of the older aristocratic order. 
Unlike the bourgeoisie, the aristocratic reproduction of class had historically evolved on the 
basis of a variety of unproductive, arbitrary and seemingly useless protocols: prevalent 
among them the ability for war and military conquest.86 The bourgeois logic dictated that 
this antiquated, irrational and ultimately parasitical claim to power could not withstand the 
rise of the efficient, wealth-producing middle classes. And indeed, the socio-political and 
economic structures of late mercantile and industrial capitalism did not outgrow feudalism 
simply in material terms. That is, the historical transition to capitalism was not limited to 
what Marx described as the emergence of a new social order out of the maturation of specific 
productive forces bound to destroy the old.87 Capitalist modernity also entailed the gradual 
elimination of the moral dispositions that sustained what was now increasingly perceived as 
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the decadent and inefficient, aristocratic worldview.88 In the process of liberalisation of the 
West, the secularisation of natural law, the separation of powers, and the transubstantiation 
of fundamental antagonisms into economic competition produced a juridical-political 
framework designed to domesticate megalothymia: to denude the desire for recognition of 
its pre-democratic and existential dimensions.89 With its suppression, formally egalitarian 
liberal societies were able to achieve a degree of order and stability on the basis of assumed 
mutually beneficial socio-economic activity.90 
 
1.2.4 LOSER WINS: SELF-OTHERING, REJECTION AND AESTHETIC 
INNOVATION 
The incongruity between the pre-democratic logic of artistic legitimation and 
bourgeois conformity inscribed the formation of identity in a process of self-othering— 
socially and aesthetically. As Nathalie Heinich has argued, this fundamental contradiction 
was integral to the creation of a unique identity in the history of Western culture: one which, 
rejecting bourgeois norms as symbols of mediocrity and stagnation, now sought excellence 
in social and cultural margins.91 This, simultaneously marginal and elitist, social identity 
marked the passage into what Heinich has described as “singularity realm.” The “singularity 
realm” was the modern aesthetic paradigm which centred abnormality, originality, and 
individuality as its prominent values. With the articulation of excellence on these rather 
subcultural characteristics, singularity eventually became synonymous with eccentricity, 
marginality and anti-conformism.92 Because the post-Renaissance history of art dictated that 
great art has to be based on the revision and refinement of older models and produce similarly 
universalisable works, beauty in nineteenth century academic art became “the ideal of 
regular features,”93 collapsing ideal beauty into the stereotypical. For the artist of the 
“singularity realm” this beauty came to symbolise a distinctly modern form of ugliness, in 
stark contrast with the atypical, the new, and the transgressive; in stark contrast with the 
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antinormativity of the modern.94 The entry into the singularity realm intensified the rate of 
aesthetic experimentation in modernity, bolstering, thus, a nascent culture of constant 
revaluation, revision, and change.95 
As artistic individuation began to draw from the imaginary of rejection, the recuperation 
of artistic authority came to be mediated by the magnification of the non-conformist 
characteristics of artistic identity. In this process of self-othering, modern artists entrenched 
themselves into the position of socio-cultural outsiders: aesthetically impenetrable and 
unyielding to social imperatives. With the formation of an artistic identity in opposition to 
bourgeois social and aesthetic norms, modern artists allowed or even facilitated their own 
reflexive rejection by the general public; that is, in the realm of singularity, the modern artist 
has to be the subject and the object of rejection. Rather than seek reconciliation with the new 
bourgeois art public, the radical artist of modernity sought to magnify the principles 
underlying their original rejection by cultivating a socio-psychological and aesthetic identity 
precisely based on those. The controversies surrounding the histories of Gustave Courbet, 
Édouard Manet, Vincent van Gogh, and Paul Gauguin underline the salience of the 
“misunderstood” or “maligned genius” artist-type of the nineteenth century. These histories 
embed the navigation of modern crisis in a mythology of rejection, scandal and self-
marginalisation. The prehistory of the avant-garde can be therefore reframed as the history 
of the assertion of individuality and the expediency thereof. By the early twentieth century, 
the dialectic of alienation and rejection had become so important that it was now seen as 
integral to the formation of artistic identity.96 
This development— the progression of artistic positions on the basis of rejection— is 
encapsulated by Bourdieu as the institution of a logic of “loser wins” among modernist 
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artists.97 The host of changes and transformations during the second half of the nineteenth 
century that we have already touched upon— with the most critical among them being the 
“democratisation” of the profession leading to an influx of new professional artists, the 
decline of centralised cultural legitimation through a state-academic system, and the 
expansion of the grip of market economies on artistic production— revealed the extreme 
stratification that governed the artistic field and crystalised the oppositional relations 
between artistic elites and underclasses. As the former were either still institutionally secure 
or even in a position to benefit from the socio-economic conditions of capitalist “large-scale” 
production, the latter were compelled to develop systems of recognition and prestige based 
on the inversion of the predominant economic logic. This compelled specific sections of 
unrecognised, dissident or marginalised artists to adopt a logic of “restricted” production— 
that is, production of art that does not target a wide audience, is not primarily motivated by 
superficial economic concerns, and advances through the production of difference. The very 
same self-styling of modern artists in opposition to the predominant social and artistic 
conventions that exacerbated their vulnerability to economic failure uniquely positioned 
them at the same time as prime candidates for the recognition— that is, the acquisition of 
symbolic capital— from their peers. 
Interestingly, Thierry de Duve takes this “loser wins” logic even further: the strategic 
employment of rejection was not simply woven into the historical development of the avant-
garde, but, effectively, of explanatory importance historically. As he writes, in the early days 
of modernism behind every meaningful advance lay a careful interrogation of two questions: 
what to reject, and why to be rejected. This was the mechanism that activated “the historical 
law of painting:” the notion that the art of tomorrow is the art rejected today.98 Scandal and 
derision constituted then the preparatory stages of vindication in the annals of history: 
”[w]hat is today laughed at we see tomorrow as astonishing and admirable.”99 In this advance 
of history through the activation of a mechanism of rejection, art’s significance gradually 
came to be identified with the direction and magnitude of its innovative qualities. As 
adherence to convention could no longer suffice in the expanded and precarious bourgeois 
artistic field, the exigency of recognition propelled a series of successive fundamental 
stylistic changes— of “abandonments.” The trajectory that this history of “abandonments” 
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spanned over is now well-established. Within a few decades the foundational principles of 
art’s centuries-long post-Renaissance history had been dismantled: from chiaroscuro to 
linear perspective, Euclidean space to figuration.100 
It needs to be underlined here, that the modern notion of rejection was not abstract or 
allegorical anymore— it was not a mere reiteration of older Romantic tropes according to 
which a genuine and meaningful experience of art can be attained through the transgression 
of norms and boundaries. For many modern artists it had taken the form of a concrete, 
substantive philosophy of history; one wherein failure prefigured ultimate recognition. So 
pervasive were these ideas that some modern artists even attempted to ritually invoke their 
own failure, to stage their defeat as a means of accelerating this economy of rejection. For 
instance, Robert Jensen suggests that the triumphant reception of Paul Cézanne by the 
Viennese Secessionists in 1903 was, at least partially, motivated by this narrative. By 
receiving Cézanne, the precursor of Cubism and pioneer of a style that clearly undermined 
the economic Jugendstil of the Viennese Secession, with honours that far surpassed his own 
recognition in France, the Secessionists were consciously creating a metaphor of their own 
failure and rejection.101 Yet, it has to be highlighted that these ideas did not spring from an 
absurd, quasi-religious faith in some force of providence over the shunned, mistreated artist 
of modernity: by the end of the nineteenth century there was already in place an 
infrastructure that could support, or at times even encourage experimentation— commercial 
galleries often relied on the promotion of novelty, while the various Central European 
Secessions allowed progressive artists to develop marketable group identities. The attention 
that these spaces generated helped legitimise the progressive connotations of rejection. In 
France, however, the accommodation of the unorthodox— and thus new– artistic tendencies 
was not limited within the sphere of activities of an upstanding, enlightened citizenry or 
artistic elite, but was in fact mandated by the state itself: the patron of the Salon des Refusés 
was no other than Napoleon III. 
 The legitimating presence of Napoleon III had far-reaching implications. With the 
Salon des Refusés, the dissemination of radical modern art ceased being a private endeavour 
of limited reach but was now under the aegis of the universal character of the state. The 
Salon des Refusés was in that regard a de facto and de jure normalisation of artistic 
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innovation; rejection by the older generation of the official Salon now amounted to 
recognition by the modern artist’s contemporaries. The Salon des Refusés, however, did not 
simply provide the social space for a symbolic affirmation of said link, but the space of its 
activation in the present. The vindication of novelty was no longer a mere promise deferred 
to a vague posterity: the moments of rejection and recognition began to converge.102 This 
opened up a parallel progressive institutional history that modern artists could become part 
of if they were willing to test its limits. It created a heritage that artists could participate in 
only insofar as they were committed to challenging its fixity.  
As Jensen points out, until the early years of the twentieth century modernist practices 
were indeed understood as belonging to a history paralleling, and opposed to, official Salon 
culture. More specifically, they were implicitly associated with the Impressionist tradition 
and were, thus, classified as subsets thereof. In the first decade of the twentieth century, 
however, this continuity was disrupted; the various semi-official and alternative salons that 
had recently been established, such as the Salon des Indépendants and Salon d'Automne, 
shifted the discourse of novelty from continuity to disruption. Postimpressionism— 
represented by the work of artists such as Paul Cézanne, Georges Seurat, Paul Gauguin and 
Vincent van Gogh— was presented not as a continuation of Impressionism, but as its 
critique: a departure from it. 
As Jensen correctly underlines, the reception of Postimpressionism, separated and in 
opposition to Impressionism, signified the transition from a synthesising understanding of 
modern art’s historicity to a narrative of exclusion— one defined by the competition between 
various factions, not as a means of admission into a progressive “canon,” but as an attempt 
to monopolise and redefine it in their own image.103 This was arguably a consequence of the 
expansion of de Duve’s parallel history of “abandonments” in an increasingly 
commercialised environment— that is, under conditions which incentivised aesthetic, and 
sometimes ideological, autonomisation. By the time Filippo Tommaso Marinetti penned the 
Futurist Manifesto in 1909, the progression of art practice was no longer perceived as the 
struggle between vaguely progressive and academic or bourgeois artists— the very 
declaration of Futurist revolt came with the emphatic affirmation of its own ultimate radical 
negation and overcoming, “[f]or art can be nought but violence, cruelty and injustice.”104 
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Meanwhile, for the artists of Berlin Dada the rhetoric accompanying the vehement 
repudiation of Expressionism was often more caustic even than that employed against the 
various platitudes and failures of mainstream culture. The self-determination of Berlin Dada 
was grounded equally in the war against the prevalent, “philistine” bourgeois culture and a 
complacent, domesticated modernism; in fact, Dadaist critique often treated these two as 
indistinguishable.105 
 
1.3 THE POLITICS OF THE AVANT-GARDE 
1.3.1 THE DOUBLE CHARACTER OF AVANT-GARDE CRITIQUE 
For Peter Bürger, the acceleration of stylistic change evident in the modernist 
preoccupation with form of the late nineteenth century reflected an internalisation of 
oppositionality; the sublimation of opposition into a refusal to engage with social realities 
outside art. The self-referential focus on art’s own formal laws during that era was therefore 
only superficially the result of liberated, subjective stylistic decisions; most importantly, it 
was a symptom of the social organisation of art in bourgeois society. Art’s distanciation from 
social relevance in favour of an inward turn toward form reflected the deeper reality of its 
separation from social or moral usefulness in bourgeois society. In the inward containment 
of critique, Bürger recognised a transformative process that had begun earlier in history— 
its earliest manifestation being the erosion of the pedagogic elements of the neoclassical 
tradition106— and eventually found its apogee in the anchoritism of Aestheticism. 
Unlike its earlier historical stages, art in bourgeois societies lacked a concrete social 
function; it was no longer sacral or in the service of aristocratic power.107 Art’s separation 
from other social structures formed the basis of its autonomy; bourgeois art became its own 
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individual institution, separated from the “praxis of life.”108 Artificially isolated from broader 
socio-historical realities, the bourgeois institution of art served as a source of reprieve from 
the depersonalisation of capitalism: a space where ideas ostracised by capitalist instrumental 
rationality could survive as aesthetic representations, unable to effect any meaningful 
change.109 This was according to Bürger the historical basis of the self-critical, introspective 
turn of modernism. At the heart of its unsociability lay the disenchanting realisation that, in 
conditions of bourgeois autonomy, art was structurally cut off from any meaningful 
interaction with broader socio-political life. The self-critical development of its own formal 
and historical laws crystalised thus the conditions of its bourgeois autonomy and highlighted 
the limits of a possible critique from within institutional parameters. With Aestheticism these 
limits— in essence, art’s political inconsequentiality— became art’s own content.110 
As much a historical failure as a way out of an impasse, Aestheticism ironically paved 
the way for the historical avant-garde of the early twentieth century. By demonstrating that 
the inward containment of oppositionality failed to free artist and art from the new tensions 
that their commodified degradation in capitalism thrusted them onto, but instead contributed 
to a self-replicating crisis, it created the conditions for a new radical critique— this time 
directed against art’s institutional enframing. The new, liberated forms of avant-garde 
creativity would then form the basis for a comprehensive and radical renegotiation of art and 
life. In the historical avant-garde Bürger identified the completion and negation of the socio-
politically ineffective introspection of the nineteenth century. However, for Bürger, the 
ultimate goal of the historical avant-garde was not to simply deconstruct the bourgeois 
ideologies that entrenched art as an autonomous category and condemned it to the production 
and consumption of socially irrelevant aesthetic representations, but to produce a sweeping 
critique of life in capitalism. And, by doing so, to carve out a path out of it through a new 
life praxis. Therefore, it was not just the origins of the alienation of the modern artist that 
were political; at the heart of Bürger’s theorisation lies the notion that the historical avant-
garde was fundamentally a wide-reaching political project. 
The critique of art’s autonomous status as the symbolic and material destruction of the 
relations of production in capitalism introduces, however, certain problems as it produces an 
inevitably underdetermined, politically, avant-garde history. As has already been discussed 
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in this chapter, the socioeconomic and cultural alienation of the modern artist can indeed be 
traced in material changes that took place during the bourgeoification of art. This does not 
however necessarily entail that artistic anti-institutional activity was fully determined by 
coherent ideological motivations. Having registered the tangible problems that modern 
artists were faced with— the transformation of the art system to a market economy and its 
oversaturation, followed by the degradation of the social position of the artist through the 
decline in the rarity of the artistic product— the priority that Bürger assigns to the ideological 
and political origins of the avant-garde appears rather overstated. Ironically, this approach 
tends to subsume the material basis of alienation of the nineteenth century under a critique 
of capitalism writ large. It is therefore a perspective that overlooks how the socio-cultural 
realignment of modernity impacted on the traditional avenues of economic survival and 
recognition in favour of the rather abstract possibility of revolutionary change through art. 
As a consequence, it does not consider the discrepancy between the ideas and values that 
artists were thought to embody in the past, and the new characteristics of the bourgeois 
artistic field as a particularly impactful factor. 
These shortcomings, however, reflect broader epistemic questions regarding our 
understanding of the relation between the artistic and the political; that is, the field wherein 
artists operate and its interaction with other social structures and forces. Bürger’s 
prioritisation of the ideological motivations of the avant-garde essentially hinges on the 
presupposition that avant-garde artists operated primarily in the political— that they were 
principally agents of political action, rather than professionals in a field with specific 
characteristics. By suppressing all movement within the field through the lens of political 
radicalism, the artist of the avant-garde becomes then hyper-ideological; the power of the 
new is the power of a new politics, severed from the already salient dialectic of novelty and 
rejection as an artistic politics of recognition. The sphere of the aesthetic and the political 
become thus coterminous; a political gesture within the sphere of the aesthetic collapses into 
a political declaration in the arena of politics.  
In reality, however, among the movements that Bürger classifies under the historical 
avant-garde only Russian Constructivism presented instances where that line was truthfully 
traversed; undoubtedly, to no small extent due to its development inside revolutionary 
conditions and to the fact that the identification of the artist with a specific political position 
happened under the aegis of the post-revolutionary state. On the other hand, the Dadaist 
playful alignment with communism declared in “What is Dadaism and What Does It Want 
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in Germany” of 1919 was repudiated by the “Manifesto of Proletarian Art” five years later.111 
Finally, the entire history of the André Breton-led Surrealist group could be re-narrated as a 
series of implosions and excommunications that followed the various unsuccessful attempts 
to coerce its members into ceding their relative autonomy as artists. Bürger, by 
underdetermining the historical avant-garde on the basis of its proclaimed political 
programmes, collapses the homology between the position of the avant-garde artist and the 
revolutionary historical subject as a relation of identity. Nevertheless, the affinity between 
avant-garde artist and political actor has historically been fraught in tension: it has been 
incomplete, unstable and often circumstantial— a relationship between roles at times 
intersecting but never resulting in the internalisation of political utility as the primary object 
of art. This is a problem that even the 1920s Soviet avant-gardes eventually had to reckon 
with. Boris Arvatov recognised in 1926 the signs of a dead-end in Productivism’s alliance 
with the factory system of production in socialism:112 a realisation which highlights the 
uneasy relationship of advanced artistic and political project and foreshadowed avant-
garde’s ultimate devaluation and fall out of favour under Stalin’s rule.113 
The logic underlying Bürger’s perspective is thrown into relief in his attempt to 
hierarchise the political and artistic derivations of avant-garde history: “Dadaism, the most 
radical movement within the European avant-garde, no longer criticizes schools that 
preceded it, but criticizes art as an institution, and the course its development took in 
bourgeois society.”114 While Bürger correctly identified that the nature of Dadaist critique 
was evidently not monolithically aesthetic but broadly cultural and political, this broader 
critique could not be articulated outside specific disputes with older or concurrent rival art 
movements. To downplay, or outright deny, this oppositional relationship is to suppress one 
of the most salient and effective mechanisms that the struggle for dominance within a field 
employs. In fact, the Dadaists most definitely singled out artists and movements as enemies 
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to be ridiculed and attacked ferociously; the difference being that Dadaist critique interpreted 
them in relative continuity with a decadent and stagnant bourgeois culture, adding thus 
gravity to their various polemical declarations.115 And Dadaist artists did, in fact, understand 
their work in relation to specific artists and movements whose work they perceived as 
exemplary of broader cultural and political decline. It was only through the attack on the 
particular that the Dadaist critique of the general— of the cultural and political structures of 
the capitalist machine— could be concretised. 
Acknowledging, however, the banal material or thymotic reality underlying the avant-
garde adversarial ethos should not be interpreted as an attempt to denude it of all possible 
ideological motivations and political functions. Otherwise a simple reiteration of Poggioli’s 
thesis wherein the avant-garde artist is embedded in a rather symbiotic relationship with the 
development of Western liberal democracy would suffice.116 While Poggioli’s approach 
enables a demythologised reading of the avant-garde— not as the emancipatory praxis of a 
heroic modern artist anymore— it also leads to the erasure of its professed programmatic 
intentions. In short, demythologisation comes at the cost of depoliticisation. What this results 
in is a vision of the avant-garde as a relatively continuous history instantiating the cult of 
novelty in varying degrees. This is, however, a framework that is reductive even in strictly 
aesthetic terms: Poggioli offers no historical law with explanatory value that can account for 
the aesthetic chasm between movements such as Impressionism and Dadaism— let alone, 
explain the derivation of their vastly different conceptions on the nature and social role of 
art. 
The challenge, therefore, consists in formulating a theory that retains Bürger’s 
historicising rigour but grounds it in the dynamics of the bourgeois artistic field; to propose 
a framework that admits the political derivations and motivations of the historical avant-
garde but filters those through the conditions of artistic recognition in modernity. Rather 
than being driven by art’s inability to interpret life and, thus, catalyse social change, I would 
then like to suggest that the radicalism of the historical avant-garde was born from the 
impossibility of change in the artistic field outside of a broader socio-political 
transformation. The double character of the avant-garde critique— against bourgeois art, and 
the conditions of its social separation— was embodied in the demand for the restoration of 
the modern artist to a distinct, socio-historical position through the overcoming of the 
bourgeois institution of art. The revolt against art’s loss of a social function occurred because 
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this loss was symptomatic of the modern crisis of the artist herself. This had been anticipated 
several decades earlier when Olinde Rodrigues, Henri de Saint-Simon’s disciple, linked the 
restoration of modern artists’ dignity with the prospect of broad transformative social 
change— with the prospect of revolution: 
And if today we seem to play no role or at best a very secondary one, that has been the 
result of the arts' lacking a common drive and a general idea, which are essential to 
their energy and success.117 
 
1.3.2 THE DEATH OF THE AVANT-GARDE? 
The historical avant-garde as a project of revolutionary political-cultural change 
failed— about that there is very little room for doubt in Bürger’s account. If there was any 
success to it at all, that lay in its exposing the structure and function of the bourgeois 
institution of art. With the material conditions of capitalism remaining intact, the avant-garde 
was gradually absorbed into the institutional apparatus it had originally set out to destroy, 
recalling the truism according to which capitalism, unlike Illiberal cultures which tend to 
eliminate threats, incorporates the new and survives through its critiques. As Frederic 
Jameson has presciently remarked, assimilation, after all, is “an immanent rhythm of 
capitalism.”118 For Bürger, the institutionalisation of the avant-garde was an act of cultural 
rehabilitation; an elimination, albeit “false,” of the distance between art and life.119 It was 
consequently avant-garde’s effective death, followed by its reanimation in standardised, 
imitative and devitalised formulations: radical only in name, and performed inside the 
commercial environments of a hypertrophic Culture Industry. Given the explanatory value 
that Bürger assigned to the attack on autonomy as avant-garde’s operative mechanism, we 
are led to its central aporia: the impossibility to effectively demarcate the point after which 
the attack against art’s autonomy ceased to constitute an act of revolt against the artificiality 
of its enshrined status in capitalism, and became a symptom of its capitulation to market 
forces. 
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Bürger’s conception of the avant-garde is given thus a particularly unsatisfactory 
closure, one marked by repetition and complicity. Bürger’s conclusion is the almost 
inevitable outcome of its premises; the avant-garde could have never succeeded outside a 
deep and comprehensive transformation of production relations, as the critique of the 
bourgeois institution of art was just one aspect of the critique of capitalist social and 
productive relations. This overdiagnosis of political radicalism in historical avant-garde 
formulations as a central criterion for avant-garde’s legitimacy allows no other path than the 
dismissal of the various neo-avant-gardes of the second half of the twentieth century— and 
therefore, the dismissal of subsequent practices that draw their condition of possibility from 
the contestation of the art’s autonomy— as tokenised and defanged reiterations of a radical, 
yet ill-fated idea. The weakness of Bürger’s conclusion is not merely its foundation on a 
historicist conception of the avant-garde, essentially collapsing the category itself with its 
historical conditions as John Robert has pointed out,120 but, that the very same historical 
conditions which supersede the category are in fact sustained by the negation of the relative 
autonomy of the artistic field. That is, the framing itself, historicist or not, has already 
eschewed the impact that the struggle for recognition has had on any movement inside the 
artistic field. This is why the assessment of the historical impact of the avant-garde on the 
basis of the political connotations of its postwar institutionalisation should not be allowed to 
overshadow its contemporary relevance: its enduring new conception of art based on the 
diffusion of the political as the object itself of art— a phenomenon outside which we cannot 
grasp the character of contemporary experiments in socially engaged art. 
If the historical avant-garde emerged as the culmination and negative resolution of 
nineteenth century struggles over art’s autonomy— in the wake of the defeated strategy of 
socio-political resignation as suggested in Bürger’s account, and the ensuing new energies 
seeking to carve out a historical role for the artist beyond a system of generalised 
commodification— we have to confront then the possibility that the ultimate and perhaps 
most critical impact of the historical avant-garde lies not in the alleged disclosure of 
autonomy’s historical obsolescence but, in fact, in its reconstruction as the critique of 
autonomy, as John Roberts has argued.121 This is in reality the other side of Bürger’s narrative 
of avant-garde’s institutional recuperation: there is no other way to interpret avant-garde’s 
“false” sublation of art and life in postwar, neo-avant-garde practices if not as a definite 
autonomisation of the avant-gardist critique of art’s autonomy. 
                                                             
120 John Roberts, "Revolutionary Pathos, Negation, and the Suspensive Avant-Garde," New Literary 
History 41, no. 4 (2010): 717-30, 717 
www.jstor.org/stable/23012703 (Accessed 04/10/2019) 
121 John Roberts, Revolutionary Time and the Avant-Garde (London; New York: Verso, 2015) 
55 
 
Beyond, however, the understanding of autonomy-as-the-critique-of-autonomy as a 
manifestation of defeat and institutional recuperation I would like to suggest an 
interpretation of the postexistence of the historical avant-garde as a process akin to 
routinisation, to use Max Weber’s term. Routinisation for Weber constitutes the necessary 
and inevitable process that every revolution is subject to if it is to exist beyond accident and 
thus avoid historical dissolution: it is the process that every successful disruption needs to 
undergo in order for it to exist beyond the realm of exception.122 It is not therefore the 
humiliating subordination under the old structure but the means by which the new can 
survive, producing a stable order beyond its originating moment. 
The avant-garde was originally founded on the interpenetration of the sphere of the 
political and the artistic. On the one hand, it radicalised the old adage that art can participate 
in broad historical change. On the other, it proclaimed that the artistic field can be 
transformed through the change of the relations of production and consumption. With the 
material conditions of capitalism in place and, therefore, the categories of artist and artwork 
persisting in some form, avant-gardism survives in a conception of art wherein the 
exploration of the social position of artist and audience has become art’s object. The 
recuperated avant-garde position becomes then: art creates the conditions for the negotiation 
of the social position of artist and audience in relation to the work. After the avant-garde we 
can have no important art that is not an interrogation of the social identity of the artist and 
its imprint on the artwork; art that does not acknowledge the political nature of its structure. 
This is the dialectic that produces meaning and valorises the avant-garde artwork. The 
abandonment of this commitment constitutes a cacophonous disruption of this historical 
logic. And whenever this critically new horizon that establishes the coordinates for the 
position of artist vis-à-vis audience and society has been ignored, and art hints at a return to 
                                                             
122 For a discussion of Weber’s analysis of routinisation and its dialectical relationship with the historical 
exception (as embodied by the charismatic authority) see: 
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, 
ed. Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1947), 363-385. 
Routinisation/banalisation is also the process that Bourdieu alludes to in his periodisation of avant-garde 
movements on the basis of the emergence of new artistic positions through returns to past styles over the 
course of the twentieth century. Bourdieu’s analysis of this process of recurrence-through-difference, 
specifically once per generation, as the prominent logic of the artistic field after the avant-garde opens up an 
interesting conversation with Hal Foster’s psychoanalytically grounded “Nachträglichkeit” (deferred action) 
as the link between the historical avant-garde and later neo-avant-garde iterations. These two theories are in 
fact more similar than would superficially be understood. While Bourdieu interprets such returns as occurring 
after the historical intervals necessary for the formation of an art public which is equipped to “read” the 
avant-garde work, Foster’s theory stresses the traumatic character of the historical avant-garde which re-
emerges and can ultimately be negotiated only from the safety of historical distance. 
See Bourdieu, The Production of Belief,” in The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Literature and Art, 
74-111, 109. 
Hal Foster, “Who is Afraid of the Neo-Avant-Garde,” in Hal Foster, The Avant-Garde at the End of the 
Century (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1996), 1-33. 
56 
 
the practice of the integral, free (as opposed to employed) and expressive artist, it cannot but 
be opposed as a banal, anachronistic attempt at depoliticisation.123 After the avant-garde, art 
is political because its object is, with varying intensity, the interrogation of the social 
relations of the artist to the institutions of art. The political character of art consists in the 
politicisation of the relation of the artwork to a specific socio-political cause, and the 
sometimes less visible politicisation of the matrix of relations that the artwork is embedded 
in. If the historical conclusion of the avant-garde presented the defeat of the former, the latter 
persists and permeates every decision of contemporary socially engaged practices: the 
flattening of hierarchies between media, the waning presence of the author, the use of 
humble materials—or even, the complete devaluation thereof. 
As artistic practices and their meaning are always ultimately situated in and delimited 
by a “space of possibles” within the artistic field, outside of which they cannot be recognised 
as legitimate artistic propositions, during the institution’s figuring as the indisputable site of 
the battle for artistic legitimation, it was within its spaces where the artistic programmes of 
the critique of autonomy could unfold. The post-avant-garde reframing of the artwork’s 
political critique as the critique of the relations that the artwork is embedded in created 
therefore an expanded “formalism” wherein the artwork’s subject encompasses the relations 
between artist, artwork and audience. After the 1960s, this delicate equilibrium starts to 
crack under the greater social expansion of artistic activity as well as the unterritorial 
expansion of the institution itself; under these conditions, the critique of the artwork’s 
relations begins to intersect with the production of relations beyond those fostered and 
reproduced institutionally. Consider, for example, how Hans Haacke’s exploration of 
systems moves from the re-enactment of water’s status changes in the various renditions of 
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Condensation Cube (Fig.1) between 1963-5 to the observation of a system that binds art 
institution, oligarchic politics, imperialism and voter behaviour in MoMA Poll (Fig.2) of 
1970. Or how the critique of the museum becomes a critique of the exclusion of the female 
artist through the critique of the gendered work, to ultimately extend to the unacknowledged, 
denigrated labour that sustains collective life in Mierle Laderman Ukeles’ move from the 
“maintenance” performances (Fig.3) of the early 1970s to the Touch Sanitation performances 
(Fig.4) of 1979-1980. 
 
 
Figure 1 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.            
Figure 1 Hans Haacke, Condensation Cube, 1965/2006 
 
Figure 2 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 2 Hans Haacke, MoMA Poll, 1970 
 
Figure 3 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 3 Mierle Laderman Ukeles, Hartford Wash: Washing, Tracks, Maintenance: Outside, 193. 
 
 
Figure 4 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
















THE BIRTH OF THE DEMOCRATIC ARTIST: FROM BAUDELAIRE TO 
DUCHAMP 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In her 2012 study entitled “Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of 
Spectatorship,” Claire Bishop explored the historical origins of the contemporary 
societalisation of art in three moments of the early twentieth century avant-garde: Futurist 
public performance, Soviet 1920s Proletkult and mass spectacle, and finally the turn from 
the cabaret to the open public during the Dada Season of 1921. These three historical 
precedents constitute, according to the writer, the prehistory of contemporary socially 
engaged practice; contesting therefore its lineage in the history of painting and the 
readymade, Bishop’s analysis inscribes contemporary socially engaged practice in the 
evolution of avant-garde performance.124 Although the distinction between painting-
readymade and performance might initially appear inconsequential, especially given the 
“medium-unspecificity” of contemporary practices, this is a framing that needs to be 
addressed as it conceals the deeper historical causes of the societalisation of art and more 
importantly, how these were specifically inscribed in the field of artistic production. That is 
to say, what new artistic strategies and directions they made possible and how they relate to 
the historical self-understanding of the modern artist as social subject. While the previous 
chapter analysed these changes in relation to their crystalisation in the political subjectivity 
of the avant-garde artist, this chapter seeks to highlight the redefinition of artistic technique 
and authorship in modernity. These two dimensions will be explored in the writings of 
Charles Baudelaire and the practice of Marcel Duchamp. 
The limited explanatory ability of Bishop’s framing becomes evident already in her 
discussion of Futurism. There, Bishop’s attention is focused on the polemical and 
notoriously disruptive character of Futurist public performance and specifically on the 
famously riotous audience responses it was designed and managed to elicit. Futurist 
performances quickly became outlets for broad— inter-class even— and enthusiastic 
participation in violence and outrage, attracting hecklers of all kinds, armed with eggs and 
vegetables, car horns and whistles. Without a doubt, in its advance of an interpretation of art 
spectatorship as participation in chaos and destruction, Futurist public performance can 
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indeed be considered among the earliest historical examples of art production and display 
that incorporated and, to an important extent, relied on the active participation of an 
audience.  
What a historicisation on that basis however ignores is the dimension of the audience’s 
own eagerness to “play the game” of disruption, and what this might signify about the social 
character of artistic activity and, consequently, the social identity of the artist. That is, does 
performance procure an activation of the audience that is reducible to the characteristics of 
performance per se? Or does it capture a level of empowerment that was already present. As 
Bishop herself highlights, Wassily Kandinsky’s recollections of furious audiences, spitting 
and destroying his works in 1910-11,125 and Albert Gleizes’s description of moblike 
audiences fighting, protesting, shouting, and laughing at the Cubist section of the Salon 
d’Automne of 1911 are rather illuminating.126 Perhaps then the energetic reactions of the 
audience of Futurist performance were not unique to the activities of the Italian provocateurs 
but essentially in line with the predominant type of audience response to unconventional art 
practices of the time.  
Incidents like the above highlight two things. Firstly, that the aggressive self-
assertiveness of modern art’s publics which lies at the heart of audience participation 
preceded and was rather independent of developments in avant-garde performance. If early 
twentieth century audiences are recorded to have exhibited similar behaviours when 
confronted with the intentionally incendiary and chaotic Futurist performance as well as the 
unpronounced, unemotive and rather self-enclosed exhibition of abstract or Cubist works, 
then any changes in the dispositions of modern audiences cannot be reduced to specific 
developments in performance. Secondly, and most importantly, these incidents demonstrate 
that the early years of the twentieth century already point to a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between artist, artwork and audience. This chapter therefore explores this 
reconfiguration— the relationship of osmotic opposition between artist and audience as was 
described in the first chapter— and how it was renegotiated into the waning distinction 
between artist and non-artist in Baudelaire’s writings on modern art and Duchamp’s practice. 
To arrive at the historical archetype of the non-idealistic identity of the contemporary artist 
it is necessary to outline the transition toward a new conception of art characterised by the 
waning of technique and the decoupling of authorial identity from the model of the unitary 
creator. 
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By entrenching the discussion of art’s historical purpose distinctly in the present, 
Baudelaire’s essays “The Salon of 1846” and especially “The Painter of Modern Life” are 
among the earlier texts to reflect the historical inevitability of the modern and the need for 
artists to abandon the futile adulation of the past. Echoing this necessity, Baudelaire 
envisioned— and at the same time willed into being— a new socio-cultural identity in the 
place of the historical artist-type: the “man of the world.” The “man of the world” embodied 
for Baudelaire the affirmation of the inner and outer realities of modernity— the tragic 
beauty of a disenchanted world, the dangers hiding underneath its glossy surfaces, its 
overwhelming pace. Recognising the new social and psychological types at the time 
emerging in the social formations of bourgeois society, Baudelaire advocated for a departure 
from the academisation of artistic activity and outlined a new conception of artist and art 
attuned with the complexity, ephemerality and multiplicity of modern representations. 
My decision to discuss Duchamp in relation to Baudelaire expands upon a connection 
suggested by Konstantinos Vassiliou; that is, Duchamp’s role as the completion of 
Baudelairean history.127 In my analysis, therefore, Baudelaire’s “man of the world” is 
examined as a Duchampian typology. Aside from the question of a direct connection 
between the two men,128 the implications of Baudelaire’s category carry significant 
implications for the development of a model of artistic identity and technique in modernity 
which reorient the prehistory of the “social turn” away from the history of avant-garde 
performance— contra, thus, Bishop’s claim— and toward the history of painting and the 
readymade. 
 If Baudelaire’s mid-late nineteenth century critiques stress the urgency for a 
revaluation of the relationship between artistic act and experience of the modern— 
professing an early acknowledgment of the artwork’s social derivation and consequent 
existence as the negotiation of modern experience and representation— the Duchampian 
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unfinished transcripts published in 1887 with the title “Mon Coeur Mis à Nu” (My Heart Laid Bare). Finally, 
Duchamp had acknowledged the influence of Jules Laforgue who was a known admirer of Baudelaire. 
Jerrold Seigel, The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self in Modern Culture 
(Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 1997), .99. 
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readymade collapses the artwork into the most naked signs of modernity— into the by-
products of a commercial civilisation increasingly emptied of expressive content. This 
collapse is, of course, more readily evident in Duchamp’s unassisted readymade works; 
unfettered as they are by extensive intervention on the part of the artist, Duchamp’s 
unassisted readymades dispel any doubts about the ultimate ramifications of his proposition. 
At the same time, while readymades actualise the dissociation of the artwork from 
expressiveness— the repudiation of the artist’s personal expressive touch— they open up a 
new horizon for the interrogation of the meaning and form of artistic technique, carrying out 
its transposition onto the conceptual realm. This double movement toward social technique 
and conceptualisation that Duchamp articulates has had momentous impact on our 
understanding of the identity of artist and artwork over the course of modernity and beyond. 
Around the time of the scandal of the readymade, in a manner almost too characteristic 
of his renowned sense of wit and irony, Duchamp compounded his challenge to established 
preconceptions of authorship even further with the invention of a female artistic alter ego in 
Rrose Sélavy. In this discussion, Rrose Sélavy is not approached from the perspective of a 
performance of femininity in its own right; her invention and recurring authorial presence 
interests me instead in relation to the issues of authorship that she raises. Rrose Sélavy does 
not, therefore, figure as a pretext for the examination of androgyny and femininity, or in 
terms of her possible misogynist or gender-deconstructive dimensions.129 To argue broadly 
about the historical marginalisation of women appears to me a bit pleonastic and beside the 
point of this discussion. It is the intersection of authorship and femininity as authorship’s 
other that is of importance here. Rrose Sélavy is consequently not examined as the reflection 
of a specific ideological or psychological disposition but as an authorial strategy. I argue that 
Duchamp’s Rrose Sélavy persona points, on the one hand, to the broader societalisation of 
artistic identity in modernity— paralleling in that sense the readymade’s societalisation of 
                                                             
129 Taking into account that Rrose Sélavy’s photographic appearance happened amid intense debates on 
female emancipation and equality, it was inevitably invested with a very specific social significance. Amelia 
Jones has broadly described Rrose Sélavy as one of Duchamp’s “aggressive dislocations of categories of 
traditional masculinity and femininity.” The connotations of femininity in Sélavy are certainly ambiguous. 
Her ambiguity led Jones to propose that Duchamp’s move could be interpreted as a strategy of self-
presentation in relation to a “devalued feminine other,” as well as a contestation of the “phallocentric 
scenarios that constitute subjectivity in the West.” On the other hand, Barbara Zabel has highlighted that 
Duchamp’s persona was inextricable from the configurations of femininity in his own, as well as Francis 
Picabia’s machinic works, which, she argued, collectively expressed “an obvious undercurrent of misogyny... 
suggesting some dread of the New Woman of the postwar years.” 
Amelia Jones, Postmodernism and the En-gendering of Marcel Duchamp (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 151-152, 204. 
Barbara Zabel, “The Machine and New York Dada,” in Making Mischief: Dada Invades New York, eds. 
Francis M. Naumann and Beth Venn, (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1996), 283. 
Cited in Amelia Jones, Irrational Modernism: a Neurasthenic History of New York Dada, (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London, England: MIT Press, 2004), 124. 
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artistic labour— but also, importantly, to the decoupling of authorship from a conception of 
a singular and permanent subjectivity. Rrose Sélavy presents a model by which the broader 
diffusion of artistic activity is mirrored and internalised by the non-singular character of the 
author. The two main problematics I therefore explore in this chapter are the evolution of 
the idea of art as direct engagement with the non-artistic aspects of modern life, and the 






















                                                             




2.2    CHARLES BAUDELAIRE 
 
2.2.1   THE MAN OF THE WORLD 
 
Even though Charles Baudelaire’s “man of the world” is closely associated with 
Constantin Guys, its implications reach far beyond him. A key concept in Baudelaire’s series 
of essays published under the title “The Painter of Modern Life” in 1863, the “man of the 
world” heralded a new model for artistic activity and a new sociopsychological artistic 
identity. Standing in stark contrast with the specialist artist of the Salon— denounced by 
Baudelaire as narrow-minded, ignorant and solipsistic— the “man of the world” signified a 
departure from the social isolation of the academic artist, and art’s entrenchment in the 
suffocating conventions of a sphere bracketed from the bustling world of modernity.131 
Indeed, roughly fifteen years before “The Painter of Modern Life,” in his review of the Salon 
of 1846 Baudelaire was already calling for a new artistic sensibility— for the modernisation 
of the themes and imagery of art. Modernity had, Baudelaire declared, like all eras which 
preceded it its very own sense of beauty and heroism, reflected in the new conditions of 
urban life: the spaces and human-types of the modern world, and the new behaviours and 
attitudes it nurtured.132 What must be highlighted here is that Baudelaire, with the conscious 
embrace of the experience of the urban metropolis as the source for artistic creativity, did 
not simply propose a thematic shift for art. Becoming modern was not limited to a mere 
modernisation of the pool of representations that provided material to the artist but also 
rethinking the processes through which subject matter becomes art. 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the bourgeois artistic field of the 
nineteenth century was the domain of genius. Genius was the precondition of art and great 
art necessarily involved the channelling of this natural talent. Nevertheless— and Kant’s 
formulation becomes important here— genius alone was not enough. The rules of art since 
the Renaissance stressed the importance of the observation of established models and 
rules.133 As the deeper purpose of art was its existence in posterity, the artwork had to, on 
                                                             
131 Ibid., 7. 
132 “But to return to our principle and essential problem, which is to discover whether we possess a specific 
beauty, intrinsic to our new emotions…The pageant of fashionable life and the thousands of floating 
existences— criminals and kept women— which drift about in the underworld of the great city; the Gazette 
des Tribunaux and the Moniteur all prove to us that we have only to open our eyes to recognize our heroism. 
For the heroes of the Iliad are but pigmies compared to you— who dared not publicly declaim your sorrows 
in the funeral and tortured frock coat which we all wear today!—you the most heroic, the most extraordinary, 
the most romantic and the most poetic of all the characters that you have produced from your womb!” 
Charles Baudelaire, “The Salon of 1846: On the Heroism of Modern Life,” in Modern Art and Modernism: A 
Critical Anthology, eds. Francis Frascina, Charles Harrison, Deirdre Paul, (SAGE, 1982), 17-23, 17-18. 
133 Kant, 174-178. 
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the one hand, attempt to embody the beautiful, and, on the other, serve as a model for future 
generations of artists. Even with the emergence of a new audience of art consumers among 
the literate, cultured middle classes, and the concomitant increase of demand for novelty 
since the mid-eighteenth century, the process of art-making was still heavily reliant on the 
studious refinement of style and technique through the study of old masterpieces. In contrast 
to this, the creative act of the “man of the world” lay in the curious engagement with external 
life; for Baudelaire, modern “genius” unfolded in a state of engagement resembling the spirit 
of childlike curiosity, it unfolded in a creative fascination with the world.134 This was not an 
arbitrary prescription on Baudelaire’s part, a judgement made in a vacuum. This new 
conception of the creative act was ingrained in the sociohistorical conditions of modernity: 
the essence of the modern world itself could not be reconciled with the static, disconnected 
nature of the academic process. It could only be captured through spontaneous, unrestricted 
flows of creativity. Baudelaire understood that it was the sensitivity toward the conditions 
of modernity that redefined the historical role of the modern artist. No masterpieces of the 
past based on the detached refinement of academic skill could capture the experience of 
modern life truthfully. After all, as his now iconic adage on modernity revealed,135 there was 
beauty waiting to be discovered— to be distilled from the new urban environment— and 
this presupposed a new kind of historical awareness, a new kind of attentiveness toward the 
complexity of modern experience.136 
2.2.2.   TECHNIQUE 
Drawing on the creative process of Guys, Baudelaire attempted to outline a new 
conception of artistic technique. Already evident in Gustave Courbet’s and Édouard Manet’s 
engagement with the realities of modern life, the focus of the modern artist had begun to 
shift from the single-minded, introspective study of the paradigms of the past. It was 
ultimately inevitable that technique itself be reassessed in order to parallel this modern art’s 
iconographical reorientation. Observing Guys’s preoccupation with the conflict between the 
rendering of contour and detail, Baudelaire realised that the painter was already cognisant of 
                                                             
134 Charles Baudelaire, “The Painter of Modern Life,” in The Painter of Modern Life and other Essays, ed. 
Jonathan Mayne, (Phaidon Press, 1995), 1-41, 7-8. 
135 “By ‘modernity’ I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent, the half of art whose other half is the 
eternal and the immutable.” 
Ibid., 12. 
136 Mirroring this awareness of being in the present, after Romanticism styles are no longer categorised as 
schools but as movements. While the description of artistic production inside “schools” suggests the 
systematisation of artistic activity according to the precepts of an authority, and a specific method for 
attaining knowledge, movements define themselves by their dissociation or even repudiation of the past. 




the need for a creative process that could capture the fluidity and complexity of the modern 
environment and allowed the quick and accurate transposition of the creative idea on the 
medium of painting.137 In other words, the very temporal nature of modern subject matter 
led to the modification— or even the outright elimination— of a number of conventional 
preparatory stages central to the historical development of the craft.138 
The discontinuity between the generative idea and its execution was, of course, neither 
a new problem nor one peculiar to painting— it is a problem rather hardcoded in every 
performance that involves the translation of intuition into action. As Baudelaire himself 
acknowledged, it was in fact a problem that had plagued the entire history of painting,139 and 
yet a problem whose impact was ineluctably exacerbated during modern art’s shift to the 
interrogation of the hectic nature of urban modernity. That is to say, the unique 
characteristics of the modern experience magnified the dissonance between idea and 
execution and revealed the futility of recourse to successful models of the past. With older 
models gradually losing their relevance, modern artists were now bereft of certainties and 
conventions they could rely on: the diminished utility of older models exposed technique as 
a particularly unstable and precarious component of the artistic process. Baudelaire captured 
this uniquely modern predicament with precision; for him, technique takes the form of a set 
of methods employed to essentially minimise the use of technique itself. As such, it retains 
its importance for the modern artist insofar as it provides a solution to an innate problem of 
art that is magnified under the conditions of modernity. Baudelaire reframed technique as 
the control of technique: as the reduction of the variables that distort the modern artwork, 
and, thus, prevent it from embodying the “the beauty of circumstances and the sketch of 
manners.”140 
Baudelaire’s commentary on technique should obviously not be looked at through the 
prism of a contemporary iconoclasm we are now well acquainted with. To interpret his 
commentary as a call for artistic technique’s total abolition or as the announcement of its 
obsolescene would be utterly anachronistic. In fact, Baudelaire insisted that a certain mastery 
                                                             
137 “The more beauty that the artist can put into it, the more valuable will be his work; but in trivial life, in the 
daily metamorphosis of external things, there is a rapidity of movement which calls for an equal speed of 
execution from the artist.” 
Baudelaire Op.cit,.4. 
138 Baudelaire description of Guys’s creative method reveals a rather systematic process: “Monsieur G. starts 
with a few slight indications in pencil, which hardly do more than mark the position which objects are to 
occupy in space. The principal planes are then sketched in tinted wash, vaguely and lightly coloured masses 
to start with, but taken again later and successively charged with a great intensity of colour. At the last 
minute the contour of the objects is once and for all outlined in ink.” 
Ibid., 17. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid., 1. 
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of diverse expressive means remained the sign of great artists, as this allowed the quick, 
unhesitating response to ideas before they were surrendered to the disunity of mind and 
hand.141 Neither was the “man of the world” a creative automaton that produced images 
indiscriminately and without inner moderation. Baudelaire’s modern genius was that of 
“childhood recovered at will;” the naiveté and spontaneity of the modern artist had to be 
tempered through reason— through the employment of analytic and conceptual faculties.142 
Nevertheless, Baudelaire did highlight that the existence of art as the object of an entrenched, 
self-enclosed performance of virtuosity was no longer sufficient to its historical role in 
modernity. Baudelaire’s typology of the modern did not merely signal the temporalisation 
of the creative process, as that was reflected in the selection of subject matter appropriate to 
modern experience, or the revaluation of the social and psychological characteristics of the 
modern artist. Baudelaire also recognised, most interestingly, that the modernisation of art 
coincided with a scepticism toward established styles, and the movement toward a novel, 
centrifugal approach to artistic technique. In Baudelaire’s writings, iconography, talent and 
the psychological character of the modern artist become inextricable from the problem of 
technique. 
The movement that Baudelaire registered already in the middle of the nineteenth 
century underlined the interdependence between the art-life dialectic and art’s contravention 
of form. The thematic and technical responsibilities of the artwork can be seen to change in 
step with the displacement of the specialist artist for the “man of the world,” while the artist 
cannot become truly modern without the transformation of technical means and procedures. 
Nevertheless, Baudelaire’s observations were clearly not describing a fully-fledged cultural 
phenomenon in mid-nineteenth century Paris; in fact, only through a very generous 
assessment of Guys’s work could we conclude that it can measure up to the almost world-
historical dimensions that Baudelaire assigned to it. What is important about Baudelaire’s 
writings on art is that they identified the early stages of a rupture in the historical continuity 
of artistic practice. That is, the value of his observations does not so much lie in the precise 
articulation of the conditions of his time as in the anticipation of changes that would unfold 
in the decades to follow. As Boris Groys has pointed out, Baudelaire’s criticism was not 
“topographic;” it should not be understood as a mapping of his own era. It was, in fact, rather 
                                                             
141 Baudelaire wrote characteristically: “[i]t is the fear of not going fast enough, of letting the phantom escape 
before the synthesis has been extracted and pinned down; it is that terrible fear which takes possession of all 
great artists and gives them such a passionate desire to become masters of every means of expression so that 
the orders of the brain may never be perverted by the hesitations of the hand and that finally execution, ideal 





prefigurative, and, in that sense, contributed to the emergence of the future that it 
described.143 
To properly illustrate Baudelaire’s implications in their full scale we need then to turn 
to the work of Marcel Duchamp. As will be argued, the proposition of the readymade,144 and 
the invention of Rrose Sélavy do not simply constitute two interrelated explorations of the 
characteristics that Baudelaire outlined in the nineteenth century, but in fact complete 
Baudelaire’s system: Duchamp embodies, on that account, the teleology of the system 
outlined by Baudelaire. And by doing so, he crystalises its inner contradictions. 
 
2.3.   MARCEL DUCHAMP 
2.3.1 THE READYMADE AND TECHNIQUE 
It is not clear whether Duchamp could have ever anticipated the world-historical 
implications that his pseudonymous submission of the Fountain in 1917 (Fig.5) would have. 
Or that a rejected work could irretrievably change the face of art. One thing was clear, 
however. This time, unlike his rejection of 1912, he was prepared to respond.145 “The 
Richard Mutt Case” was to become his retaliation against the decision of the Society of 
Independent Artists, who in their bewilderment at the sight of the porcelain urinal, were 
forced to violate the “no jury, no prizes” policy of the open exhibition of 1917. Published in 
the second issue of the Blind Man in May 1917, “The Richard Mutt Case” also presented a 
sardonic, yet articulate testimonial of his pseudonymous alter ego’s artistic merit through a 
defence of the Fountain’s status as an artwork. Duchamp’s rationale was clear:  
“Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not has no 
importance. He CHOSE it. He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so that its 
useful significance disappeared under a new title and point of view – created a 
new thought for that object.”146 
                                                             
143 Groys, Art Power, 118. 
144 My decision to associate Duchamp’s readymade with Baudelaire’s propositions on painting is based on 
Thierry de Duve’s interpretation of the readymade as an “abandonment of painting.” During a period of 
experimentation with Post-impressionist, Cubist and Cubofuturist styles that lasted until 1913, Duchamp 
recognised that, even though all possible avenues for the development of painting appeared to have been 
exhausted, painting was still unable to respond to the crisis of pictorial practice in industrial society. The 
readymade, therefore, registered a moment in which painting is no longer possible. 
De Duve, Pictorial Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting to the Readymade, vii, x-xi. 
145 I am referring here to the rejection of “Nude Descending a Staircase, No.2” submitted to the 1912 Salon 
of the Société des Artistes Indépendants. 
146 The Richard Mutt Case, The Blind Man, issue 2 (May, 1917) 
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André Breton and Paul Eluard's “Dictionnaire Abrégé du Surréalisme” of 1938 
features a slightly more succinct yet similar definition of the readymade. The readymade is 
"an ordinary object elevated to the dignity of a work of art by the mere choice of an artist."147 
Both accounts are consistent— the readymade is the artistic proposition based on the 
decontextualization of found material or commodities and their recodification as art objects. 
In its manipulation of objects  
 
Figure 5 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
     Figure 5 Marcel Duchamp, Fountain, 1917. 
 
taken directly from the sphere of everyday life, it stands as the first fully formulated rejection 
of art’s categorical separateness as an autonomous symbolic space. The Fountain was in fact 
not Duchamp’s sole or even first experiment with this new form— this would be the Bicycle 
Wheel of 1913, made only briefly after his decision to abandon painting. Over the years 
Duchamp would produce a series of readymade works which can be roughly divided in two 
groups: unassisted and assisted. The former type describes objects used without any 
modification by the artist which consequently bear no visual sings of artistic intervention. 
The latter involves readymades produced either through the modification of their 
components or the transformative combination of two or more readymade objects in a new 
one. 
The creative process that Duchamp established for the production of unassisted 
readymades (such as Bottle Rack, 1914, In Advance of the Broken Arm, 1916, and Fountain, 
1917) was tripartite: selection, titling, and signing the object. Acutely aware of the profound 
implications of modern art’s elevation of modern representation as art’s object, Duchamp 
played with the hypothesis that any human work could potentially exist as a work of art. In 
1913, he posed the question: “[c]an one make works which are not works of art?”148 The 
title of the object was now the necessary step toward infusing it with a “new thought,” that 
is, imbue it with new intellectual insights which, distancing it from the world of the 
mundane, introduce it into a context of art.149 Finally, the artist’s signature completes the act 
of transubstantiation as the affirmation of the intentionality of the action.  
                                                             
147 Hector Obalk, “The Unfindable Readymade,” tout-fait 1 (2000) 
http://www.toutfait.com/issues/issue_2/Articles/obalk.html (Accessed: 15/04/2016) 
148André Gervais, “Connections: Of Art and Arrhe”, in The Definitively Unfinished Marcel Duchamp, ed. 
Thierry de Duve, (Cambridge, MA; London: The MIT Press, 1991), 401. 
149 Dawn Ades, Neil Cox, David Hopkins, Marcel Duchamp, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1999), 128. 
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In line with his theorisation of the avant-garde as a systematic attack on the institution 
of art, Peter Bürger interpreted the readymade as a direct challenge to one of bourgeois art’s 
foundational myths: the perception of the artwork as the product of individual creativity.150 
Indeed, the readymade was by definition premised on the artwork’s negation of a singular 
authorial source. It advanced a conception of art no longer reducible to personal creative 
endeavour, and therefore pointed to the fact that art has always existed through labour 
extrinsic to the core activity of the artist.151 By declaring itself a product of alienated work, 
the readymade revealed that artworks cannot be separated from their technical, non-artistic 
components, and thus brought attention to the social construction of art broadly. 
Nevertheless, as Roberts has proposed, the readymade should not be understood simply as a 
comment on the suppressed social character of art’s production. Its true novelty lay not in 
acknowledging the presence of technical or executive work in the art-making process, but in 
the synchronous movement between this recognition and the eclipsing of the artwork’s 
artisanal character. In Duchamp’s unassisted readymades the domination of the non-artistic 
was made possible only through the simultaneous retreat of the artisanal— with the only 
remaining visual trace of the artisanal being the artist’s signature.152 
At the same time, the suppression of the artisanal elided the site of the most persistent 
historical aporia of art. By relinquishing the space of the artisanal, the readymade allowed 
the artist to circumvent the conflict between what is crucial for the existence of the artwork 
and what is not: to circumvent the conflict between the artwork’s essential idea and the 
execution of disorientating details that detracted from it. Since the readymade was premised 
on the elimination of this distortion, its selection became a paradox form of pure artistic 
vision. Yet, with the suspension of the disunity between idea and execution— between 
“intention and realisation” in Duchamp’s own terms153— the artwork managed to attain to a 
kind of objectivity only possible in the non-artistic form, in the form of the commodity. As 
the paradigmatic modern artform, the readymade presented a subversive literalisation of 
Baudelaire’s art as attitude toward modern representations, and thus drove it to its logical 
conclusion: the commodity was now reinstated as the embodiment of pure artistic vision. 
Duchamp appears to have been aware of this contradiction emblematic of the entanglement 
of artwork and commodity in modernity— the convergence of the commodity and the 
                                                             
150 Bürger, 51. 
151 For a comprehensive discussion on the production of art through systems of artistic and extra-artistic actors 
see Howard S. Becker, Art Worlds, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2008) 
152 John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art after the Readymade (London: Verso, 
2007), 2. 
153 Marcel Duchamp, “The Creative Act,” in The Essential Writings of Marcel Duchamp, eds. Michel 
Sanouillet, Elmer Peterson (London; Thames & Hudson, 1975), 138-140, 139. 
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absolute artistic form in Theodor Adorno’s famous formulation— already from his years as 
a painter. When describing his painting process, Duchamp suggested that the industrial 
manufacturing of paint-tubes had deposed colour as the material for painting; the act of 
selecting the appropriate paint-tubes as found objects was in fact not principally different 
from the selection of the found object in the readymade. As he acknowledged in 1961: 
“Since the tubes of paint used by the artists are manufactured and ready-made 
products, we must conclude that all paintings in the world are ‘readymades aided’ 
and also works of assemblage.”154 
 
2.3.2 THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE READYMADE 
The disappearance of the artisanal base of the artwork— the process of deskilling155— 
through the adoption of the form of the commodity is inevitably accompanied by the retreat 
of the presence of the historically-signified artist. Nevertheless, as Roberts has underlined, 
unless the essence of artistic activity is as shallow as to reside exclusively in “the execution 
of forms of expressive mimeticism,” this entails neither a loss of artistic sensuousness nor 
the disappearance of the artist.156 Instead, after its displacement from its historical 
responsibilities, artistic skill survives repurposed in “the demonstration of conceptual 
acuity.”157 With the dissociation of artistic skill from its mimetic or expressive correlates, 
artistic activity is transformed into a process of selection and presentation. If the value of the 
work of the modern artist lay in the ingenuity of the “translation of external life,”158 which 
was inevitably distorted by the reliance on the artisanal, Duchamp invented the ultimate 
technique of abbreviation: the transposition of the process of translation of “intention” to 
“its realisation” onto the realm of the conceptual.159 In doing so, his work confronted the 
                                                             
154  This is the main reason behind Thierry de Duve’s decision to interpret the readymade as emerging from 
the history of painting. De Duve therefore follows Duchamp’s implication that his paintings were assisted 
readymades— that the logic of the readymade stems from the impact of paint tubes.  
Marcel Duchamp, “Apropos of Readymades,” in The Essential Writings of Marcel Duchamp, eds. Michel 
Sanouillet, Elmer Peterson (London; Thames & Hudson, 1975), 141-142, 142.  
De Duve Op.cit., 176. 
155 John Roberts parallels this obsolescence of handcraft, traceable or not, in artistic production with the 
prevalent late capitalist tendency of “deskilling.” Deskilling according to Roberts’s analysis takes two forms: 
the incorporation of science and technology in the labour process, and the managerial organization of 
workers, resulting in turn in the increase in overall productivity through the structural decline of the 
prerequisite character of individual skill. This transition is traced in two aspects of art production: the 
creation of art through the delegation of activities to non-artists, and the removal of the normative character 
of artistic skill in art production. 
Roberts, 85. 
156 Ibid., 3. 
157 Ibid., 
158 Baudelaire, 16. 
159 Marcel Duchamp, The Creative Act, 139. 
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inevitable “historical irresolution of technique and art”160 and pointed to a way out of it. The 
readymade, therefore, stands for the utopian sublation of the dichotomy between art and 
technique with the inscription of both into the realm of concept. In a fashion reminiscent of 
the proverbial decision to sever rather than untie the Gordian knot, the readymade responded 
to technique’s distortion of creative vision by dislodging technique from the domain of craft. 
Through the unassisted readymade, authorship appears hardly associated with 
conventional notions of creativity based on expressiveness anymore. It emerges reliant on 
executive skills and intellectual acuity, signifying thus a separation “between the man who 
suffers and the mind which creates.”161 When in 1957 Duchamp made this reference to T. S. 
Eliot’s essay “Tradition and Individual Talent” of 1919 he was alluding to a text calling for 
a revitalisation of tradition— a call for tradition to move beyond its misconception as a term 
of “censure” over some notion of cultural lagging, and the inability to be one with the 
world.162 And thus for tradition to become what it truly is: an entity wherein all history exists 
simultaneously, the “simultaneous order” that constitutes contamporaneity.163 This was T.S. 
Eliot’s antidote to modern infatuation with shallow difference and individuality; to become 
the conduit of contamporaneity, one had to erase oneself, and only through this act of kenosis 
could one lay genuine claim to being one with the present. 
According to one of Theodor Adorno’s most salient observations, art in modernity was 
characterised by a marked tendency toward the dissolution of all perceivable distance 
between the artwork and the life of the spectator. This was a two-directional, dialectical 
process: modern art was caught at the crossroads of “deartification” and “the mimesis of the 
hard and alienated.”164 On the one hand, art was subject to the pressures of a fledging Culture 
Industry seeking to subsume all creative activity under the total administration of capitalism. 
                                                             
160 De Duve, xi-xii. 
161  T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” in T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1953), 13-22, 18. 
162 Ibid., 13. 
163 Ibid., 14. 
164 In “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” Adorno and Horkheimer presented an 
interpretation of “deartification” or “deastheticisation” (original: “Entkunstung”) as a consequence of the 
advancing industrialisation of cultural consumption in capitalism and the consolidation of a totalising cultural 
apparatus. Art under the domination of the “Culture Industry” is steadily subsumed by the general economy 
and artistic production is thus subject to the imperatives of standardisation and profitability that govern 
industrial production. This strips art of its unique qualities and degrades it into entertainment. “Aesthetic 
Theory” on the other hand, presents a more nuanced analysis of “deartification” as a phenomenon ingrained 
in the historical advance of modern art. Modern art, as a revolutionising historical force, is engaged in a 
constant renegotiation of its techniques, contents and boundaries. Deartification signifies therefore a more 
dialectical phenomenon— the predicament of art in capitalism and in a sense its historical inevitability. 
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On the other, art was constantly revolutionising itself by delving into the elements of the 
modern world, repurposing them toward the repudiation of its claims to objectivity. The 
readymade’s representation of the collapse between art and life exemplified thus Adorno’s 
central aporia. Nevertheless, by virtue of eliminating the expressive aspects that historically 
characterised art, the readymade created art objects aesthetically impenetrable which 
virtually concealed the inner world of the artist. In a sense, the readymade marks the point 
where art as attitude towards modern representations becomes anterior to the subject which 
brings it to life: there is no Duchamp that derives his stability as an artistic subjectivity from 
the expressive unity of eye and hand.165 Duchamp-as-artist exists in spite of the readymade.  
The obstruction of the artist’s presence in works utterly saturated in the representations 
of the external world is resolved by the concurrent reorientation the audience’s attention to 
two new directions: the context of the artwork’s display, and the life itself of the artist. The 
important point here is that both follow from the logic of the readymade. The former, even 
though originating in the non-aesthetic constitution of the readymade, becomes more visible 
in the second half of the twentieth century with the neo-avant-garde expansion of art’s 
domain to the exhibition in Pop Art, Minimalism and Conceptual art practices; this is an 
observation that we will return to in the next chapter. The latter, however— the reinscription 
of authorship back into the sphere of the artist’s life that follows the impasse of the 
readymade— is more paradoxical: the defamiliarising impact of the bareness of the 
readymade is recodified in the self-invention of the artistic subject as “pure personality.” 
I should then clarify my claim. The inscrutability— or even superficial pointlessness— 
of the readymade needs to be accounted for, insofar as it is to be recognised as a work of art. 
In the absence of intelligibility in traditional terms there are two potential outcomes: to either 
attribute the conferral of the artwork-status to an illegitimate system of signification that is 
subsequently rejected, or to account for it by recourse to certain non-visible dimensions of 
the artist’s own world, that is, the life of the artist, and especially those elements that an 
audience is barred from ever fully knowing— the intent, the intellectual and psychological 
motivations underlying the work. Following this “crash test,” the successful artist is bound 
to re-emerge imbued with a renewed sense of mystique: to resolve the contradiction between 
the crowning of the readymade as the apogee of the creative process and its uniquely non-
artistic qualities, the audience is compelled to the unassailable conviction that it is the artist’s 
personality that legitimises the work as art. This is a premise exceptionally close to the 
hypothesis that it is the artist’s personality that is the true, hidden work. Yet, unlike the 
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historical idealisation of genius followed by the turn to individual life as a hermeneutics of 
uncompromising vision and aesthetic innovation, in the case of Duchamp the turn to life 
happens precisely because these expressive elements are eminently absent in the gesture of 
the readymade. The readymade facilitates therefore a move of utmost disinterestedness, 
which, as Bourdieu would comment, signifies the highest gambit for the avant-garde artist, 
and thus the most authentic and potentially rewarding claim to prestige. 
Not at all surprisingly then, this led to an early implosion of the medium: meaning can 
no longer be found in the now diminished aesthetic construction of the work and has to be 
discovered outside of it, in life.166 The impact of this defamiliarising gesture on the 
delimitation of artistic activity cannot be overstated— its implications transcend the 
discussion on the aestheticisation of everyday life; there lies the impossibility of categorising 
Dadaist events and Surrealist explorations of the urban setting as something ontologically 
separate from the groups’ artistic output. The affinity between art and life eventually leads 
to another change; art ceases to exist as art-as-object and becomes art-as-event. This shift 
does not only underline the new socio-technical framework of art’s production and 
distribution but also constitutes a pivotal moment wherein a majority of corollaries 
associated with the aesthetic existence of art are called into question.167 
 
2.4 RROSE SELAVY 
2.4.1 FEMININITY AND MASS CULTURE 
After an initial flirtation with the idea of a Jewish persona, Duchamp arrived at Rrose 
Sélavy in 1920 as a “much simpler” project, as he explained decades later with characteristic 
nonchalance.168 Incarnated by Duchamp in drag, Man Ray’s now iconic photographs have 
often overshadowed her role in Duchamp’s oeuvre. Yet, besides her existence as 
photographic image, her name would also appear behind a series of works throughout the 
years, including Duchamp’s Fresh Widow of 1920 (Fig.6), Belle Haleine: Eau de Voilette 
of 1921 (Fig.7), Monte Carlo Bond of 1924, Francis Picabia’s L'Oeil Cacodylate of 1921, 
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Robert Desnos’s aphorisms. It is this less acknowledged dimension of Rrose Sélavy as artist 
that needs to be explored in relation to Duchamp’s strategies of authorship. 
 
Figure 6 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
Figure 6 Marcel Duchamp, Fresh Widow, 1920 (replica 1964) 
 
Amelia Jones has highlighted that Man Ray’s portraits of Rrose Sélavy strongly 
resemble female celebrity photographs featured in popular magazines of the time;169 in that 
sense, it was probably not a coincidence that Man Ray’s pictures were taken around the time 
he entered the world of fashion photography— a field where he would have a successful 
career over the next two decades. Man Ray’s conscious emphasis on the artificial, glamorous 
aspects of Rrose Sélavy, underpinning thus her intimacy with popular culture, inflects her 
conception with clear implications. By the time of Rrose Sélavy’s emergence as a figure 
immersed in vanity and mystique there had been a long history wherein femininity, 
consumption and mass culture formed a negative triad— a history which allows us to 
contextualise Rrose Sélavy’s symbolic significance in relation to the twentieth century world 
of consumerism. 
 
Figure 7 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 7 Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, Belle Haleine, Eau de Voilette, 1920-1921. 
 
The modern origins of the parallelism between femininity and mass culture can in fact 
be traced back to the eighteenth century. The ascendance of the European bourgeoisie during 
that time and its displacement of heredity for economic productivity paint an already 
turbulent post-feudal landscape, exacerbated by fears of a complete overhauling of social 
and cultural life on the basis of financial exchange and consumption. Among certain literary 
and artistic circles these aspects of bourgeois society were interpreted as signs of moral and 
cultural degradation and thus triggered anxieties of civilisational decline. Paul Mattick Jr. 
connected these fears with pervasive ideas of “degeneracy,” according to which periods of 
moral and cultural prosperity were inevitably succeeded by decline. Similar conceptions of 
time’s cyclical alternation between rise and decline were shared by David Hume, Johann 
Joachim Winckelmann, and Denis Diderot among others, and were so impactful that would 
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lead Sir Joshua Reynolds to lament that “that the Art has been in a gradual state of decline, 
from the Age of Michelangelo to the present, must be acknowledged.”170 Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, on the other hand, would outright associate the prevalence of the market and the 
idealisation of consumption with the feminisation of taste. Rousseau was of course 
expressing the then popular notion of women as irrational beings guided by passion instead 
of reason or duty: their inscription in a context of excess and superficial pleasure-seeking 
was rooted in similar patriarchal notions.171 Femininity was therefore demonised as a proxy 
for consumption and complacency, which in turn were rooted in the bourgeois 
commercialisation of life.172 
By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Andreas Huyssen observed that 
femininity had become inextricable from the idea of mass society. Partly responsible for this 
conflation was the historical coincidence between struggles for female emancipation and 
social movements agitating for political change, improved participation in political power 
and recognition of rights as expressed by the Revolutions of 1848 and the Paris Commune 
of 1870.173 Gustave Le Bon’s “The Crowd” carved this association in relief: “[c]rowds are 
everywhere distinguished by feminine characteristics.”174 In this context, femininity came 
to symbolise the disorderly characteristics of the mass, which were now penetrating the 
established political order and notions of “real, authentic culture,” clearly conceived as the 
realm of men.175 The extent to which the negative association of womanhood and mass 
culture-as-disorder influenced modernist culture is debateable, but the psychoanalytic 
construction of femininity certainly did not alleviate any concerns. In the first decades of the 
twentieth century Freud depicted women as essentially incomplete men, subjects with 
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limited creativity, and for the most part, passive recipients.176 It should, therefore, come as 
no surprise that Adorno shortly after the end of World War II would categorically oppose 
the prospect of reorganising society based on the values of femininity. The feminine psyche 
in capitalism was, according to Adorno, passive, superficial and universally conformist. By 
being enforced and reproduced through the most oppressive and totalising mechanisms of 
capitalist interpellation it represented capitalism’s most debased characteristics: femininity 
was “the effect of the whip” and “the negative imprint of domination.”177 
Rrose Sélavy becomes therefore one of the gestures by means of which Duchamp 
severed all ties with the tradition and the privileged status of the male, author of high art, 
and rather assumed its opposite. Her association with mass culture goes even further than 
the stylisation of her photographic representation. With the appearance of her photographic 
image in Duchamp’s perfume bottle readymade Belle Haleine: Eau de Voilette in 1921 she 
becomes directly and unquestionably inscribed in a context of female consumption. Her 
association with the banal, the everyday and the world of consumption is further underlined 
by the use of the same perfume bottle for the New York Dada cover (April, 1921) where her 
image accompanies Tristan Tzara’s mock editorial that presented Dadaism exclusively in 
commodity terms with women composing its target audience.178 
 
2.4.2 THE ARTIST AS ARRANGER 
Rrose Sélavy’s first appropriation of authorship was the Fresh Widow of 1920.179 In 
this work Marcel Duchamp’s signature has been replaced by the industrial inscription: 
“Fresh Widow Copyright Rose Sélavy 1920,” alluding thus clearly to the replacement of the 
artwork by a patented item of industrial design. The implications of this gesture are relatively 
self-explanatory and certainly consistent with the narrative of femininity as consumption and 
mass culture. What interests me here, however, has less to do with the transgression of the 
boundary separating “high” and “low” culture per se, and more to do with the substitution 
of the identity of the artist for another professional in a process mediated by Rrose Sélavy. 
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 Fresh Widow was not the only time that Duchamp/Sélavy would assume an identity 
beyond that of the artist. From the industrial manufacturer of domesticities in the Fresh 
Widow, Duchamp/Sélavy would reinvent themselves as gambling entrepreneurs with the 
Monte Carlo Bond in 1924,180 and eventually become art archivists-curators with the Boîte-
en-Valise of 1941 (Fig.8). This variation between multiple professional identities— or 
rather, the hybridisation of artistic identity with other forms of work reflected a new direction 
for twentieth century art practices. As the precondition for this new freedom, the production 
of art had to be disembedded from the performance of artisanal skills, something which 
became possible only after the readymade; the dislodged artisanal elements could now be 
replaced by other types of work. What the readymade enabled, therefore, was not simply the 
substitution of artisanal skills for conceptual ones, but the liberation of artists from their 
historically prescribed role. 
As Duchamp’s early readymades reveal, the new skillsets at work were borrowed from 
the industrial-commercial world. The role of the industrial-commercial world was also 
salient in the emulation of extra-artistic professional identities during the 1960s, in the 
performance of what Caroline A. Jones has described as the “technological sublime.” During 
that era, Andy Warhol, Frank Stella, and Robert Smithson reinvented themselves as artists 
in relation to the world of bureaucracy and industry that framed the historical horizon of the 
decade.181 The phenomenon described here is not, however, limited to a specific era or 
direction; it is not exhausted in Warhol’s industrial division of labour or Stella’s performance 
of the executive. It is instead the preparatory stage toward a wider transformation of the 
character of the artist from creator of original works to “arranger” of pre-existing forms, 
signs, procedures and identities.182 As Victor Burgin described this change: “[t]he artist is 
apt to see himself not as the creator of new material forms but rather as a coordinator of 
existing forms.”183 
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Figure 8 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 8 Marcel Duchamp, Boîte-en-valise (de ou par Marcel Duchamp ou Sélavy), 1935-41. 
 
There are two major implications in the passage from the artist-as-creator to arranger. 
Firstly, the artwork after the manipulation of pre-existing forms becomes “non-organic,” and 
consequently reveals the untruth of the organic form which had been the predominant 
ideology for the entirety of art’s history since the Renaissance. The incorporation of symbols 
and forms of productive labour from a variety of contexts outside art denies the organic 
nature of the artwork, and as such, dispels the illusion of its construction as an autonomous 
product of “unconscious organic labour.”184 With the artwork revealing itself as the product 
of discontinuous elements manipulated in specific configurations, the illusion that it 
corresponds to an objective, unified reality collapses. By deconstructing ideologies of 
organicity, art can no longer obscure the historical conditions of its social construction by 
laying claim to a transcendental aesthetic order. 
Secondly, the advent of artforms that refuse to reconcile their parts into totalising 
systems of meaning, Adorno argued, effectively revealed the deception of “genius 
aesthetics.” The cult of genius— and its profound untruth— has been historically predicated 
upon the myth of the artist as “creator” and of art as an act of “creation.”185 This has served 
as the veneer of transcendental ideologies of originality and authenticity, and has been at the 
same time the underlying cause of uniformity and subordination. If the work of the artist of 
genius is allowed to present itself as a visual universe in its own right— an all-too-personal 
creation in spite of society— its quasi-religious derivation can then only enforce 
standardisation: it produces style. Yet, great art for Adorno has always been the self-negation 
of this illusory, asocial self-sufficiency of style.186 The artist as arranger is the definitive 
repudiation of “genius aesthetics;” no longer an “original” creator of “original” creations but 
works that by definition acknowledge the social character of art.187 
For Hal Foster, the modern role of the artist as a “manipulator of signs” did not only 
transform the artistic subject, but also had profound impact on art’s audiences. Confronted 
with work that has shed its pretensions of a universal character, the viewer is forced to 
become an “active reader of messages” rather than passive consumer engulfed in the totality 
of an organic aesthetic proposition.188 The idea that Foster expresses here is clearly indebted 
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to Walter Benjamin’s seminal essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction” of 1936. Benjamin’s position is certainly well-known: the use of the new 
technical means of art’s production— technologies of reproducibility such as photography 
and film— helped deconstruct the “auratic” existence of the artwork, with “aura” describing 
the mystique of originality and singular existence of the work of art. The origins of the 
concept of aura were, according to Benjamin, premodern: aura was, in fact, a remnant of the 
sacral status of art, Benjamin argued, and its existence in the bourgeois artwork had utterly 
mystifying effects. Contrary to the auratic existence of art, reproducibility was premised on 
the negation of such absolute authentic status— it was premised precisely on 
disenchantment— allowing thus modern audiences to experience the work from a critical 
distance and not as an embodiment of a continuous, universal order.189 
The transition to a model of artist-as-arranger has had tremendous impact on the 
development of art, artist and audience in the twentieth century. After the readymade, artistic 
identity can be freely configured according to art’s content and the type of labour artists 
perform or emulate. The tactical adoption of skills, procedures and attitudes characteristic of 
non-artistic professional identities has changed established ideas surrounding the essence of 
the artistic personality dramatically. The identity of the artist becomes fluid, contextual but 
also fundamentally performative— the essence of the artwork resides often in the 
performance and manipulation of the signs of the adopted professional identity. This change 
helps illuminate the various hybrids forms of artistic identity which emerge throughout the 
twentieth century (for example, Andy Warhol as an industrialist, Ed Ruscha as a 
topographer, Joseph Beuys as an educator) but also underlies what Roberts has described as 
contemporary art’s “adisciplinarity;” that is, artists’ tactical investigation and adoption of 
methodological frameworks outside art without entailing the reducibility of art practice to 
these fields. 
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2.4.3 THE ARTIST RROSE SELAVY 
Even though Rrose Sélavy was conceived as a new identity, Duchamp did not appear 
to diversify his approach to accommodate her as an individual artist. Rrose Sélavy was in a 
sense a new identity denied of a unique personal style; the works attributed to her lacked the 
distinct character that could separate them from Duchamp’s own. In reality, the distinction 
between the two authors is made possible only through recourse to their different signatures. 
As Duchamp admitted, her authorship resulted from “the difference between the style and 
the unexpected name for the experts.”190 Her relative indeterminacy was also reflected in 
Duchamp’s decision to include both signatures in La Boîte-en-alise of 1941: “de ou par 
Marcel Duchamp ou Rrose Sélavy” (from or by Marcel Duchamp or Rrose Sélavy).  
There is an interesting history of artists, pseudonyms and alter egos that Rrose Sélavy 
intersects with. Pseudonyms have been in use by writers for a very long time. In classical 
antiquity pseudonyms were often selected deliberately to evoke a famous figure of the past, 
while other times they were the result of pseudepigraphy. In more recent times, the use of 
pseudonyms helped liberate personal expression from the fear of repercussions.191 The 
production of the pseudonymous author therefore tends to be continuous with the real 
identity behind the pseudonymous work. The invented identity of the pseudonym is in a 
sense rather shallow— it is identity only in name. Rrose Sélavy, fleshed out and performed 
by Duchamp in Man Ray’s photographs, was not simply a name though. She was given flesh 
and bones— she was conceived with specific characteristics: female, vain, mysterious, and 
temporal. In fact, Rrose Sélavy should be interpreted as a “heteronym” rather than as a 
pseudonym.192 A “heteronym,” albeit one lacking a distinctly personal voice. 
Rrose Sélavy’s continuity with Duchamp’s own approach— her lack of authorial 
individualisation— suggests that Duchamp did not consider the assumption of a new identity 
to be so radical a gesture as to necessitate the fashioning of a different artistic approach. 
From that perspective, Rrose Sélavy could then be reframed as the medium through which 
Duchamp proceeded to undercut ideologies of individuality and originality: Rrose Sélavy 
signifies an emphatic understatement of the “unique self” of the artist. The decision to flatten 
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individuality between Duchamp and Rrose Sélavy parallels in many ways the 
problematisation of originality evoked by the readymade. Rrose Sélavy, in fact, mirrors its 
function; she mirrors the function of an object that bears no signs pointing to a unique 
creative identity.193 Through Rrose Sélavy, Duchamp is underlining that art does not stem 
from an expressive creative self; in reality, Rrose Sélavy, in her conception as the 
continuation of the already impersonal work of Duchamp through a (in)different persona, 
constitutes a double negation of the notion of the unique artistic personality. Because 
Duchamp’s work could have been made by himself, by Rrose Sélavy, or perhaps by someone 
else entirely, the understatement of the “unique self” as author obviates the necessity of a 
strong authorial presence as a source of legitimation for the work. This de-emphasising of 
the exceptional characteristics of artistic personality appears to have been conscious and was 
corroborated by Duchamp himself when in 1966 he confided in Pierre Cabanne: 
...I don’t believe in the creative function of the artist. He’s a man like any other. 
It’s his job to do certain things but the businessman does certain things, you 
understand?194 
Perhaps then, Rrose Sélavy’s role in this process of disassociation of self and work exceeds 
the level of authorial deflection; her “de-autobiographising” function does not simply 
separate Duchamp from his work.195 It does not simply refute the origination of the work out 
of a stable, consistent identity, but also the notion that this identity is the product of a process 
of individuation which imbues it with specific exceptional characteristics. 
Duchamp’s decoupling of artwork and author therefore challenges the belief in an 
inner consistency responsible for authorial difference. The artist is instead conceived as a 
“mediumistic” being:”196 the site wherein the discrepancy between the intention behind the 
artwork and its final material form is produced. The unique contribution of the author during 
this process, the imprint of the authorial personality on the work, parallels thus the “art 
coefficient;” the variable that Duchamp described as “an arithmetical relation between the 
unexpressed but intended and the unintentionally expressed.”197 Yet, if we construe the artist 
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as the source of an intention that is betrayed and left incomplete through the process of art-
making, the artwork still has to be completed somehow. This is where the audience comes 
in, because it is the audience that is responsible for the completion of the creative process by 
bringing the artwork in “contact with the external world.” There is a certain ambiguity in 
Duchamp’s formulation; the audience is determining “the weight of the work on the esthetic 
[sic] scale” but also “deciphering and interpreting its inner qualification.”198 That is, on the 
one hand, the audience evaluates and judges, but on the other, it is also presumed to be 
productively contributing to the creative act by assigning meaning to the work— meaning 
that was either integral to the original intention and was lost during the production of the art 
object, or new meaning that supersedes the original formulation. The artist is therefore “only 
the mother of the work;” the artwork is always completed by the audience— an assertion 
that not only engenders authorship in feminine terms, but also stands to underline the 
relativity of the artist as the agent of artistic activity.199 
Emerging out of the limited authorship of the artist, and being signified by the 
audience, Duchamp’s work becomes principally open-ended, unstable and participatory. The 
work of art is free to have its own life, separated from that of the artist after its enunciation; 
its openness and multivalence become inexorable, reproblematising in turn the stability of 
the artistic subject. The artist, abandoning the security provided by the assumption of a 
standpoint adhering to the illusion of a singular expressive identity in the modern world, 
gives birth to an artwork that reflects and reproduces the flux of their own identity, acquiring 
thus a separate yet cognate significance. Duchamp does not only announce the separation of 
the artisanal and the artistic: he announces the separation of artwork and author and the 
separation of the author from a permanent and exceptional self. And despite, or rather 
because of these negations, he still manages to establish himself as an inimitable artistic 
personality and authorial presence. 
Rrose Sélavy, being an agent granted with authorial power, is a metonymy for 
Duchamp-as-artist. At the same time, she is an invention. By being represented as an image 
                                                             
Interestingly enough, if we follow the “artist-as-medium” proposition to its logical conclusion we are faced 
with a reframing of the artist-as-subject into a problem of technique, a problem reminiscent of what 
Baudelaire described transpires during the translation of the idea into its execution. This fundamentally blurs 
the distinction between artist as the source of a performance and artist as the site wherein a performance is 
carried out. Seigel has highlighted this contradiction in the formulation of the conception of the artist-as-
medium and the concept of the “art coefficient.” The existence of the artist-as-medium presupposes that the 
artist is subject to an agency or intention that comes from without. Nevertheless, the personal nature of the 
“art coefficient,” which Duchamp linked to the “subjective mechanism which produces art in a raw state,” 
implies that the intention ultimately originates in the subject. 
Seigel, p.222. 
198 Duchamp Op.cit., 139-140. 
199 Jones Op.cit., 146. 
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to be looked at, she becomes a work of art herself. She is, therefore, conceived as a dual 
nature: that of the artistic subject and object.200 Her objectification elevates Duchamp to the 
place of the artist. Her subjectification elevates him— his life— to the place of art. Through 
the recognition of the intricacies underlying her creation and performance, Duchamp 
establishes himself as the object of scrutiny: we are compelled to try to comprehend him 
through her. It is not, therefore, merely the epistemologies of authorship— the distinction 
between subject and object— that Rrose Sélavy confounds through the infinite play between 
the two. She also questions art from an ontological perspective: by conferring artistic 
candidacy to the life of the artist. By obscuring a transparent reading of the relationship 
between the productive subject and the produced work, the two eventually overlap and 
become interchangeable. And with that we come to the realization that every complication 
Duchamp posed to the conventions of what an authorial subject consists in are ultimately 
redirected to him and become quintessentially Duchampian; in that process, Rrose Sélavy 
appears to have fulfilled an intermediary role. Duchamp defies the conventional ideas 
surrounding the artist by assuming the anti-artistic, and mystifies the limits of authorship by 
disassociating it from a unitary identity only to see it reinstated with new rigor, empowering 
thus his claims to uniqueness and announcing the new paradigm of the detached author as 
the artist par excellence..201 
 
2.5 THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRATIC AUTHORSHIP 
When Baudelaire mapped out the cultural transformations unfolding in modernity, he 
recognised the danger of a future bereft of meaning and distinction. He recognised the danger 
inherent in the levelling of difference; the liquidation of all beauty and individuality, 
overseen by a tyrannous moral majority.202 Implicit in his writings was the conviction that 
the dawn of democracy would sweep away all the conditions of life that made it tolerable. 
                                                             
200 Interestingly, Man Ray’s 1923 portrait of Rrose Sélavy presents her in double drag— as Rrose 
impersonating Duchamp; that is, inverting authorial and authored identity. 
201 By no means do I suggest that these moves were motivated by cynical speculation. After all, there is 
enough biographical evidence to suggest that Duchamp’s involvement with Sélavy was sincere: “[m]y 
intention was always to get away from myself, though I knew perfectly well that I was using myself. Call it a 
little game between ‘I’ and ‘me’.” 
Ibid., 154. 
202 In 1852 Baudelaire had written about the social and cultural ostracism that Edgar Allan Poe suffered at the 
hands of the American democratic society: “[w]hat a pitiless dictatorship is that of opinion in a democratic 
society! Ask of it neither charity nor indulgence, nor any sort of flexibility in the application of its laws to the 
multiple and complex issues of the moral life. You might think that the impious love of liberty had given 
birth to a new tyranny, a bestial tyranny, or zoocracy whose savage insensibility recalls the idol of 
Juggernaut.” 




There were three impulses worthy of respect for Baudelaire— “to know, to kill and to 
create”— and none of them could survive in the uniformity of democratic life.203 In this era, 
surrendered to decadence and a prevailing sense of “spleen,” the figure of the dandy emerged 
as the “last spark of heroism.”204 Or as Walter Benjamin reframed it: the hero in “his last 
incarnation.”205 The dandy is a figure of crisis and loss, emerging in the decline of the 
aristocratic order and a democratic present that has not fully arrived yet: in the axiological 
void separating aristocracy’s fall and democracy’s ascent. In this period of transition, when 
no normative system holds sway over social and cultural life, the dandy embodies the endless 
possibilities no longer possible; “the malady of infinite aspiration” after the loss of a 
definitive rule of life.206 
These are the sociohistorical conditions that frame the birth of the dandy. Preoccupied 
with materiality, he sought to rescue a sense of self in conditions under which the possibility 
of distinction was increasingly waning. Dandyism thus attempted to establish “a new kind 
of aristocracy”— one based on spirit; outside its old reproduction on the basis of money and 
power, so that it could endure the democratic levelling of life.207 For Baudelaire the real 
stakes in the existence of the dandy was the loss of individuality: the dandy was animated 
by “the burning need to create for oneself a personal originality, bounded only by the limits 
of the properties.”208 
Baudelaire’s thought reveals the strong belief that under conditions of democratic 
levelling of difference, art needs to find a way to preserve its status as the site wherein a 
sense of individuality can survive. And he commanded the “man of the world” to discover 
it in the life of the urban metropolis. Yet Duchamp’s embodiment of the “man of world” 
denies that possibility. His response to the questions centred by Baudelaire— the 
abbreviation of technique and destabilisation of artistic identity— appears to imply that the 
                                                             
203 “There is no form of rational and assured government save an aristocracy. A monarchy or a republic, 
based upon democracy, are equally absurd and feeble. The immense nausea of advertisements. There are but 
three beings worthy of respect: the priest, the warrior and the poet. To know, to kill and to create. The rest of 
mankind may be taxed and drudged, they are born for the stable, that is to say, to practise what they call 
professions.” 
Charles Baudelaire, Intimate Journals, trans. Christopher Isherwood (New York: Dover Publications, 2006), 
74-75. 
204 Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life, p.28. 
205 Walter Benjamin, “The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire,” in The Writer of Modern Life: Essays 
on Baudelaire, ed. Michael W. Jennings, trans. Howard Eiland, Edmund Jephcott, Rodney Livingston and 
Harry Zohn (Cambridge, Mass; London: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 46-133, 
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206 Emil Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Society of Education, ed. 
Everett K. Wilson, trans. Everett K. Wilson and Herman Schnurer (London; New York, The Free Press, 
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208 Ibid., 27. 
85 
 
inner life of the modern artist cannot, and probably should not, survive its saturation in the 
premises that Baudelaire’s interpretation of modernity was founded on. 
Nevertheless, this did not eliminate the possibilities for new types of authorship. While 
the political and cultural institutions of democratic life are designed to reproduce equality, 
to encourage modes of subjectivity and relating conducive to its frictionless reproduction, 
Duchamp realises an authorial voice through the repudiation of an exceptional personality. 
By reversing the expectation of the artworld for the performance of individuality, he, in fact, 
declares his unwavering confidence in his strength as an authorial presence. Abandoning the 
anachronistic desire to prove a mythical, hypertrophic ego, he transforms the denouncement 
of exception into a form of sublimated megalothymia. As T.S. Eliot asserted:  
Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the 
expression of personality, but an escape from personality. But, of course, only 
those who have personality and emotions know what it means to want to escape 
from these things.”209 
Duchamp’s description of his inner motivations appears to echo this sentiment: “I’ve always 
felt this need to escape myself.”210 But to escape oneself, the self needs to exist, and to feel 
compelled to do so is to escape its overpowering presence.  
The true modern artist becomes then the one who understates or denies access to their 
own personal world. Impersonality reveals itself not as the negation of the self through the 
personal overidentification with the characteristics of the conformist crowd of democratic 
life, but as a way out of it. Unlike Baudelaire’s dandy, who is a symptom emerging out of 
the slow death of the old and the refusal of the new to be born,211 Duchamp’s “aristocratism” 
derives from his status as the pioneer of the apathetic embrace of the new. Duchamp accepts 
the transition from the old aristocratic order to mass democratic existence and no longer 
needs to reconstruct an exceptional identity based on a detached enjoyment of vanity and 
beauty. His proposition subverts the aristocratic origins of Baudelaire’s exceptionalism; 
Duchamp’s construction of a singular identity is based on its paradoxical negation while 
remaining firmly inside its generative context, the context of art. His paradigm is one of 
unexceptional exception in a socio-cultural environment that has yet to fully confront the 
reality of its impossibility; an impossibility fully realised in the impersonal, aesthetically 
                                                             
209 Eliot., 21. 
210 Cabanne, 31. 
211 This is of course a liberal adaptation of the famous observation by Antonio Gramsci: “The crisis consists 
precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of 
morbid symptoms appear.” 
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare 
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 276. 
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deflated practices of the American 1960s. And in that way, he becomes a prophet of a new 
era: Duchamp maps out the predominant model of authorship in conditions of mass 
democracy. 
Under this light, Duchamp’s repudiation of personality anticipates art’s new need to 
address the commonality of democratic life. His selection of objects drawn directly from the 
representations of the everyday, his conscious decision to suppress the impulse of artisanal 
intervention, and his playful identification with the subject of mass culture are impersonal 
only insofar as the artist-as-author is concerned. As his work and identity are liberated from 
the individuality of the artist, his impersonality becomes a mode of an interpersonal 
production and experience of art; his work is the nascent form of an art of the audience. Yet, 
when an artwork allows itself to become the conduit of an active audience, it is the invisible 
curator of this interaction who is primarily valorised as a creative subject. In this new 
paradigm of authorship, the democratising impulse inherent in the understatement of 





















DELEGATION AND DEMATERIALISATION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the major challenges that any analysis of socially engaged art practice has to 
face lies in its inextricability from forms of activity that originate outside of art’s 
conventional framework. This proximity is thematic as well as structural: thematic in the 
irreducibility of social practice’s themes and outcomes to what is proper or useful to art, and 
structural in the incorporation of processes that are by no means peculiar to art. In fact, one 
of the defining characteristics of socially engaged practice is that the forms of labour integral 
to its performance and realisation are often firmly non-artistic. This relation of proximity 
gives rise to the two main problems I set out to explore in this chapter: delegation and 
commodification. The first half of the chapter lays out a necessary framework of practices 
and explores their historical evolution as strategies of delegation, while the second half 
explores the problem of commodification and immateriality in Nicholas Bourriaud’s 
influential “Relational Aesthetics” of 1998. 
Art practices whose object is the mobilisation of collective action, the enactment of 
forms of social interaction, or the analysis of social and political systems do not simply 
signify clear departures from the older aesthetic-contemplative character of art, but also 
appear largely disinterested even in the aporetic function of the historical avant-garde. 
Socially engaged art no longer attempts to blur the boundary between the practices that merit 
the privilege of the museum and those that do not. In other words, the centrality of the non-
artistic in contemporary socially engaged art practices is not an extension or attempt to revive 
the avant-garde iconoclastic tradition— the tradition that disabused art of the notion of an 
indispensable aesthetic core. When the blurring of the boundaries between art and non-art 
became so confounding as to demonstrate the futility of normative definitions, the artworld 
decisively restructured itself on the absorption of the latter. This is a score that has been 
resolutely settled in the twentieth century; only naiveté or cynicism could interpret 
contemporary art as the re-enactment of the avant-gardist struggle over the status of the art 
object, and the domains of art and non-art. As John Roberts has pointed out, the readymade 
and reproducibility— the two main critiques of the status of the art object in modernity— 
are “no longer ‘parasitic’ on art, living on the margins of painterly modernist subjectivity, 
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but are constitutive of the technical relations of art’s production.”212 This is the axiomatic 
position from which socially engaged practice begins. 
The readymade remains, nevertheless, the prehistory of contemporary experiments in 
art’s societalisation. Firstly, the readymade is the first artform which implies that the work 
of the non-artist might in fact be the object of the artwork; the timidity of my formulation at 
this point reflects the fact that the readymade exists in the history of the crisis of the artwork 
and was not its resolution. On that account, the readymade is productive insofar as it 
generates new value and meaning through the appropriation of the embodied labour of the 
non-artist. Inevitably, however, this act of appropriation and recontextualisation institutes an 
artwork that is socially constructed: no longer the possession of a singular author but 
constituted through forms of work that inhere outside of the traditionally understood 
personal universe of the artist. The readymade, therefore, intersects with the dimension of 
“openness” in art. Umberto Eco arrived at the concept of the “open work” through the 
observation of examples of modern artworks which did not seal off their performance or 
interpretation possibilities; such works included, for example, Pierre Boulez’s aleatoric 
Third Piano Sonata (1955-1957), composed of pieces of music that were not defined in 
linear succession and could thus be rearranged by the performer.213 Subsequently, in his 
exploration of the concept, Eco proposed that the evolution of modern art was in fact 
inscribed in a movement toward openness; openness as a heuristic was consequently inverted 
and found to correspond to a more implicit detachment of the modern artwork’s content from 
a singular, fixed meaning. The openness of social practice lies in its enactment through the 
literal enactment of the work necessary for its production by a group of people. Openness in 
socially engaged art practice becomes then the dimension of its collective construction 
through processes of delegation. 
In my discussion, delegation acquires a broader meaning— it is not limited to the direct 
assignment of productive duties to third parties of the kind that Andy Warhol or Sol LeWitt 
popularised. Following John Roberts’ employment of the term, delegation signifies here the 
construction of a work of art through a necessary collective diffusion and ownership of 
authorial duties. This means that delegation can be more or less hierarchical, preconceived, 
or can even evolve organically through the coordination of a group; in contemporary art, the 
forms of collaboration it corresponds to are flexible and can range from explicit top-down 
chains of command to emphatically open-ended forms of contributed labour. Naturally, this 
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emancipation can be understood to correspond to contemporary art’s pluralist character, yet 
this is not the only reason for its flexibility. In fact, the freedom to choose from a range of 
approaches to delegation reflects the waning importance of the art object itself in 
contemporary socially engaged art. To clarify: for as long as the inevitable destination of the 
artistic process was the production of the art object, delegation needed to be governed by a 
system that could safely lead to a specific objective outcome. Once artistic production 
becomes immaterial however, it opens up a variety of paths that an authorial group can 
follow for the completion of a project. 
My insistence on the use of delegation instead of participation is conscious. The reason 
for that is that the latter dilutes the systematicity of the artwork or art project. The artwork 
or art project will always be the product of specific forms of labour and contingent upon 
their distribution. Participation as a signifier with strong voluntarist connotations obfuscates 
that. In fact, the ubiquity of participation discourses in contemporary art must be treated with 
suspicion as it distorts the systematicity of the artwork into vague expressions of democratic 
isothymia. The danger of reframing socially engaged practices in terms of participation 
becomes all-too-evident once this systematicity is obscured by the abolition of the material 
constitution of the work: once the object is replaced by the social relation. There, I explore 
Nicholas Bourriaud’s conflation of the openness of relating in relational practices with a 
resistance to commodification; one of the most characteristic misconstruals of that kind. In 
“Relational Aesthetics” of 1998, Bourriaud suggested that relational practices’ irreducibility 
to portable, self-enclosed art objects, and their enactment in the “interstitial” environment of 
the contemporary art exhibition separate them from the relations that govern the general 
economy.214 
There are two ideas that need to be interrogated here. The first one is the conception 
of the exhibition as a “social interstice.” This term, borrowed from Marx, describes in 
Bourriaud’s text “a space in human relations which fits more or less harmoniously and 
openly into the overall system, but suggests other trading possibilities than those in effect 
within this system.”215 To deal with this problem I return to the source of Bourriaud’s 
employed term, Marx’s “Capital” and “Grundrisse,” and explore its meaning in the original 
context. There, “interstice” has a wholly different meaning than what Bourriaud purports; it 
does not designate a zone free from the alienating conditions of commodity production that 
may point to new modes of social and economic organisation. On the contrary, it represents 
temporary social formations subject to laws of domination just as oppressive— if not more— 
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which do not coexist harmoniously at all with the prevalent economic models based on 
commodity production. Naturally, the point here is not to attempt to invalidate Bourriaud’s 
position through a textualist return to the source; rather, what I demonstrate is that 
Bourriaud’s quasi-Marxian perspective is founded on a misconception, which is then 
projected onto the role of the contemporary art exhibition in capitalism. If the contemporary 
art exhibition can exist within capitalism without being totalised by the pressures of its 
productive relations, it is because it is at some level exempted from those and not because 
relational practices evade them. 
Which ultimately leads to the second point: Bourriaud’s formulation of relational art’s 
commodity character, or even the implied lack thereof, is based on a reluctance to recognise 
that Marx’s analysis of commodification is not limited to object-commodities. What creates 
the commodity is instead the commodification of labour. The fact, however, that Bourriaud’s 
relational practices are produced in an environment where participation is voluntary and 
liberating, and still produces suplus-value without calling attention to it— silencing it even— 
draws an inevitable parallel between delegation in relational practices and the modes of 
subjectivation in neoliberalism.  
There are two main directions for a critical reading of neoliberalism. The first one, 
exemplified by writers such as David Harvey, follows the Marxian tradition and posits 
neoliberalism primarily as a class project which creates hegemonic discourses to legitimise 
the rolling back of the state and the domination of social life by market economics.216 The 
second one regards neoliberalism as an issue of government, or rather self-government, on 
the basis of competition and interest. This is the perspective of Michel Foucault, as 
articulated in the 1978-1979 lectures at the Collège de France and specifically in his analysis 
of the theory of “human capital.”217 The main difference between the two approaches is the 
exteriority of neoliberal discourse; in Harvey’s account neoliberalism is an ideology 
propagated and imposed from specific centres of interest, while for Foucault neoliberalism 
is a “general style of thought, analysis, and imagination”218 that is self-reproducing; just as 
dominating as it is self-reflexive. On that account, Foucault’s analysis has been attentive to 
neoliberalism’s utopian pretensions which maintain and mobilise its “technologies of 
self.”219 Foucault’s account, therefore, produces a neoliberalism insidious and totalising, one 
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which, as Thomas Lemke remarks, “endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests it 
already exists.”220 It is not merely a political project responsible for the gradual upending of 
the embedded liberalism of the postwar era, but a cemented system of depoliticisation— a 
system of suppression of conflict across all aspects of socioeconomic life, including 
individual dispositions toward work. On that account, even without subscribing to the 
absolute genealogy of Foucault as I have already analysed, his neoliberalism can be a very 
useful tool in the analysis of the breakdown between Marxian social reproduction and 
production in neoliberalism— in the analysis of a world of work without end, where the 
private has been economised and the economic has become a matter of personal expression; 
of style. It is these transformative effects that need to be considered in the examination of 
art practices that draw their material from social life, as the layers of mystification which 
envelop the art space separate it from the site of mere ideological catechism and present the 
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Daniel Zamora, Michael C. Behrent (eds), Foucault and Neoliberalism (Polity Press, 2015)  
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3.2 DELEGATION AND SHARED AUTHORSHIP 
3.2.1 AUTONOMOUS AND HETERONOMOUS LABOUR 
The question of what forms and structures of labour art is produced through is 
inextricable from the problem of creativity. For as long as art was the object of ritual, the 
concept of creativity was either inchoate or of theological character. The Greek language 
lacked a word to describe this artistic creativity altogether: with the exception of poetry, art 
was a matter of “τέχνη” (techne) and thus derived from natural laws, observed and applied 
to the artistic object.221 A similar disconnect can be found in the Romans: for them, creator 
signified “father” or “founder.”222 Consistent with the conception of art as craft, notions of 
creativity were thoroughly unrelated to art during the Middle Ages; the act of creating 
reflected theological ideas instead, as evidenced in the creation of the cosmos as a “creatio 
ex nihilo.”   
Creativity as a concept associated with art emerged tentatively during the Italian 
Renaissance where it came to reflect the emerging individualism of the era. In Vasari’s 
writing the practice of painting was defined through the acts of imitation (imitazione) and 
invention (invezione). With the notion of invention now underlying the artistic process, 
creativity came to signify the Renaissance painter’s nascent independence, as that was tested 
in the struggle to create something greater than nature.223 At the same time, creativity also 
addressed the artist’s eccentric characteristics; Paolo Veronese’s assertion that painters share 
the liberties of poets and madmen reveals the proximity between ideas of artistic greatness 
and eccentricity— or even pathology— already existent from the Renaissance period.224 
Eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought was still relatively cautious with regard to the 
adoption of the term, which now appeared mainly associated with imagination. The main 
reasons for that scepticism were two: the theological origin of the concept, and the 
conception of art as adherence to rules.225 As evidenced in Kant’s emphasis on a necessary 
delineation between originality and genius, art was still understood as a studious and 
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systematic endeavour that could not be judged on the merits of imagination alone.226 Denis 
Diderot, on the other hand, went even further to state in his critique of Claude-Joseph Vernet 
in the Salon of 1767: “imagination creates nothing.”227 
The nineteenth century did not simply mark the elevation of creativity to a prestigious 
status in artistic activity, but in fact, its near exclusivity in the work of artists. There were 
various interconnected factors which contributed to this change. Janet Wolff identified that 
the monopolisation of creativity by artistic work was essentially a consequence of the social 
isolation of the artist in nineteenth century capitalist societies. The enshrinement of creativity 
within the realm of the artist followed therefore from a conception of art as separated from, 
and often in opposition to, social life in industrial capitalism. This is the era when the 
development of the autonomous institution of art entrenched the work of the artist as a 
reflection of creativity— and both as opposites to heteronomous labour.228 This environment 
magnified the contradictions between artistic and productive economic activity, and art came 
to be delimited as an autonomous, theoretically self-governing sphere.229 This underlines the 
fundamental ambiguity of art’s autonomy: on the one hand, autonomy was a consequence 
of the colonisation of modern life by economic transaction, while on the other, it served as 
a means to defend the status of the artist in the new professionally uncertain environment.230 
Therefore, the monopolisation of creativity as a characteristic of the autonomous activity of 
the artist was both a consequence of nineteenth century economic organisation and an 
ineffective, as it was proven, means to mitigate its consequences. 
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For the artist of the historical avant-garde, the bourgeois proposition that creativity 
was what unfolds inside the ossified hierarchies of a socially isolated art institution was an 
absurd one. In fact, the life-forms developing outside the institution were much more vibrant, 
dynamic, overwhelming, and far exceeded the representational traditions of academic and 
bourgeois taste. When Tristan Tzara stated in 1922 that “life is far more interesting than 
art,”231 art had long ceased being cherished as the sanctuary for what is creative and 
liberating: the avant-garde artist saw bourgeois art for all its insufficiency. Not only was art 
inadequate to reflect the dynamism of the modern world; even the avant-garde— for all its 
new and radical methods— was often unable measure up to it. As Man Ray wrote to Tzara 
in 1921:  
Cher Tzara— dada cannot live in New York. All New York is dada and will not 
tolerate a rival— will not notice dada.232 
In the avant-garde project of the unification of art and life we can, therefore, discern 
the attempt to synchronise artmaking with the forms of creativity unfolding outside of it. 
The analytic function of the avant-garde lay in the dismantling of the art-creativity dyad: in 
the extraction of the “beautiful” and the “extraordinary” from their field of signification. To 
accomplish that, the artists of the avant-garde invented new artforms immersed in modern 
representations. The end result of this process was the disruption of the fixity of categories 
as mediators of relations between individuals and objects: the dissociation of the concept of 
“genius” from artmaking, and the transformation of art into creative activity freely unfolding 
in one’s everyday life experience.233 With the attack against art’s autonomous status, 
creativity could now become something that exists unconstrained, penetrating potentially 
every aspect of life. The first step for the diffusion of creativity into life was, therefore, its 
decentring. If creativity could exist freely outside art however, then the labour of art could 
conversely be non-artistic. 
The avant-garde incorporation and acknowledgement of extra-artistic labour 
processes in the construction of the artwork was thus integral to the project of de-
essentialising the hierarchical arrangement between art and non-art. The readymade, as the 
paradigmatic avant-garde artform crystalised the indispensability of heteronomous labour 
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for the existence of the artwork, instrumentalising the social division of labour through the 
employment of extra-artistic technical skills. While liberating, the expansion of the 
acceptable forms of art’s labour signified at the same time art’s entrance into the realm of 
general economy; this is a side-effect of the avant-garde project well established by now. 
In its synchronisation with the technological world of capitalism, the avant-garde artwork 
underwent a gradual elimination of its artisanal base, which was compensated either 
through activities performed by non-artists or through the performance of technical but non-
artisanal skills by the artists themselves, mirroring thus the processes of deskilling in 
capitalism.234 While early twentieth century avant-garde practices relied on non-artistic 
labour extensively, this was normally in the form of alienated labour as a substitute for 
artistic work. In montage and readymade-based artworks the non-artistic productive 
procedures embodied in the found material were acknowledged but rarely performed by the 
artist; it was selection and decontextualisation that formed the first stages of the artist’s 
intervention. Later in the century, post-readymade practices proceeded to acknowledge the 
composite character of authorship officially, as an internal stage of the productive 
procedure, in strategies that Roberts describes as “surrogate authorship.”235 
Throughout the twentieth century delegation became a popular strategy across 
multiple movements and artists, and was employed for the expression of a variety of 
aesthetic and political motivations. Delegation was just as important a strategy for the 
“workerist” constructivist experiments of Moholy-Nagy as it was for Warhol’s “Taylorist” 
revision of the Renaissance workshop. One of the earliest examples of formally delegated 
work in art production was when in 1922, five years after Duchamp’s Fountain, Moholy-
Nagy famously commissioned over the phone five steel paintings covered in porcelain 
enamel. The artistic labour that Moholy-Nagy contributed was purely immaterial and 
simply consisted in dialling the factory telephone number and giving the necessary 
instructions.236 The embrace of delegation by Conceptual artists later in the century 
underlined its reversely proportional relationship with art’s artisanal conception— techne. 
As Sol LeWitt asserted, once the idea is established as the essence of the artwork, execution 
becomes a “perfunctory affair”— something secondary that can be executed by someone 
other than the artist or even not executed at all.237 Finally, in Andy Warhol’s extensive 
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system of collaboration and delegation his assistants were assigned with those tasks that did 
not interfere with his signature style; this would regularly make their labour 
indistinguishable from his own.238 Warhol’s reliance on external work was so thorough that 
it would at times exceed the tasks strictly related to the material production of the artwork 
and even involved aesthetic decision-making. According to the famous anecdotal history 
of the Coca Cola bottle, Warhol’s own trademark detached approach was based on Emile 
de Antonio’s recommendation to abandon his early expressive style in favour for a clean-
cut, commercial one, while the idea for the Campbell Soup Cans of 1962 was allegedly 
purchased from his friend, Muriel Latow, for the price of fifty dollars.239 
3.2.2 THE OPEN WORK 
The extensive use of delegated work in art production invariably foregrounded the 
issue of “openness” in art. In his seminal treatise of 1962, Umberto Eco identified two 
different layers along which we can examine the openness of an artwork. The first would be 
what we conventionally understand as the elements of subjectivity that reorganise the 
artwork and its interpretation during its reception. The process by which this type of 
openness materialises is contingent on the reaction that a work provokes in the audience that 
it addresses. Reception is naturally not monolithic; the form of a work can be perceived in 
several different ways and evoke a variety of different responses. The important element that 
defines a work of art in the Western tradition is that the co-presence of a range of possible 
interpretations does not invalidate the work’s status; the artwork retains its status as art, not 
in spite of the potentially multiple perspectives from which it can be looked at, but precisely 
because of them. Even though an artistic proposition might be presented as a completed 
formal entity, with beginning, middle, and end expressing a specific artistic intention, an 
element of openness is incontrovertibly inscribed in its reception.240 When Western art exited 
its sacral phase and entered the field of aesthetic representation, every work of art became 
to some degree intrinsically open; unlike signs and objects of utility that cease existing in 
their intended form and particular meaning when they are removed from a specific context, 
works of art are generally open to different interpretations without slipping through 
categories.241 
Nevertheless, and this is a crucial contribution of Eco’s theory, openness is not limited 
to the types of “interpretation and performance” integral to the reception of art. Modern art 
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moved on to a relative externalisation of openness— it externalised the freedom of subjective 
association of interpretation into forms of action that a performer is invited to undertake for 
the “completion” of the work.242 The modern artwork is thus premised on a field of 
possibilities rather than a definite form that produces predetermined performances and elicits 
fixed meanings. The openness of modern art creates the conditions for external participation 
beyond the stage of interpretation: “the author offers the interpreter, the performer, the 
addressee a work to be completed.”243 The work of art however, as Eco pointed out, is always 
governed by a logical organisation which ultimately redirects authorship back to the author. 
For it to exist, it needs to maintain a stable centre— a modicum of organisation the 
parameters of which are set by the author: an element of systematicity. These parameters 
define the extent of external participation: the dimension of openness is not commensurate 
with an “amorphous invitation to indiscriminate participation.”244 
Not all artworks produce the same conditions for audience intervention in qualitative 
and quantitative terms. Anna Dezeuze identifies the variance in openness in the dialectic of 
“extending” and “abolishing the frame of the artwork.”245 The comparison between Robert 
Rauschenberg’s Black Market of 1961 (Fig.9) and George Brecht’s Suitcase of 1959 (Fig.10) 
highlights how different politics of participation produce different degrees of openness. 
Rauchenberg’s Black Market invited viewers to remove one of four numbered objects from 
a case and replace it with another of their choice. Having done so, they were then instructed 
to register the new object in one of correspondingly numbered notepads on the canvas, by 
drawing it in the place of the replaced one. Contrary to Rauschenberg’s instructions, Brecht’s 
Suitcase was premised simply on the removal of any of the objects from the exhibited case 
and its subsequent use “in ways appropriate to their nature.”246 While Rauschenberg’s clearly 
laid out instructions limited the artwork within certain parameters articulated and 
emphasised by the artist, Brecht opened it up by allowing the unrestricted removal and 
reappropriation of the originally provided items. A similarly different sensitivity between 
the two artists is highlighted in the juxtaposition of Rauschenberg’s Pilgrim of 1960 and 
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Brecht’s Three Chairs Event of 1961. Rauschenberg’s use of the chair saw it attached to a 
painted canvas; through this gesture Rauschenberg foreclosed it from audience use. Even if 
an audience member violated Rauschenberg’s intention and used the chair, their action 
would compromise the experience of the work as it would ultimately involve turning their 
back on the canvas. On the other hand, Brecht envisioned a discreet and seamless 
incorporation of the chairs in the gallery space, resulting in the audience’s inability to 
distinguish them from their everyday counterparts, unaware of their special status.247 
 
Figure 9 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 9 Robert Rauschenberg, Black Market, 1961.  
 
Figure 10 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 10 George Brecht, Suitcase, 1959.                            
           
There is, however, an interesting contradiction that needs to be addressed here. When 
the readymade-based work is not inserted into an explicitly participatory context, its 
intersection with openness becomes rather aporetic. The reason for this is that, while on the 
one hand, the readymade’s expansion of art’s productive base appears to fully encapsulate 
the logic of openness at a structural level, on the other, its social construction closes it off 
formally. To clarify: the work of art as a product of acknowledged collaboration abandons 
the claim to a unitary creative personality and attests to its production through processes that 
necessarily involve more people than the artist. In industrial capitalism, however, the social 
construction of the readymade-based artwork is at the same time the source of the very 
processes that suppress its formal openness. Because the logic of the readymade is the 
immersion of the artwork in the productive procedures of the general economy, it inevitably 
borrows— critically or not— its characteristics. The rigidity of industrial design, the 
commercial finish of the manufactured object and its seriality are simultaneously integral 
elements of the artwork’s collective construction and the elements that seal its formal 
closure. This is an issue that can be observed in the “coldness” of the Minimalist object: 
theoretically open yet formally closed off.  
Ironically, it was Michael Fried’s scathing critique of Minimalism in 1967 that 
explained in detail how these object-based practices retained their openness; this was 
precisely the reason for Fried’s very negative assessment, after all. Minimalist works, by 
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erasing the distance between the medium and the object, became works actualised through 
their experience by the viewer; they became works based on the modality of viewer 
experience— essentially “theatrical” and thus relying on a “stage presence.”248 Therefore, 
in their alleged collapse of the inexpressive object and art, openness re-emerged not as a 
visual quality but as a way of relating. This is an important dimension that characterises 
much of contemporary art, including of course, socially engaged practices: the retreat of the 
expressive characteristics of the object— with the disappearance of the object altogether as 
its logical conclusion— makes exhibition the medium of art. When the internal relational 
character of the composition is suppressed, it is sublimated into the spatial relating between 
viewer and work. 
 
3.3 FROM OPENNESS TO ACTION: THREE MODELS OF DELEGATION 
Contemporary socially engaged art incorporates these lessons and turns the 
experiential relation with the work in space into a direct intervention into its formal 
characteristics. This is accomplished by tying the experience of the audience into the active 
participation in the production of the work. Unlike the experience of the modern art 
exhibition, wherein the audience fulfils a productive role only insofar as the artist has 
conceived their work in the dialectic of the “coefficient of art”— that is, only insofar as the 
artist expects something to be contributed by the audience either in the form of revealing or 
producing meaning, as has already been discussed in Chapter 2— socially engaged art 
practices literalise and perform this relation in space. With the experience of the socially 
engaged artwork becoming, therefore, inextricable from the labour that the participants 
provide toward the performance of the work, the experience of the work through 
participation takes the form of— implicitly or explicitly— delegated labour. The 
collaborative processes of socially engaged art do not simply commentate on the social 
character of the production of art but rather literalise it, as they enact the social processes 
of their production as the mode by which artwork are experienced. 
The framing of contemporary socially engaged art in the vague terms of participation 
is however insufficient. The forms of labour written in the various contemporary 
articulations derive from different conceptions of delegation, and unlike the original early 
twentieth century incorporation of non-artistic hands, the expansion of authorship in recent 
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decades is not limited to the integration of specialist technical workers. In that respect, we 
could classify contemporary socially engaged art practices in three categories. The first one 
is composed of practices that involve expanded authorship but require the use of technical 
skills by the participants/collaborators, or by the audience more broadly. The second 
category does not dematerialise the contributing labour of the audience but renders the 
existence of a shared modicum of technical skills rather inessential. Finally, the last group 
consists of participatory practices that, without necessarily obviating all types of virtuoso 
activity among participants, lift the technical barrier of entry completely. The last category 
of works actualise themselves as nexuses of human interaction and sociality and tend to align 
participation with its socio-communicative characteristics. 
Works such as Rirkrit Tiravanija’s Untitled 2008-2011 (the map of the land of feeling) 
I-III (Fig.11) belong to the first category. The work— an enormously ambitious 
collaborative print spanning over 3 feet high and 84 feet long, composed of a montage of 
inkjet printing, lithography and screenprinting249— required the work of an entire team of 
highly specialised workers, among which “several master printers, shop managers and (at 
least) 40 students worked on the project at one time or another.”250 The work was overseen 
by Thomas Vu while Tiravanija’s involvement consisted mainly in coordinating, often 
through his assistant, and providing direction.251 
 
Figure 11 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 11 Rirkrit Tiravanija, Untitled 2008–2011 (the map of the land of feeling) I–III. 2008-11. 
 
Tiravanija assumed, therefore, a more managerial role as the bulk of the production was 
taken up by specialist collaborators and volunteers. In contrast with Tiravanija’s example, 
Tobias Rehberger, despite relying on delegated heteronomous labour extensively, employs 
strategies that attempt to disrupt the one-on-one correspondence between delegation and 
execution. In 1994 during a visit to Cameroon, Rehberger commissioned the production of 
chairs based on the classical modernist designs of Gerrit Rietveld, Alvar Aalto, and Marcel 
Breuer to local craftsmen. The twist he introduced to the task was that he provided the 
craftsmen with crude drawings of the designs only, resulting thus in products vastly different 
from their European counterparts. Similarly, beginning in 1999, Rehberger has produced a 
series of iconic sports cars such as Porsche and McLaren F1 in collaboration with car 
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manufacturers in Thailand who have had to work off his incomplete plans. Since the plans 
were by no means sufficient for the production of accurate versions of the originals, 
Rehberger forced the manufacturers to directly enter the creative process.252 
Carlos Amorales’s Flames Maquiladora (2001-2003) (Fig.12) provides an example of 
the second category. In Flames Maquiladora, Amorales transformed over the period of three 
years gallery spaces into impromptu sweatshops. For this project, Amorales invited 
audiences to offer their unremunerated labour for the production of traditional Mexican 
wrestling shoes; that is, to emulate the productive labour that disenfranchised Mexican 
workers may find themselves forced to. Nevertheless, even though the premise of the project 
corresponded to a typically technical task, the project was not organised in a way that could 
filter the participants based on their experience or technical expertise: Amorales did not seek 
to recruit an audience with shoemaking skills. The success of the project itself was separated 
from the successful completion of the technical task at hand, and in fact, the goal of Amorales 
appears to have been rather the opposite: not to actualise Western audiences through the 
fulfilling employment of technical skills and talents, but to demonstrate that beneath the 
exotic surface of a cultural curiosity lies a machinery of very real dehumanisation. The 
drudgery of work in Flames Maquiladora becomes, therefore, a microcosm that reflects the 
depersonalising futility the survival of the global periphery relies on; Amorales employs a 
relational strategy in order to ridicule the naivety of the claim for emancipation through 
participation.253 Quite fittingly then, by the time the project completed its three year cycle 
not a single shoe had been produced.254 
 
Figure 12 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
           Figure 12 Carlos Amorales, Flames Maquiladora, 2003. 
 
Finally, the third category is composed of practices that rely on rather immaterial forms 
of audience participation. Unlike the previous two groups of social practice, artworks here 
utilise strategies of delegation that revolve either around the interactions between the 
participating members of the audience or between the audience and elements— animate or 
inanimate– of the environment that the artist is responsible for. Even though these practices 
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tend to be generally aligned with, or understood within, Bourriaud’s relational framework or 
Kester’s dialogical aesthetics, these terms cannot by any means encompass the entire range 
of artworks based on these types of extra-artistic work. 
Returning to Rirkrit Tiravanija, his signature works are characteristic examples of this 
last category. His original project Untitled (Free) of 1992 (Fig.13), which subsequently 
spawned a series of emblematic recreations, was built on a disarmingly simple premise. 
Tiravanija decided to turn the gallery space into a space for free and convivial exchange 
between people around the unifying experience of culinary pleasure. His work consisted 
therefore in the transformation of the gallery space into a makeshift restaurant where the 
members of the audience were offered the traditional Thai curry the artist had prepared. A 
similarly idealised, unassuming, and technically undemanding vision of social interaction 
lies at the heart of works such as Exchange of Mental, Physical and Un-detected Substances 
of Known and Un-known Matter During a Period of Four Nights, (1996) (Fig.14) by Carl 
Michael von Hausswolff, Andrew M. McKenzie and Ulf Bilting for the collective exhibition 
“Interpol” (Färgfabriken Stockholm, 1996). For this project the artists used the gallery to 
organise a sleep-in during the first days of the exhibition, inviting the audience to join.255 
 
Figure 13 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 13 Rirkrit Tiravanija, Untitled (Free), 303 Gallery, New York, 1992. 
 
Figure 14 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 14 Carl Michael von Hausswolff, Andrew M. McKennie and Ulf Bilting, Exchange of Mental, 
Physical and Undetected Substances of Know and Unknown Matter During a Period of Four Nights, 1996. 
 
Santiago Sierra, on the other hand, offers a disruptive and antagonistic vision of 
collective art production. Many of his works are premised on hiring socio-economically 
marginalised people to perform highly demeaning tasks for negligible money. Sierra 
outsources the employment of these people to recruitment agencies, does not develop any 
kind of personal relationship with them, and always emphasises the transactional character 
of their involvement in the work— a gesture which, as Claire Bishop points out, intensifies 
the alienating character of his projects.256 In his work “Workers Who Cannot Be Paid, 
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Remunerated to Remain inside Carton Boxes” presented in Kunstwerke Berlin in 2000 
(Fig.15), Santiago Sierra employed 6 Chechen asylum seekers to stand inside carton boxes 
for four hours a day over six weeks. Being prohibited from employment due to their legal 
status, the workers were forced to remain in anonymity for their own safety.257 Hiring the 
undocumented refugees to perform this purposeless and dehumanising task for which they 
were paid disproportionally less in comparison to his own financial gain, Sierra drew a clear 
parallel between collaboration and extraction of surplus value, reframing the space of art as 
a space of exploitation and accumulation. This is a topic consistently tackled in the artist’s 
work— in Person Saying a Phrase of 2002 Sierra hired a beggar to be recorded saying: “My 
participation in this work could generate £72,000 profit. I am paid £5.”258 In the self-
explanatorily titled 160 cm Line Tattooed on 4 People (Salamanca, Spain. December 2000) 
(Fig.16) what was alluded in the carton boxes works— that the ownership of one’s body is 
under constant negotiation in capitalism— becomes the clear object of the action. Four 
heroin-addicted sex workers were hired for the price of one shot of heroin in exchange for a 
tattooed line on their backs.259 Sierra’s decentering of authorship takes, therefore, the form 
of an absolute surrender of the last vestiges of autonomy by people who can no longer afford 
the illusion of choice. His collaborators are beings bereft of agency, bought and sold, and 
denied even the most basic dignity.260 
 
Figure 15 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 15 Santiago Sierra, Workers Who Cannot Be Paid, Remunerated to Remain Inside Carton Boxes. 
Kunstwerke Berlin, Germany, September 2000. 
 
Figure 16 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 16 Santiago Sierra, 160 cm Line Tattooed on 4 People. El Gallo Arte Contamporaneo, Salamanca, 
Spain. December 2000. 
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3.3.1 THE BANISHMENT OF THE ART OBJECT 
Despite the striking differences between the practices of Tiravanija’s Untitled (free) 
and Sierra’s Workers Who Cannot Be Paid, Remunerated to Remain inside Carton Boxes, 
both artists’ works converge in one important aspect: these projects produce no lasting 
artistic object. Even though there are clear indications that both artists conceive the bodies 
of their participants as artistic media in varying degrees— Sierra through enactments of 
exploitation and abuse, and Tiravanija through their presence and reciprocation of 
openness— neither produces quantifiable, self-enclosed aesthetic objects that can exist 
beyond the lifespan of the project. The focus of the work lies instead in the production of 
social relations— however intimate, enjoyable, cathartic or agonising these may be. For 
both artists the site of meaning production no longer lies in stable artistic forms but in the 
exploration of tensions and commonalities— in elements of intersubjectivity, or the lack 
thereof. And although the participants retain their materiality after the end of the action, 
and might even carry the scars of their participation, they cease to exist as anything but 
aspects of documentation once the work completes its cycle.  
This is, of course, not a characteristic unique to these two artists; the art of the “social 
turn” in general exhibits a tendency toward the departure from the production of art objects. 
Its intersubjective orientation, reflected in the move away from a definition of artistic labour 
as the production of quantifiable material outcomes, raises thus the issue of immateriality 
in artistic and general economy. The dematerialisation of the artistic products of socially 
engaged practices— their resistance to the production of clearly representable, quantifiable 
and marketable art objects— is in fact a direction toward which the activist and relational 
tendencies of the “social turn” converge. 
As activist forms of socially engaged art are by definition disembedded from a 
limiting conception of art practice as the production of art objects, their analysis does not 
present too many significant complications. The premise of these practices tends to be 
relatively straightforward; it always involves a cause, abstract or specific in varying 
degrees, an initiative that inspires a primary form of mobilisation, the planning out of the 
procedures necessary for the materialisation of the work, and, finally, the implementation 
of forms of action that have been decided through processes of interaction between the 
artist(s) and a group of participants or collaborators. The end-result of these activist 
practices consists of material outcomes that could be examined through the prism of art but 





Figure 17 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 17 Joseph Beuys, 7,000 Oak Trees, 1982. Kassel, Germany. 
 
 When Joseph Beuys was invited by Documenta to produce and exhibit a work for 
the exhibition of 1982 (documenta 7), he decided that instead of a sculptural piece he would 
direct his energy to a large-scale project of environmental regeneration; an idea that led to 
the 7,000 Oak Trees (Fig.17) which was eventually completed a year after his death in 1986. 
In line with his ecological concerns as well as his, admittedly, highly idealistic belief in 
art’s “evolutionary-revolutionary” potential for a universal transformation of life,261 7,000 
Oak Trees took the form of a major intervention in the urban and ecological planning of 
Kassel. The project was based on collective action, deliberation with local authorities and 
collaboration with communities toward consensual solutions and their implementation. It 
is noteworthy that Beuys did not conceive the project as mere public service but in rather 
aestheticised terms; the tree planting process was tied to the management of 7,000 large 
basalt stones that had been piled up outside the main hub of the Documenta organisation, 
the Fridericanum museum in Kassel. The mechanism for the activation of the work was the 
following: for every tree planted, a stone would be removed, incentivising, therefore, the 
progression of the project and at the same time transforming it into a piece on ephemerality, 
movement, and rebirth. 7,000 Tree Oaks was as much a project of ecological activism as it 
was a conceptual-land art piece.  
Park Fiction (Fig.18), on the other hand, has a very different origin story. Park Fiction 
was born out of the collective reaction against the redevelopment of the waterfront area of 
Hamburg. When in 1994 Hamburg city authorities decided to repurpose a piece of public 
land for the construction of high-rise buildings that would wall off the residents of the 
Hafenstraße neighbourhood from the city waterfront, local activists, artists, and social 
workers formed an activist group in protest.262 This was the platform that spawned the Park 
Fiction project, originally conceived by the Hamburg-based artists Christoph Schäfer and 
Cathy Skene.263 Park Fiction gradually evolved into a large-scale social project that 
                                                             
261 “Only on condition of a radical widening of definition will it be possible for art and activities related to art 
to provide evidence that art is now the only evolutionary-revolutionary power. Only art is capable of 
dismantling the repressive effects of a senile social system that continues to totter along the deathline: to 
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Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), 123-125, 125. 
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combined activism, urban planning and art. Its programmatic goal was the recuperation of 
the land designated for gentrification and the revitalisation of the public space into a park 
envisioned, built, and enjoyed collectively. This led to a long process of collective work, 
negotiation and artistic activity. The planning process was gamified in order to attract the 
participation of local populations in processes aimed at the actualisation of aesthetic and 
practical desires into an open political intervention in the commons. The efforts of the 
project were eventually fruitful; within a decade of its inception the project had successfully 
prevented the original plans and managed to construct the largest parts of the park, which 
was officially inaugurated in 2005. Park Fiction has since attracted the attention of major 
art institutions and was for the first time incorporated in installation form in Platform 5 of 
documenta 11 in 2002. There, a Park Fiction delegation installed seven constructivist-
inspired benches containing important material documenting the history, activities and 
processes of the project (Fig.19).264 
 
Figure 18 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions.  
Figure 18 Park Fiction, Hamburg, Germany. 
Figure 19 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 19 Park Fiction, Documenta 11, 2002. 
 
In the more relational-oriented practices, Felix Gonzalez-Torres’s series of “stacks” 
works underline that even when the artwork has a more demarcated material existence— 
approximating the more conventional notion of an object-based practice or installation— it 
is often contingent or intentionally understated. The ‘stacks’ works may indeed be 
understood from the perspective of a minimalist practice on seriality and repetition. Untitled 
(Death by Gun) of 1990 (Fig.20) reflected these formal concerns through the specific modes 
by which the sheets of paper were configured on the gallery floor. Similarly, in Untitled 
(Portrait of Ross in L.A.) of 1991, the rectangle formed by boiled sweets had a distinct 
sculptural quality, while its leaning at the intersection of the gallery walls placed it within 
a context of minimalist spatial exploration. Nevertheless, the works’ essence was by no 
means confined to the aesthetic considerations that governed the arrangement of the 
multiple objects. Torres’s artworks were centred around the interaction of the audience 
members with the offered objects and among themselves, as they were confronted with a 
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gesture of generosity and were thus compelled to negotiate issues of freedom and 
responsibility. The audience, by picking up and keeping the pieces of the works that were 
at its disposal, affected its form and ultimately threatened— at least symbolically— its 
continuity.265 Ultimately, it was only through the audience’s interactions that Torres’s 
object configurations were signified and transformed into what they truly were: meditations 
on permanence and loss, with materiality forming the pretext that set this dialogue in 
motion. 
Finally, in Olafur Eliasson’s The Weather Project of 2003 (Turbine Hall, Tate 
Modern, London) (Fig.21) the giant orange globe that represented the sun, composed of 
hundreds of tiny lamps, the dry ice effects that created an impression of mist, and the giant 
mirror on the ceiling reflecting the movement of bodies in space, were not the components 
of a work that could exist by virtue of its own materiality.266 Their use was instead directly 
related to the creation of a specific atmosphere that audiences could navigate; they were 
simply instruments for the creation of an environment that allowed the transformation of a 
banal theme of everyday interaction into an apocalyptic collective spectacle. The Weather 
Project attempted therefore to transform the proverbial instances of socialising around 
discussions about the weather into an exploration of the contingent nature of sociality.267 
 
Figure 20 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 20 Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Untitled (Death by Gun), 1990. 
Figure 21 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 21 Olafur Eliasson, The Weather Project., 2003. Turbine Hall, Tate Modern, London. 
 
                                                             
265 Shannon Jackson underlines the symbolic character of precarity in Torres’s Untitled (Portrait of Ross in 
L.A.) of 1991: the sweets were in fact replenished regularly during the display of the work. 
Shannon Jackson, Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics (London: Routledge, 2011), 46. 
266 Janet Kraynak, “Therapeutic Participation: On the Legacy of Bruce Nauman’s Yellow Room (Triangular) 
and Other Works,” in Practicable: From Participation to Interaction in Contemporary Art, eds. Samuel 
Bianchini, Erik Verhagen (Cambridge, Mass; London, England: MIT Press, 2016), 459-467, 459-460. 
267 In a 2004 interview the artist described the social character of the work: ''I'm not interested in weather as a 
matter of science...I'm not a meteorologist or a botanist. I'm interested in people: how people engage 
sensually with the qualities of weather -- rain, mist, ice, snow, humidity -- so that through their engagement 
they may understand how much of our lives are cultural constructions.”  
Michael Kimmelman, “The Sun Sets at the Tate Modern,” New York Times, March 21, 2004 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/arts/art-the-sun-sets-at-the-tate-modern.html (Accessed: 02/05/2017)  
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3.4 DEMATERIALISATION AND RELATIONAL AESTHETICS 
3.4.1 THE INTERSTICE 
What is interesting here is that, while the resistance that activist tendencies of socially 
engaged art demonstrate toward the production of art objects follows from their premises, 
relational practices, despite often operating directly within and through the institutions of 
art, demonstrate a similar tendency toward occluding the material art object. Relational 
practices are, indeed, centred on the production and examination of gestures and social 
relations which are by definition not as readily quantifiable in traditional economic terms 
compared to conventional art objects. This inevitably raises certain questions regarding 
their position in the wider art-economy matrix: what are the material relations that arise 
from relational art in the absence of clearly demarcated art objects? Bourriaud’s response 
to this was rather ambitious— as he wrote in “Relational Aesthetics” of 1998, relational art 
practices, irreducible to portable, self-enclosed art objects, are governed by an economy 
that is not subsumed by the relations of the general. Because “practice” as a category does 
not collapse into “object,” the mechanisms of production and dissemination of relational 
practices exhibit a certain resistance to the formation of exchange-values; ultimately, a 
resistance to the commodity-form.268 
In Bourriaud’s account, central to relational art’s decommodifying function is its 
“interstitial” character, with “interstice” being a term that Bourriaud references from 
Marx’s writings.269 As Bourriaud wrote, operating as a “social interstice,” the exhibition of 
relational art:  
“creates free zones, and time spans whose rhythm contrasts with those structuring 
everyday life, and it encourages an inter-human commerce that differs from the 
‘communication zones’ that are imposed upon us.”270  
Nevertheless, Bourriaud constructs this claim on the basis of a bizarre distortion of the 
original meaning of “interstice” in Marx. Bourriaud claims that by “interstice” Marx 
described those communities which existed alongside early capitalist economies without 
being integrated in capitalist relations— these communities lived, according to Bourriaud, 
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269 Marx had in turn borrowed the concept from the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus. In Epicurean 
cosmology, “interstices” (“μετακόσμια” in the original language, and “intermundia” in the Latin the term 
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Manuel Mazetti, “Epicureans and Gnostics in tr.47 (Enn. III 2) 7.29-41,” in Plotinus and Epicurus: Matter, 





self-sufficient lives, “free from the law of profit”271 even. This could not be further from 
the truth however: what for Bourriaud carries melancholic, yet empowering connotations, 
for Marx was a definite sign of regression— of inadequate evolutionary or economic 
development. Interstices, which in Marx’s Capital are used to refer to the societies of tribal 
ancient trading nations: 
...are founded either on the immaturity of man as an individual, when he has not 
yet torn himself loose from the umbilical cord of his natural species-connection 
with other men, or on direct relations of dominance and servitude. They are 
conditioned by a low stage of development of the productive powers of labour 
and correspondingly limited relations between men within the process of creating 
and reproducing their material life, hence also limited relations between man and 
nature.272 
Interstices were, thus, not conceived as liminal “third spaces”273 of freedom from oppression. 
They were social formations that were either lagging in terms of the development of their 
productive forces compared to the societies they existed in the peripheries of, or even worse, 
kept together by relations of brutal domination. What is even more illustrative is that in the 
“Grundrisse,” the concept of “interstice” is painted in an even more negative light: when 
Marx referred to it, he did so to juxtapose the ancient trading nations— the Carthaginians 
and Phoenicians— with societies that had developed commodity producing economies, such 
as the ancient Greeks and Romans. Yet again, in Marx’s analysis, the nations of the 
interstices were not free in the way that Bourriaud would misinterpret: in fact, due to their 
lack of an advanced productive base sufficiently organised within the productive process, 
they were utterly enslaved to exchange-values. In Marx’s analysis, for the nations of the 
interstices exchange-value was the “nexus rerum.”274 
It will have to be, of course, presumed that Bourriaud’s intention was not to project 
Marx’s observation of interstitial despotic tribalism or the complete subordination to 
exchange-values onto the social space of the contemporary exhibition of relational art. 
Apart from the absence of materialist analysis that Bourriaud’s use of interstice 
demonstrates— an absence which characterises a significant part of relational discourses— 
                                                             
271 Ibid.. 
272 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Penguin, 
1990), p.173. 
273 Here, I am very liberally referring to Homi K. Bhabha’s interstitial theory and its “third space” as the 
space wherein colonial subject and coloniser could temporarily coexist outside the strictly defined framework 
of colonial domination.  
Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 2004) 
274 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, (Notebook II: The Chapter on 
Money), trans. Martin Nicolaus (Vintage Books, 1973), 223. 
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Bourriaud’s use of this metaphor is also an attempt to address the art space with an 
unexpected Adornian twist; a move admittedly uncharacteristic considering the significant 
differences among the two on issues of art’s autonomy.275 Nevertheless, the evocation of 
Marx in Bourriaud writing inadvertently calls attention to another cynical historical truth. 
Within a predominant, totalising economic paradigm, divergence can exist only marginally 
and temporarily: the interstitial nations did not survive their encounters with the ancient 
societies that could mobilise greater productive forces— that is, the “capitalist” ones in 
Bourriaud’s quasi-Marxian narrative. 
If, on the other hand, a parallel model of production is allowed to exist alongside the 
hegemonic one in non-antagonistic terms— “more or less harmoniously and openly into 
the overall system,” as Bourriaud remarks276— then we have to examine its utility, and 
whether its relative exemption from the totalising pressures of market economics is a 
reflection of a specific role it fulfils. This is also the problem of analyses that examine the 
political character of art on the basis of its direct commercial exploitation alone; these 
analyses tend to overlook the specific political and cultural functions of the artworld in 
modernity— from nation building to the normalisation of social protocols, to celebration of 
democratic freedoms. There is, consequently, always the possibility that art can appear 
exempt from mechanisms of commodification, not as the result of some radical act of 
resistance, but due to a particular role it fulfils; that its availability and generous distribution 
are in some shape or form useful for the reproduction of a specific political economy. If the 
commodity does not emerge explicitly inside an art space it might not be because artists or 
curators have devised a strategy that banishes the commodity-form from a specific sphere 
of social life, but that it was perhaps not designed to appear there in the first place.277 This 
                                                             
275 Bourriaud’s twist is Adornian in its evocation of premodern, precapitalist institutions as vestiges of 
resistance to capitalist domination. Adorno had highlighted that the domination of cultural production by the 
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having a more substantial historical connection to predemocratic socio-cultural institutions, tended to grant 
artists more substantial freedoms from commercialisation compared to the United States of America. 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightement: Philosophical Fragments, 105. 
276 Bourriaud Op.cit., p.16. 
277 Even this hypothesis is too generous. In reality, by withholding the artwork from the possibility of 
exchange, the work is not divested from its value, but the opposite: it is reframed as too valuable— rare— for 
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precipitating an artwork’s temporary removal from the flow of exchange. Parallel to its (temporary) removal 
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documents that take its place and are monetised as its proxy forms. Furthermore, we should not forget that 
relational works do get sold and bought, just as Conceptual works did in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, 
Rirkrit Tiravanija’s untitled (free/still) has been purchased by the Museum of Modern Art in New York, 
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See Igor Kopytoff, "The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as a Process," in The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai, (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, UK, 1986), 64-91.  
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is the essence of the affirmative character of art, after all— that it can operate as a zone of 
human experience seemingly shielded from the relations of subordination and alienation 
which govern the totality of human life. And, fully cognisant of my bordering on a “rabid 
criticism of culture,” as Adorno had framed cultural critique on the basis of a totalised 
affirmative character,278 by fulfilling this role, the space of art can indirectly affirm and 
reproduce the conditions of its own existence in capitalism which are the conditions of a 
capitalist economy.  
 
3.4.2 CONCEPTUALISM AND COMMODIFICATION 
Bourriaud’s formulation that relational practices’ irreducibility to the portable, self-
enclosed object insinuates their being governed by an economy that stands in relative 
autonomy from the general one, clearly echoes Lucy Lippard’s analysis of Conceptual art’s 
dematerialisation of the art object during the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1968, outlining the 
general characteristics of this transformation, Lucy Lippard and John Chandler wrote: 
During the 1960's, the anti-intellectual, emotional/intuitive processes of art-
making characteristic of the last two decades have begun to give way to an ultra-
conceptual art that emphasizes the thinking process almost exclusively. As more 
and more work is designed in the studio but executed elsewhere by professional 
craftsmen, as the object becomes merely the end product, a number of artists are 
losing interest in the physical evolution of the work of art. The studio is again 
becoming a study. Such a trend appears to be provoking a profound 
dematerialization of art, especially of art as object, and if it continues to prevail, 
it may result in the object's becoming wholly obsolete.279 
This transition toward conceptualism had, Lippard described, impacted upon not simply the 
forms and processes of art production but its commercial character, as well. The Conceptual 
turn had liberated artists from the limitations that materiality imposed on their practice; a 
work of art could exist even if it was never embodied in a specific and finalised material 
form. At the same time, the potential existence of the artwork in the conceptual realm 
removed the artwork-as-object from the market: “since dealers cannot sell art-as-idea, 
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Criticism (New York: Dutton, 1971), 255-276, 255. 
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economic materialism is denied along with physical materialism.”280 Lippard posited thus 
the primacy of the abstract, ideational qualities in 1960s-1970s Conceptual practices as a 
strategy against art’s commodification. 
It is hard not to identify the origins of Lippard’s thinking in late eighteenth and 
nineteenth century ideologies of autonomy— in the emergence of a conception of art as a 
reaction to the crisis of the bourgeoisie: the widespread anxiety about the rising bourgeois 
commercialisation of life and the concomitant deterioration of cultural-intellectual life. In 
Lippard’s text the artist suspends the artwork’s materiality— dematerialises art— allowing 
it thus to exist safely as an idea, free from the corrupting influence of the bourgeois art 
dealer-cum-philistine. Ironically then, Lippard’s immateriality appears to have been 
motivated by the same concerns that had led Greenberg to materiality— the medium— 
close to three decades earlier.281 
It is probably redundant to state here that Lippard’s utopian projection was 
undoubtedly wrong, and that Conceptual art did not dismantle the art market. The most 
troubling aspect of her suggestion is, however, that it was not proven wrong by history; it 
was wrong even at the time it was being articulated. The entire movement toward art’s 
dematerialisation occurred in parallel with the evolution of a variety of methods aimed to 
establish the legal-commercial status of the artwork, and, hence, its ability to be sold and 
exhibited. Even more illuminating is that these strategies were, in fact, pioneered by artists 
themselves. When the conventionally visual and material aspects of the artwork retreated, 
their place was taken by contracts, certificates and instructions. This was a change already 
underway from the early 1960s.  
For example, in 1961 Piero Manzoni produced multiple Declarations of Authenticity. 
These were, however, not intended to accompany and authorise an artwork. They were 
instead certifying the status of their buyer as an artwork; in reality, Manzoni did not produce 
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revised with his identification of middlebrow culture as significantly more effective in subverting the 
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 Clement Greenberg, “The Plight of Our Culture (1953),” inThe Collected Essays and Criticism, Volume 3: 




but the certificates of non-existent artworks which he then proceeded to sell as works of art. 
On the other hand, Robert Morris’s Document (Statement of Aesthetic Withdrawal) of 1963 
(Fig.22) was not intended to authorise an artwork but, on the contrary, to suspend its status. 
Document was a notarised declaration which proclaimed in a legalistic manner that the art 
status of Morris’s earlier work Litanies (1961) had been withdrawn by the artist himself. If 
visuality and permanence were the hallmarks of the object of the art market, Morris’s 
gesture was pointing to the negation of both: Morris recognised that after the Duchampian 
readymade the artwork had become a matter of “legal definition” and “institutional 
validation.”282 Nevertheless, his performative invalidation of the artistic status of Litanies 
was not merely a comment on Duchamp’s legacy— it was also his mock retaliation to Philip 
Johnson’s failure to pay him on time for the purchase of Litanies: Morris was, therefore, 
defending his own interests as an artist by retroactively invalidating the status of his work 
through the production of another work. Ironically, Document ended up being purchased 
by the architect himself. Finally, in Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series of 1969 the material 
substance of the artwork was replaced by a series of distractions and confirmations that the 
artwork truly exists. Barry had promised that when Inert Gas Series was purchased, he 
would release inert, hence invisible, gases in Mojave Desert. Seth Siegelaub, the pioneer 
and “curator-at-large”283 of Conceptual art, had advertised Inert Gas Series as a poster but, 
in reality, the poster only repeated a description of the work, provided a post office box 
address, and a phone number. The phone number, finally, completed the cycle as it only led 
to a pre-recorded description of the work.284 
 
Figure 22 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
Figure 22 Robert Morris, Document, 1963. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
 
It would then be safe to conclude that the market proved to be rather receptive to the 
Conceptual dematerialisation of the artwork. What needs to be underlined is that the 
performative legal and commercial manoeuvres which facilitated the integration of 
Conceptual art in the market were not post hoc adjustments aiming to subsume an 
unexploited market, but were happening in parallel with the development of Conceptual 
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www.jstor.org/stable/778941 
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art. Declarations, instructions and various other types of documents were not produced after 
the fact, as memorabilia or compensation for the absence of artworks in an exchangeable 
material form.285 The entire history of dematerialisation was rather intertwined with the 
development of strategies of display, acquisition and reproduction which became necessary 
with the retreat of materiality and visuality.286 
Furthermore, the strategies that composed the production and distribution apparatus 
of Conceptual art did not evolve in a historical vacuum but reflected wider shifts in the 
techno-economic landscape of the 1960s and 1970s. As David Harvey demonstrated in his 
influential study of 1989, beginning in the mid-1960s, the American post-World War II 
economic model (Fordist industrial organisation and Keynesian economics) entered a phase 
of irreversible decline. Fordism as a system involved three dimensions: mass production, 
mass consumption, and a system of regulation that ensured a level of stability among 
producers and consumers to sustain the system.287 Unable to absorb the post-war economic 
recoveries of Western Europe and Japan, as well as the increased competition following the 
internationalisation of Fordist productive structures in developing countries, the corporate 
economy of the United States of America was faced with a crisis of profitability.288 This 
period of internal uncertainty— with American corporate productivity and profitability 
being in steady decline after 1966289– came to an end when the 1973 oil crisis, caused by 
the OPEC embargo on USA for its support to Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 
substituted the slow decline of that period with a full-blown crisis and a deep recession.290 
From 1973 onward, Western advanced capitalist economies, with USA leading the way, 
moved to a rapid internal restructuring which Harvey has described as the regime of 
“flexible accumulation.”291 
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 Alain Lipietz, Towards a New Economic Order: Postfordism, Ecology, and Democracy (New York; Oxford: 
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Now, the regime of “flexible accumulation” had important consequences on the 
physical nature of production. Utilising enhanced technological protocols, the post-Fordist 
alignment of the economy managed to reduce the production turnover time, which 
ultimately pressed toward the acceleration of consumption turnover time. This led to the 
sharp reduction of product life-spans, with certain sectors recording reductions even by fifty 
percent.292 As Harvey has pointed out, the acceleration of production and consumption 
replaced the relatively stable aesthetic of Fordist modernism with an ever-changing, 
ephemeral and unstable one: the economic mobility of flexible accumulation fed into a new 
cultural and aesthetic dynamism.293 All the tendencies associated with dematerialisation in 
Lippard’s account— conceptualism, process art, performance— were embedded thus in a 
socio-economic environment under reconstruction. Already underway from the mid-1960s, 
the rigidity of the post-war Fordist paradigm was yielding to more flexible forms of 
employment, consumption and identity. With that, the symbolic stability of the centralised, 
permanent hierarchies underlying the industrial commodity of Fordism was receding in 
favour of flexible types of organisation valorising change, ephemerality and mobility. That 
Lippard did not identify the connection between the negation of the art object and the 
decline of the Fordist “sublime” can certainly be attributed to the inchoate stage of these 
transformations at the time of her observations. On the other hand— and taking into account 
the mainstream acceptance of post-Fordist analyses in contemporary critiques of 
capitalism— it is perplexing that “Relational Aesthetics” did not reflect on what the 
implications of these changes might be with regard to art’s dematerialisation and its position 
in post-1960s Western capitalism. Even more so since Bourriaud does acknowledge the 
historicity of relational art— its embeddedness in the shift from an industrial to a service-
oriented production model.294 
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greatly intensified rates of commercial, technological, and organizational innovation.” 
Ibid, 147. 
292  By 1989, when Harvey’s study was published, in the so-called “thoughtware industries” (video games, 
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Ibid.,156.  
293 Ibid. 
294 Bourriaud has drawn a parallel between the formal inaccessibility and complexity of modernist form, 
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Nicholas Bourriaud, Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World (New York: 
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3.4.3 THE EXPERIENCE ECONOMY 
In 1998, the year of the publication of “Relational Aesthetics,” in the world of 
economics, Harvard Business Review was publishing an article announcing triumphantly a 
new stage in the history of capitalism. The article’s title was welcoming the world of 
business into a new lucrative market, that of experience.295 In the following year, Joseph B. 
Pine II and James H. Gilmore, the writers of the original article, would compile their 
observations and strategies into a larger work titled “The Experience Economy.” There, the 
writers built upon the premise of the original article: goods and services are no longer 
enough “to foster economic growth, create new jobs and maintain economic prosperity.”296 
Yet, the venerable world of business had nothing to fear from the unfolding crisis of the 
secondary and tertiary economic sectors: the most successful among them had already 
adapted their model from the production of goods and services to the production of 
experiences— a true “fourth economic offering,”297 promising triumph over competition, 
and ultimately the redefinition of global capitalism.  
The observations of the writers were not truly as new or revolutionary as they would 
have liked them to be. In fact, the writers were clearly polishing and rebranding things that 
had been known and applied for decades. The commodification of experience had been 
anticipated decades earlier with the adaptation of 1950s humanist, individual-focused 
psychological theories of self-actualisation to the manageralisation of human needs, and the 
connection of psychological wellbeing with productivity.298 There is thus no clear 
distinction between the tertiary domain of the economy and experience; the discovery of 
experience as a commodity rather reflects a stage in the evolution of capitalism where the 
oversaturation of the market casts into relief the necessity of a purely aesthetic reorientation 
of value derived from consumption— it is not so much a “fourth economic offering” as it 
is a new process of fetishisation. On that account, the commodification of experience offers 
indeed certain objective advantages. Experience is an elusive commodity— it is a form of 
economic activity which continuously denies the possibility of its existence as 
commodity.299 Because experience entails the ways by which the external world is filtered 
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through subjectivity, under conditions that do not resemble a dissociative state, experience 
asserts itself in relative continuity with one’s sense of identity. It thus lays a claim to a 
naturalness unmediated by the predetermined bounds of consumption.  
As experience is internalized and is, therefore, not anymore confined to the 
spatiotemporal characteristics of its production and dissemination, it obscures its 
quantification in measurable units. Experience follows its consumers beyond the context of 
their consumption: it unfolds in time and “time is the currency of experiences:”300 the 
consumer of experience embodies it long after and outside its context. As a consequence, 
the experience-based enterprise does not merely deal in commodities whose production 
relations are more resistant to demystification, but also radically expands the horizon of 
transactions. The experience economy does not get to monetise simply the time spent in 
locations or events but also the time past it.301 It is thus illustrative that Pine and Gilmore 
propose that experience’s transformative potency can and should be activated through the 
hybridisation of enterprise and art— theatre in particular: 
From now on, leading-edge companies— whether they sell to consumers or 
businesses— will find that the next competitive battleground lies in staging 
experiences.302 
The rhetoric of the experience economy presents, therefore, the cynical inversion of 
Lippard’s “art intended as pure experience,” defying “ownership, reproduction, and 
sameness:”303 it is certainly not art but parasitic to it, free just enough to reproduce its own 
conditions, and as spontaneous as life in its total administration. When the world of business 
is openly repackaging the rhetoric of immateriality in marketing manifestos ridden with 
managerial newspeak, the insistence on some abstract decommodifying qualities that 
immateriality procures becomes rather troubling. 
 
3.4.4 MARXIAN PROBLEMS 
Damning as that may be, it only touches the surface of the necessary critique of 
Bourriaud’s position. His suggestion that the primacy of practice over object— that is, the 
objective irreducibility of relational art practices— signifies a kind of escape from the 
general economy and thus relational art’s intrinsic resistance to the formation of exchange-
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values, needs to also be recognised as a clear evocation of Marx’s critique of commodity 
fetishism. Marx’s classical analysis of commodity fetishism posited that for as long as a 
product of human labour exists outside a relation of exchange, it exists as a use-value. As a 
use-value, the materials and labour expended for the object’s production are still 
intelligible. With its isolated production and subjection to a measure of universal 
equivalency— money— its use-value is obscured by its place in exchange. This constitutes 
the mechanism of commodity production: the commodity emerges when the product of 
private human labour enters the horizon of universal equivalency. The effect that the 
commodity-form has is to obscure the actual material realities of the object’s production; 
the prevalence of exchange removes the commodity from the sphere of the social relations 
of production as it now appears only related to a specific amount of money ascribed to it. 
This reframes the human characteristics of production as the “objective characteristics” of 
the commodity;304 commodification therefore mystifies the social relations that production 
is embedded in. In the world of universal equivalency the world of social relations becomes 
thus the world of relations between objects.305 Bourriaud, drawing on this analysis, 
suggested that since the production of an exchange-value obscures the actual social 
relations of the producers— hence, the relations between people— and relational practices 
foreground the primacy of social relations, relational practices then manage to demystify 
the social relations between people as they free them from the mediation of the 
commodity.306 Bourriaud used this logic to describe relational practices but in reality, if his 
argument was valid, it would cover socially engaged practices more generally. It is my 
position that, more than any omission of contextual economic information, this argument 
is the most dangerous one. The reason for that is that it carries the semblance of rigour that 
could facilitate its universalisation to legitimise all artforms that lay claim to the 
demystification of social relations on the basis of resisting the art object. It is also deeply 
misleading. 
Firstly, the application of a Marxian value-form analysis in art production is not 
uncontroversial. An artwork in the Western tradition is certainly the product of a process of 
fetishisation but, unlike other products of human labour, it is precisely this fetishisation 
which allows its existence in its intended status— as an artwork. Whereas with 
commonplace products of human creativity the conceptual distinction between their pre-
commodity and commodity-form is possible, the Western conception of the artwork is fully 
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inscribed in a process of fetishisation. While an everyday object is still objectively an 
everyday object before it becomes a symbol of a sociocultural identity and lifestyle, the 
artwork, disentangled from a horizon of appreciation which, governed by a particular 
understanding of history and theory, objectifies its value, becomes something else entirely: 
sometimes a piece of biography, sometimes a tool for broader knowledge production, 
sometimes an utterly non-communicative, closed off form. The use-value of the artwork is 
not, therefore, obscured by its entry in the relation of exchange: its use-value as artwork 
exists only due to the objectification of its characteristics. Bourriaud, indeed, acknowledges 
that an art object is devoted from its inception to the world of commerce, that it is in fact 
an “absolute commodity,”307 which exists purely as exchange-value devoid of any use, and 
thus inextricable from what Marx described as fetishism, yet exempts “practices” from this 
process.308 
Bourriaud’s suggestion is not entirely without merit: as practices reveal the processes 
of the artwork’s production, they resist the tendency toward autopoiesis— they resist their 
perception as objective, self-enclosed and self-produced entities, separated from the 
material of social life. This may well be valid, yet isolating the examination of autopoiesis 
to the production process of an artwork and not the total system of its signification fails to 
acknowledge the absolute dependence of relational practices, and often socially engaged 
art more generally, on the category of art. That we understand the performance of certain, 
sometimes unremarkable, aspects of sociality and social activity as carrying out a specific 
function with a specific importance that merits a specific discussion and analysis is a 
consequence of this episode of sociality unfolding inside or in relation to the institutions of 
art. The artists championed by Bourriaud in “Relational Aesthetics” do not derive 
authorship and value as mere facilitators of ordinary social relations. They extract material 
and symbolic capital as artists whose work taps into a contemporary demand for a re-
enchanted consumption of democratic culture. There is thus no system of mystification that 
distorts the original meaning of relational practices: this distortion is their original meaning. 
That relational art can ostensibly avoid the overt association with the “absolute commodity” 
should by no means be construed as testament to its escape from the commodity-form. In 
fact, this semblance of resistance is drawn from the long post-avant-garde history of art as 
exploration of the relations it is embedded in and the “social turn’s” reinterpretation of 
Bourdieu’s art as inversion of economic logic that has been laid out in previous chapters. 
Bourriaud’s refusal to scrutinise the relational practice-artworld as a totality effectively 
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depoliticises relational practices as the artworld becomes a space with little individual 
symbolic significance. 
Even if we brushed aside all previous objections as unnecessarily cynical toward 
relational practices and rather presumptuous with regard to the ideological role of the 
artworld, and conceded that a Marxian perspective on commodity fetishism could account 
for Bourriaud’s claim to the demystification of social relations, we would still have to face 
the fact that an art of “decommodified” social relations would mark the apogee of art’s 
autonomy. In reality, however, Bourriaud’s proposition is premised on a misconstrual of the 
role that objecthood plays in the process of commodification.309 As a result, Bourriaud limits 
its effects to the production and exchange of objects. Yet for Marx, the site of the 
commodity-form is not commensurate with the “physical nature of the commodity.”310 The 
commodity-form does not emerge from the object-commodity, but out of the abstraction of 
labour: it is the selling and purchase of human labour as a commodity that produces 
exchange-values. This is an absolutely fundamental observation for any analysis that draws 
from Marx’s theory of fetishism: the alienation inherent in the perception of social relations 
as relations between objects does not mean that if these objects were somehow removed 
from an economic equation, human relationships would revert back to a state of non-
alienation. Ultimately the contradictions that follow Bourriaud’s ascription of resistance to 
“practice” as opposed to “object” derive from an incomplete understanding of Marx’s theory 
of commodification. 
 The crucial question is, therefore, not whether we can arrive at a type of resistance 
toward commodification through the substitution of “object” for “social relation,” but what 
kind of material conditions arise from specific social relations, and in what ways these social 
relations can become self-critical. Overlooking this dimension equals affirming the most 
basic neoliberal fantasy: that the informatisation of Western capitalism has liberated the 
working classes from alienation.311 Once this connection has been made— once we 
recognise that what is at stake in Bourriaud’s formulation is in fact the projection of a social 
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structure liberated from alienation on the merit of it being unmediated by a specific material 
systematicity— the problem of “Relational Aesthetics” becomes a reflection of a deeper 
political problem. 
 
3.5 NEOLIBERALISM AND UNIVERSAL CREATIVITY 
Harvey’s historical account of neoliberalism traces its emergence in the years shortly 
after World War II. There, through the activity of organisations such as the Mont Pelerin 
Society it began to erode the postwar Keynesian, social democratic consensus. In his “Brief 
History of Neoliberalism” Harvey describes neoliberalism as:  
A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human wellbeing can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, 
free market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices.312 
Neoliberalism is therefore the economic and political regime of deregulation, 
financialisation and anti-inflationary monetary policy that overturned the postwar Keynesian 
social democratic consensus of the West. In Harvey’s account, nevertheless, neoliberalism 
is only theoretically coherent— and rightly so. Even though neoliberalism might exhibit 
certain systematic characteristics, it is still in essence a political program and can thus depart 
from its professed orthodoxies. This becomes all too evident when, despite its alleged self-
minimising ideology, the neoliberal state intervenes to create markets, or rescue financial 
organisations and contain the damage of financial speculation downwards. Neoliberalism, 
for Harvey, is thus fundamentally a hegemonic project of elite takeover.313 
Neoliberalism’s incoherence, however, is not merely a characteristic of its utopian 
construction— of its inability to actually accomplish what its theory purports— but 
constitutive. Neoliberalism’s incoherence was, in fact, written in its inception, as outlined 
by Friedrich von Hayek’s in 1944. In “The Road to Serfdom,” Hayek drew a line between 
classical liberalism and, what would later be established as, neoliberalism by explicitly 
defining the latter as the legal-political framework of economic competition, as opposed to 
exchange. Nineteenth century liberalism, Hayek pointed out, was founded on a conception 
of social life as constituted through mutually beneficial economic activity between rational 
actors; in this schema, exchange was the signifier of moral and material prosperity. In 
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opposition to what he perceived as a distinct gravitation toward collectivism in Western 
political and economic life, Hayek envisioned a new liberal paradigm that could intercept 
Western democracy’s alleged march toward totalitarianism. As the root cause of collectivism 
was the formation of monopolies, the new liberal paradigm had to be founded on the 
principle of competition: monopolies’ only efficient preventative mechanism according to 
Hayek. Nevertheless, competition, Hayek acknowledged, had no real grounding in 
nineteenth century moral ideologies of mutually beneficial economic activity; this was the 
domain of exchange. Neoliberalism had to therefore abandon “dogmatic laissez-faire” 
attitudes: the neoliberal regime could not and would not emerge automatically as an 
expression of the liberal conception of human economic nature as exchange.314 In order to 
succeed, the neoliberal project had to instead produce the conditions appropriate for 
competition to shape economic-political life, and most importantly, create the legal and 
political mechanisms to intervene when these conditions are not met. 
This Hayekian, “unnatural” vision of neoliberalism was the starting point for Michel 
Foucault’s investigation of the phenomenon. As a consequence, Foucault did not examine 
neoliberalism as a mere ideology or as a political program that simply evangelised an 
intensification of the grasp of market economics on society: “neoliberalism is not Adam 
Smith; neoliberalism is not market society; neoliberalism is not the Gulag on the insidious 
scale of capitalism.”315 Rather than an expansion of the free market, Foucault’s neoliberalism 
signified a complete remodelling of political power on the basis of the market’s 
characteristics, and thus entailed a comprehensive transformation of socio-economic life. 
What separates Foucault’s neoliberalism from an ideological construct— either 
implemented from above or through the hijacking of “common sense,” as it does in Harvey’s 
critique— is that it comprises a form of power that creates its conditions at the level of 
subjectivity formation: neoliberalism is, before all, a problem of governmentality.316 As 
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such, it emerges through a specific subject: competitive, possessive, and most importantly, 
self-administering.  
Since neoliberalism has to create the subject which embodies and reproduces it, it has 
to produce a positive— utopian even— vision of life in capitalism. In Foucault’s analysis 
the necessary step for this was the bridging of the gap between labour and its abstraction. 
The abstraction of labour was in Marx’s definition the process by which labour is 
commodified, that is, becomes detached from social reality and is reduced to mere numbers. 
Being the process that separates labour from its human subject, labour’s abstraction is in 
Marxist economy theory a direct consequence of the alienation of labour in capitalism: the 
process which separates the worker from the human characteristics of work. At this point, 
Foucault pointed out, neoliberal economists did not take on the problem head-on but 
attempted to reframe its terms. While in Marxist thought the abstraction of labour is 
inextricable from the position of the worker in the capitalist mode of production— in short, 
the worker’s position within a system based on the private ownership of means of production 
and extraction of surplus value— neoliberalism instead proposed that the abstraction of 
labour is a consequence of the tools designed to observe it. That is to say, the fundamental 
proposition of neoliberalism was to attribute the distortion of abstraction to the way that 
economic discourse had described it up until that point.317 It was, therefore, a problem of 
economic analysis’s formulation and scope which isolated the human element of the labour 
process as an agency-deprived cog between production and consumption, rather than as a 
subject that participates in economic life on its own accord. If the terms of economic life are 
redefined as extensions of the human characteristics of the worker, the depersonalising 
effects of capitalism cease holding universal validity.318 This was the neoliberal incarnation 
of the theory of “human capital:”319 a theory that, as Foucault remarked, attempted to extend 
economic analysis to the totality of social life, and thus economised areas “previously 
thought to be non-economic.”320 
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One of the foundational principles of the theory of human capital was that in advanced 
economies individuals do not participate in the market simply as sellers of their labour power 
but as capitalists themselves.321 However, the capital that they are in possession of no longer 
corresponds to the inanimate or abstract assets that can be converted into money but is 
inscribed into their own physical reality: it is the skills and abilities that can be cultivated 
through investment to yield greater returns for seller and buyer. Human capital comprises 
the, partly nonalienated— that is, inherited— and partly socially constructed, transformation 
of human labour into human asset. Through the prism of human capital, labour thus ceases 
being abstract; it is very specific and particular to the unique talents of the individual and the 
unique ways these are cultivated through work. By modifying the frame of reference, 
“human capital” theory redirected economic theory’s attention from the analysis of the 
mechanisms of production, exchange, consumption to the analysis of human behaviour and 
its rationality. While from classical to early twentieth century economic theory the human 
factor has been treated as a rather secondary variable of economic activity, “human capital” 
theory now foregrounded it as its focus: economics became thus the study of the motivations 
that govern decisions on mutually exclusive choices.322 As such, the study of economic 
activity collapsed into the study of human behaviour. The moment when human behaviour 
became the object of economics, life in its totality was subsumed by an economic rationality.  
This is the discursive space wherein “the entrepreneur of the self” emerges.323 As all 
aspects of human behaviour fall now under the jurisdiction of economic analysis, and 
everyone can be conceived as being in possession of perfectible skills and assets in the form 
of personal capital, individual self-understanding in capitalism no longer corresponds to 
one’s position in consumption but on the horizon of a constant production of oneself. Every 
relation, every transaction now offers a possibility for an investment in oneself and comes 
with the promise of ever-increasing returns. No longer merely the “self-moving” and “self-
directing” appetitive machines of liberal individualism,324 the docile go-betweens 
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surrounded by the thousand petty tyrants of Adorno,325 or the human products of a 
disciplinary regime that extends from the factory to envelop all life: the “entrepreneur of the 
self” is the self-sufficient orchestrator of personal flourishing. The new definition of 
subjectivity in the framework of human capital attempts to dilute— or even dissolve— the 
class antagonism between worker and capitalist; in Harvey’s words, it attempts to “bury the 
significance of the class relation between capital and labour.”326 This is where the “new” of 
neoliberalism is truly made manifest: in its formation of a subject that perceives socio-
economic activity not as the source of exploitation, disenfranchisement and 
depersonalisation but in continuity with one’s sense of identity. So, what Marx appeared to 
anticipate in the Grundrisse— that the development of individual skills in one’s free time 
could be understood as the production of capital, with “this fixed capital being man 
himself”327— is now inverted into the self-definition of worker as an eternal becoming-of-
the capitalist. The subject of neoliberalism is no longer an alienated subject; there lies 
neoliberalism’s utopian construction— in the promise of a true, perfectly perverted vision 
of isothymia, a state of universal equality wherein the “slave’s work” has now become a 
fulfilling Sisyphean cycle of self-overcoming. 
The predominant mode of subjectivation in neoliberalism detests thus the passive, 
detached subject of modernity: in Franco Berardi’s words, neoliberalism has managed to 
turn “disaffection and absenteeism” into “marginal phenomena.”328 Consumption is 
production of satisfaction while production is production of the self; this signifies a 
“breakdown between production and reproduction” as Roberts observes.329 Neoliberalism is 
fundamentally dynamic because it eliminates the distance between the labour expended in 
production and the labour necessary to return to the original conditions of the productive 
activity: communication, exchange and creativity become the objects of work and the 
mechanisms by which to organise the social relations around it. The immaterial is integral 
to this process because it is the immaterial that has made the transition between production 
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and social reproduction seamless— or even worse, completely obsolete.330 When productive 
labour is simply an extension of one’s intellectual and affective world— when it assumes 
thus the characteristics of self-expression— the restrictions and divisions that govern it 
become elusive.331 
Returning to Bourriaud, it becomes then clear that the problem does not merely lie in 
the dubious validity of his original formulation. What I mean by this is that the problem does 
not simply amount to a misguided defence of art as social relations: if anything, it is primarily 
misleading, as it directs the discussion to questions that should not have to be answered— 
“practices” do not comprise an economy separate from that of “objects,” and by extension, 
the production of social relations as art has no bearing on the demystification of the social 
relations of life in capitalism. However, insofar as Bourriaud arrives at his claim by looking 
at relational practices, and it is a notion that is reinforced by participating in them, his 
misinterpretation morphs into an actual indictment of relational practices themselves; it 
signifies that relational practices run the risk of incorporating the breakdown between 
production and social reproduction too seamlessly— that they are not sufficiently self-
critical. Which means that, as they remove the technical barrier of entry, their idealistic 
democraticity conceals the actual existing dichotomies between unskilled and high-skilled 
immaterial labour: “the instrumentality and repetitions” that immaterial labour is still subject 
to and cannot escape as long as work is subject to the law of profit.332 By reconstructing a 
vision of social life where these divisions no longer hold, Bourriaud’s interpretation of 
relational art projects a vision of universal creativity wherein work is liberated from its 
alienating characteristics. The endgame of the projected upward erasure of labour is the 
fantasy of a neoliberal post-work society. And in that regard, neoliberalism reveals its 
chiliastic character and attempts to outcompete communist “utopia;” after all, the elimination 
of the distinction between mental and physical labour was a central feature of the higher 
stages of communist society as Marx had outlined in the “Critique of the Gotha Programme” 
of 1875.333 It is therefore not a matter of a blanket rejection of relational practices but of 
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examining the ways they interact with notions of work in their strategies of delegation: we 
need to examine which attitudes toward work echo the neoliberal gospel of the end of work 
and, therefore, the end of class. 
 
3.5.1 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY IN DELEGATION 
Let us then look at two examples which highlight different degrees of criticality 
toward the conditions of their production: Tiravanija’s iterations of Untitled (free) and Tino 
Sehgal’s This Situation of 2007 and These Associations of 2012 (Fig.23). As was described 
earlier in the chapter, Tiravanija’s Untitled (free) is premised on a gesture of hospitality: 
the exhibition space becomes a place of unconditional exchange and interaction, with the 
audience activating the work by uniting over the offered traditional recipe. By minimising 
the rules and conditions that produce the artwork, Tiravanija removes its systematic 
dimensions significantly; it becomes a nexus of free, open-ended and non-compelled 
relations. Nevertheless, while Tiravanija abandons a conception of art as an idealised 
process mediated by the art object, he replaces it with a vision of social relating with 
similarly unequivocal universalist pretensions. In this substitution, one process which 
conceals its material conditions is thus replaced with another: Tiravanija’s replacement of 
the aesthetic appreciation of the object with the performance of social exchange and 
conviviality is a critique of mystification only insofar as the unacknowledged dimension of 
mystification is expedient, and aims to highlight the limits of critique itself. In the 
hypothesis of its sincerity, Tiravanija’s substitution of the art object with uncompelled, and 
putatively non-commodified social relations becomes no different than the redirection of 
its aura toward the actions of self-perceived free subjects. The fetishised object’s 
postexistence becomes then the fetishised relations of the now emancipated subjects. 
Tino Sehgal’s “constructed situations,” on the other hand, demonstrate a different 
awareness of the relations they emerge out of. Sehgal’s works tend to follow a specific 
pattern: the artist recruits and employs collaborators from artistic and academic circles who 
are then instructed to perform specific roles in their interactions with the audience. These 
collaborators are referred to as “interpreters” and their role is to mediate between the artist’s 
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intention and the work’s visitors.334 In This Situation of 2007, Sehgal instructed the 
“interpreters” to engage with the audience through the performance of a preconceived set 
of questions, quotations, and poses referencing famous historical artworks.335 By 
structuring the work around these distinctly choreographed moments of relating, Sehgal 
aimed to create an atmosphere of generalised impersonality; the “interpreters” were 
instructed to remain impersonal throughout their interactions with the visitors and to not 
allow these to devolve in personal questions or questions about the work— that is, in 
questions that either disrupted the choreography or reframed it into purely spectatorial 
terms.336 In These Associations of 2012, Sehgal repeated this formula but, as a work, These 
Associations was less rigid and allowed more space for free, unregulated interaction 
between the “interpreters” and the audience compared to Sehgal’s earlier examples: here, 
the staged routines were only three in number.337 Its premise was the production and 
performance of “conceits,” that is, semi-autobiographical personal stories that the 
interpreters were instructed to use as their platforms of communication with the audience. 
The “conceits” were established and practiced in rehearsals and drew from a variety of 
predetermined emotional states and concepts including “arrival, departure, belonging, 
satisfaction, dissatisfaction.”338 
The types of labour that Sehgal delegated to the “interpreters” corresponded, therefore, 
to the markedly immaterial character of his works. Even though the work of the 
“interpreters” lacked a strictly technical component, the communicatively sophisticated 
nature of their role set specific requirements for participation: an affective-intellectual barrier 
which ultimately preselected participants from specific educational backgrounds. And while 
the restriction of participating positions to specific professional-educational strata 
effectively constructs microcosms of the “creative class,” it also underlines that 
immateriality carries and reproduces its own divisions and biases, and ultimately produces 
class. More importantly, the elite educational-cultural background of his “interpreters” is not 
a liberating factor of their participation: their work is regulated, routinised, and in time 
becomes tedious and mechanical. The immaterial character of these performances of human 
interaction is, therefore, not designed to allude to a state of spontaneous, unmediated relating. 
On the contrary, the interactions between visitors and audience are choreographed, in 
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varying degrees of control, developed through long hours of practice, and performed on 
demand as a service which allows the work to exist. Sehgal’s situations produce sociality as 
a process of work and are thus embedded in a dialectic of freedom and necessity; they exist 
in the moments where the “realm of freedom” and the “realm of necessity” intersect. What 
remains to be seen is whether the tension of this intersection can survive the experience of 
art, as the audience’s work of sociality becomes the work of the artist. 
 
Figure 23 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 

























THE DEMOCRATIC LIFE OF ANTAGONISM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Okwui Enwezor described his vision of documenta 11 as one of “spectacular 
difference.”339 Consisting of five separate yet interrelated platforms and taking place over 
the course of two years around the world, the exhibition was conceived as a series of 
intercessions to pressing social, political as well artistic questions of our time.340 These 
platforms were not however reserved for an exchange of ideas between artists; artists were 
just one professional class among many, including political activists, historians, cultural 
theorists, sociologists, and community workers. Enwezor extended this new approach to the 
structure of the art exhibition itself. Contesting traditional curatorial conventions, the 
“actual” art exhibition was “relegated” to the fifth and final platform, which in turn mirrored 
the issues that the preceding four had taken on. Unifying all five platforms was the intent to 
transform the exhibition of art into a public space of knowledge production, political theory, 
and activism. 
“Democracy Unrealized” was the first of the five platforms. There, in the numerous 
papers and discussions over the conditions and future of democracy, two were the main 
targets: Fukuyama’s liberal democracy as historical inevitability, and the Habermarsian-
Rawlsian liberalism of deliberative democracy. Fukuyama’s infamous narrative of the “end 
of history” needs no particular introduction; its central and most controversial contention 
was its casting of Western-type liberal democracy as the ultimate socio-political horizon of 
human history. By the 1990s, liberal democracy had, according to the writer, attained to the 
status of a universal ideological monopoly— not necessarily because the entirety of the 
world had already been organised in its image, but because the great historical shifts of the 
previous decades had left extant no other ideological system “with pretensions to 
universality.”341 Not only had the modern ideological competitors of liberal democracy 
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(fascism and communism) become largely marginal political systems but even deviations 
from a system based on “popular sovereignty and individual freedom,”342 as Fukuyama 
summarised liberal democracy, were now seeking legitimacy though the invocation of 
liberal democratic ideals. On the other hand, deliberative democracy as a concept emerged 
after the 1970s to model the organisation of democratic social and political life on the 
principles of rational self-government through deliberative decision-making. Rejecting the 
minimalist tradition of democratic theory which casts political life as primarily the domain 
of conflict, competition and domination, minimising as a consequence citizens’ democratic 
role disproportionately in relation to that of (elected) authorities,343 theories of deliberative 
democracy tend to underline, in varying degrees, the possibility of political consensus 
through bargaining and public reason.344 Even though the concepts of “end of history” and 
deliberative democracy correspond to different categories of thought, as the former 
constitutes a Neo-Hegelian interpretation of history as progressing to the universalisation of 
liberal democracy, and the latter a theorisation of liberal democracy on a participatory model, 
they both converge in the presupposition of the consensual construction of a democratic 
polity. Opposing this premise, “Democracy Unrealised” sought instead to qualify dissent 
and oppositionality as the qualities responsible for the expansion and deepening of core 
democratic values. 
That the emergence of such problematics in the artworld unfolded in parallel with the 
societalisation of art practice since the mid-1990s is not particularly surprising. In fact, 
“Democracy Unrealised” is just one iteration of the problematics posed by this dichotomy; 
indicatively, variants of this debate appear in Kester’s critique of the rhetoric on artistic 
autonomy and self-determination in arts bodies since the 1970s,345 Maria Lind’s critique of 
Thomas Hirschhorn’s Bataille Monument of 2002 for documenta 11 as degrading toward the 
local community it was co-created by and was supposedly addressing,346 the aggressive 
back-and-forth between Bishop and Kester in the wake of the former’s scathing critique 
launched with “The Social Turn: Collaborations and its Discontents” of 2006, or even 
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perhaps the more recent advocacy of overidentificatory art practices by Marc James Léger.347 
In this chapter I chose to focus on Claire Bishop’s critique of relational aesthetics in 
“Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” of 2004, published two years after the English 
translation of “Relational Aesthetics,” as it frames the argument directly in the terms of 
antagonism and democracy in contemporary art practices, the relationship of which I will 
explore. 
In Bishop’s now famous critique of relational aesthetics, as exemplary of an open-
ended, processual curatorial “paradigm of the laboratory” since the mid-1990s,348 
Bourriaud’s sociable and convivial conceptualisation of art practice was juxtaposed with a 
more morally ambiguous, and conflictual interpretation of the social character of art. This 
was however not a polemic presented simply as a disagreement on artistic matters. Bishop’s 
intention was instead to address a key argument that Bourriaud put forward; namely, the 
attribution of a democratic quality to relational aesthetics. Yet, while Bourriaud’s democracy 
is enacted “through negotiations, bonds and co-existences,”349 democracy, as 
counterproposed by Bishop, becomes possible as long as antagonistic social relations are 
allowed to make visible its unacknowledged exclusions.350 Transposed onto the level of 
artistic practice, this dichotomy materialised in the opposition between the ostensibly 
conciliatory character of the work of Rirkrit Tiravanija and Liam Gillick against the 
antagonistic and authorial practices of Thomas Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra. The 
opposition between these two groups of artists set the stage for the confrontation between 
democracy as the political form of consensus and antagonism. 
To outline the terms of the political language of antagonism, Bishop turned to one of 
the early conceptualisations of the idea of “radical democracy” as articulated in “Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy,” written in 1985 by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Departing 
from an orthodox Marxist analysis of class, Laclau and Mouffe’s book advanced an 
interpretation of the social world on the basis of Antonio Gramsci’s “hegemony.” This 
reorientation away from class analysis was a response to what the writers perceived as a 
pluralistic— or even fragmented— world that could no longer be encompassed by categories 
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which could not account for the centrality of difference in the postwar formation of political 
identity. The dimension of difference plays a key role in the theory of radical democracy 
both as the generative condition of political mobilisation and its figuring of a pluralistic 
milieu that needs to be defended against the totalisation of the ascending rightwing 
neoliberalism of the 1980s. To that end, Laclau and Mouffe insisted that social struggles 
need to be redefined in “hegemonic articulations.” Because these are always partial, they are 
always in potentially conflictual relationships with other articulations. The field of political 
power is thus structured antagonistically; antagonism for Laclau and Mouffe is the element 
that underlines the impossibility of general equivalence and reconciliation, and, at the same 
time, the force that can produce collective political identity by revealing relations of 
inequality.351  
The centrality that antagonism is accorded in the construction of radical democracy in 
“Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” echoes the prominence of the concept of antagonism in 
Carl Schmitt’s political theory. In fact, Mouffe’s subsequent research would engage 
extensively with Schmitt’s own intellectual output in a project that she has described as 
aiming to “think with Schmitt against Schmitt.”352 Confronted therefore with this bizarre 
trajectory of antagonism from Schmitt to Mouffe, and from Mouffe to Bishop against 
Bourriaud, it becomes necessary to seriously examine antagonism’s implications and see 
how these could help produce a framework for the interpretation of the antagonistic gesture 
in art practice. In this chapter I attempt to therefore test Bishop’s proposition of the 
antagonistic construction of democracy in the practice of Santiago Sierra, by returning to 
Schmitt’s own work. This analysis can then provide a platform for a deeper interpretation of 
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4.2 THE UBIQUITY OF DEMOCRACY 
Bourriaud’s engagement with the social character of contemporary art started in the 
1990s. Although not yet termed relational, the catalogue for “Traffic” (CAPC Musée d'art 
Contemporain de Bordeaux, France, 1996) offered a blueprint for the future development of 
a cohesive model of practice. For Bourriaud, “Traffic” had a double purpose: to transform 
the passivity of “viewing” into the more active experience of engaging physically or socially 
with artworks, and to create platforms capable of exploring new modes of communication 
and experience.353 In the catalogue of Traffic, Bourriaud, acknowledging the transformation 
of social relations of production from material to immaterial, advocated for a contemporary 
art that could recuperate the socio-communicative characteristics of contemporary 
capitalism, and redirect them outside of their normative function— into strategies of 
resistance.354 The quasi-Marxist, quasi-Debordian proposition of “Traffic” served thus as the 
foundation for the core principles of “Relational Aesthetics” of 1998. In “Relational 
Aesthetics,” however, the vague anticapitalist polemic of “Traffic” had now given way to a 
new, pedagogic conception of a democratic, participatory art: one that sought to teach the 
public “to inhabit the world in a better way.”355 For Bourriaud, the democratic artist of 
relational art was called to envision, produce and disseminate new models of social co-
existence, free from the instrumentality of social relations in neoliberal capitalism. 
Democracy is a certainly a resonant concept nowadays, but it was particularly so in 
the 1990s. This was, after all, the decade of the fall of the Iron Curtain, a decade of economic 
growth, of fantasies of world democracy and the socio-historical environment that would 
legitimise the “end of history” thesis. As Anthony Gardner underlines, this was also the 
historical context of Bourriaud’s gravitation toward artistic forms of democracy in 
“Relational Aesthetics.” By that time, democracy had become a “master signifier” globally; 
as the nexus of competing discourses united only by their claim to be democratic, democracy 
came to signify things as radically different as interventionist wars and anti-globalization 
movements, revivals of local traditions and the globalisation of human rights. 
In Europe, which primarily matters for Bourriaud’s development of ideas, democracy 
reflected the desire for reunification, openness and prosperity— in the European context, 
therefore, democracy was rather “europeanised.” It is no surprise then that the two ideas— 
democracy and Europe— eventually became interchangeable. Admittedly, the prospect of 
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pan-European unification under the banner of liberal democracy was an inviting thought for 
many and this was reflected in its various artistic conceptualisations: “Wanderlieder” 
(Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam, 1991) imagined Europe as “a better design for society,”356 
“Europa, Europa” (Bonn, 1994) as a symbol of change and hope, while the first Manifesta 
(Rotterdam, 1996) attempted to portray “an uncodified experience” of a borderless, open 
Europe.357 
Europe, however, represents an idea which is at the same time too amorphous and too 
specific to inspire long-term artistic projects in its name. After a point, therefore, the more 
universal and, at the same time, stronger idea of democracy superseded Europe in artistic 
imagination. Among the projects that reflect this shift Gardner lists “Interpol” (Stockholm, 
1996), “Wounds: Between Democracy and Redemption in Contemporary Art” (Stockholm, 
1998), and Bruno Latour’s “Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy” (ZKM, 
Karlsruhe, 2005). More characteristically, by 2000 the Manifesta Foundation had redefined 
its mission in openly democratic terms— with a collaborative and interactive conception of 
democracy in its centre: 
Foremost among Manifesta’s objectives have been responding, as appropriate, to 
new forms of artistic practice, experimenting with new curatorial methods and 
developing new audiences for contemporary art. All this was to be achieved 
through the development of open-ended, democratic procedures, which 
emphasised the values of collaboration and interactive communication.358 
This was therefore the political and cultural climate of Bourriaud’s “inhabit the world 
in a better way;” it is impossible to separate his ideas on art from the general climate of 
democratic optimism of that era. This was also probably one of the reasons why a few years 
later his ideas would become particularly vulnerable to critique. Once the democratic “end 
of history-ish” global nirvana was interrupted, these ideas were deprived of their original 
legitimating context. So, in the new world dawning with 9/11, the revival of crusades in the 
Middle East, and a global surveillance and torture apparatus, this type of optimistic 
celebration of democracy, collaboration and conviviality was subject to suspicion. It was 
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therefore Bourriaud’s claim of relational art’s democraticity that Bishop appeared to mostly 
take issue with. 
At this point, there are two basic observations that need to be made. Firstly, the 
opposition between Bourriaud’s relationality and Bishop’s advocacy of antagonistic 
practices is from the outset framed politically: Bishop does not so much politicise a 
disagreement on artistic matters as she contests Bourriaud’s political claims by way of art. 
While Bourriaud procures a vision of democracy grounded in the imaginary of “negotiations, 
bonds, and co-existences,” Bishop advances a conceptualisation of democracy based on the 
constant and conflictual renegotiation of difference and the dialectic of inclusion and 
exclusion. The new rigorous criteria for art are not simply explored outside aesthetics but 
also outside art’s own field of (self)reference, which respectively characterised its aesthetic 
and post-aesthetic histories. The porosity between political and artistic discourses is a crucial 
characteristic of art since the “social turn,” which cannot be fully explained through 
reference to the subject matter of art itself; it is a consequence of art’s reorientation toward 
the social which, as I have analysed in the introductory chapter of this study, is in turn a 
claim to artistic legitimacy. This means that the political discussion of socially engaged 
practices does not merely signify its adaptation to the specificities of art itself but also 
amplifies art’s claim to legitimacy. The way that this claim is advanced is through the 
inversion of the characteristics of art practices perceived stereotypically as subordinated by 
the market: the “social turn’s” political commitment, aesthetic deflation and eventual 
character preclude art’s fungibility as asset which tends to presuppose its durability as object, 
certain intriguing formal characteristics that underline its authorial construction, and perhaps 
a referential character toward other consecrated works. Of course, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, there can be no doubt that art’s escape from its objective characteristics 
should not be uncritically celebrated as a strategy of resistance of the commodity-form. 
Secondly, it is particularly illustrative that the language of the debate between Bishop 
and Bourriaud was firmly grounded in the symbolic space of democratic language. Neither 
Bourriaud nor Bishop projected their political claims beyond the level of a different 
signification of democratic social life and the ways by which it can be constructed. What 
this entrenchment of critical language within the limits of democracy undoubtedly 
demonstrates is democracy’s universalisation as a value, and its incontestability as “ambient 
milieu,” as Marc James Léger  has pointed out.359 Once this has been established, therefore, 
what remains is to determine the exact configuration that is more adequate to democracy’s 
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meaning; this is the field of all possible disagreement. This kind of circularity appears to 
affirm Stuart Hall’s diagnosis of democracy’s existence as a horizon: the idea of democracy 
has acquired such prominence that now defines the limits of all discourse.360 Ironically, the 
reduction of all politics to a litigation of democracy’s details is also rather “Fukuyamean”— 
it discloses a collective internalisation of the oft-maligned projection that the eponymous 
political scientist first made in the late 1980s. In a sense, then, it is not only the number of 
choices that nations can make politically and economically that has been diminishing in the 
global hegemony of Western type democracy, but the limits of political discourse too.361 
The focal points of Bishop’s critique were two. Firstly, Bourriaud’s theorisation of 
relational art practices was seen as premised on a conceptual confusion between the ideas of 
open-endedness, viewer participation and democracy. Bishop underlined that the 
“activation” of the viewer per se should by no means be construed as a “democratic act” in 
its own right.362 Drawing on Eco’s insistence on the necessary existence of a minimal logical 
organisation in every artwork— irrespective of the degree of its formal open-endedness— 
Bishop underlined that the parameters of participation are always set by an authorial subject. 
Indeed, there is an intrinsic limit to participation that cannot be exceeded before the collapse 
of the artwork, and this limit can never be the product of unconditional democratic 
deliberation. Instead of mystifying the structure of the work on the basis of its relational 
construction, the crucial task of the critic should be to dissect the relations it emerges out of 
and the relations that it consequently produces.363 This is a dimension that Bourriaud 
certainly overlooks in “Relational Aesthetics” as was also demonstrated in the previous 
chapter; in “Relational Aesthetics” the limits of freedom and necessity disappear in ways 
akin to their abolishment in the universal creativity of neoliberalism. Yet, the impossibility 
of this delimitation is no longer the self-critique of the artwork or the institution which 
creates its conditions, but a “micro-utopia” of reciprocity.  
Bishop’s criticism addressed therefore the intrinsic limit of participation, as well as 
emphasised its value-neutral character. These two issues are interconnected; in fact, the 
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reason underlying the misinterpretation of viewer activation and participation as liberatory 
in their own right in “Relational Aesthetics” is precisely the concealment of the artwork’s 
systematic properties— its systematicity— and, consequently, of the fact that these are 
governed by variables, however elusive, that are set by an author. Participation is essentially 
the democratisation of activity, and democratisation exists as a technical as well as political 
process. The former refers to the technical characteristics of the arrangement of relationships 
between people and things, while the latter corresponds to the types of political relationships 
specific configurations produce. As the technical character of democratisation entails the 
method by which processes are broken down to individual stages which are then distributed 
to a group, it becomes meaningless outside of a specific economic and technological 
framework. After all, the consolidation of the productive base in capitalist modernity 
amounted essentially to a massive process of technical democratisation, with the social 
division of labour being one of its most representative manifestations. While political 
democratisation must necessarily involve the expansion of political power, technical 
democratisation by no means guarantees that. The reason why these two dimensions 
sometimes coincide in popular imagination is due to the historical overlap between the 
democratisation of social organisation-production and the extension of political rights and 
civic liberties in Western history. This contextual overlapping is then projected as the 
identity between processes of technical implementation and social progress according to 
specific political values. 
The second key point of disagreement in Bishop’s essay was related to Bourriaud’s 
selection of art practices to describe under the category of relational aesthetics. Bishop 
understood Bourriaud’s privileging of art practices with a markedly optimistic, convivial 
character as highly inconsistent with his political claims. While the origins of the ideal of a 
convivial contemporary democratic co-existence can be traced to the utopian articulations 
of left-wing post-industrialism of the 1960s-1970s,364 these ideas might be less persuasive 
to the left-wing thought of a disenchanted new millennium, which has experienced the 
rhetoric on subsistence and de-industrialisation for what it really is: not a return to a genuine 
way of relating with the world but an extension of neoliberal brutality.  
The main problem that Bishop identified in Rirkrit Tiravanija’s hospitality and Liam 
Gillick’s (Fig.24) open-endedness is their uncritical exploration of the social relationships 
they enable. To clarify, Bishop considers the unity— the “togetherness” upon which the 
works of the two artists are premised— to be superseding any potentially critical dimensions 
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that socially engaged practices should foreground. Instead of transforming common 
experience toward a democratic revaluation of social structures, Bishop argues that the 
generalised conciliatory character of relational art offers only temporary reprieve, while at 
the same time obfuscates the reality of social tensions. In her analysis, the foundational 
premise of the work of Tiravanija and Gillick is, therefore, the production of social synthesis. 
In doing so, their work becomes the space wherein art and outside world are presented to co-
exist in a harmonious balance. For Bishop, this is alarmingly close to an art of consensus-
production: its enthusiastic rhetoric conceals all tensions that might underlie social 
relationships. Bishop’s objection, however, is that social tensions need to be acknowledged 
for democratic dialogue to exist. In short, the art of Tiravanija and Gillick cannot lay claim 
to Bourriaud’s professed democratic qualities as it suppresses the dissent and conflict that 
permeate social relationships. Instead, Bishop argues, a radical conception of contemporary 
democracy can only be advanced insofar as the antagonistic dimension of social relations is 
sustained and highlighted.365 
Antagonism is a concept that Bishop borrows from Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal 
Mouffe’s “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” of 1985.  Bishop writes: 
Laclau and Mouffe argue that a fully functioning democratic society is not one 
in which all antagonisms have disappeared, but one in which new political 
frontiers are constantly being drawn and brought into debate— in other words, a 
democratic society is one in which relations of conflict are sustained, not erased. 
Without antagonism there is only the imposed consensus of authoritarian order— 
a total suppression of debate and discussion, which is inimical to democracy.366 
Bishop thus juxtaposes Bourriaud’s “relationality” with the idea of radical democracy, as 
proposed by Laclau and Mouffe. The implication here is clear; while Bourriaud’s model is 
likened to a vision of democracy based on amicability and consensus, there is a wholly 
different conception of democracy which ever denies the possibility thereof and reconfigures 
democratic politics on the basis of antagonism. Antagonism cannot simply be erased in a 
pluralist democratic society; for Laclau and Mouffe it is pluralism’s constitutive element. 
Unlike liberal theorisations of democratic life, radical democracy attempts to dispel the 
illusion that the multiplicity of positions in a pluralistic social landscape can be reconciled 
through recourse to a universal order of reason common to every member of society.367 In 
                                                             
365 Bishop op.cit., 64-67.  
366 [Emphasis in original] 
Ibid., 65-66. 
367 It has to be mentioned here that the main target of Laclau’s and Mouffe’s radical democracy in 
“Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” is Jürgen Habermas and his “discourse theory” of democracy.  
140 
 
opposition to the politics of reason and communication as mediators of social relationships, 
Laclau and Mouffe define radical democracy as:  
[A] form of politics which is founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any 
“essence of the social,” but, on the contrary, on an affirmation of the contingency 
and ambiguity of every “essence,” and on the constitutive character of the social 
division and antagonism.368 
What is important in this formulation is that radical democracy is not conceived as a theory 
with a specific political content but as a theory of political form. The central element of this 
form is antagonism: radical democracy is the political form of antagonism. Even though it 
is not openly acknowledged in “Hegemony and Socialist Politics,” the overtly antagonistic 
determination of the political signals a conception of the political directly indebted to Carl 
Schmitt. Schmitt was the originary theorist of antagonism, and largely responsible for the 
redefinition of the entire field of the political as the field of antagonism from as early as 
1932, with the publication of “The Concept of the Political.”369 
 
Figure 24 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 24 Liam Gillick, Big Conference Centre Legislation Screen. 1998. 
 
For Schmitt, there is only one meaningful political distinction in social life and that is 
between friend and enemy; in fact, a distinction becomes political only insofar as it can 
mobilise this oppositional grouping— every other distinction is ultimately reducible to it.370 
Just as questions of morality are defined through the distinction between good and evil, and 
aesthetic problems through the distinction between beautiful and ugly, the political is 
governed by the distinction between friend and enemy.371 All politics, thus, constitutes 
instances of conflict that follow the necessary polarisation between friend and enemy, and 
every political concept acquires its meaning through a reference to a specific struggle; there 
is no meaningful politics outside conflict.372 The political is not defined as a specific sphere 
with substantial characteristics, separate from the rest of the spheres of human activity, but 
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369The first edition was published in 1927. The second edition of 1932 is however different as Schmitt 
followed up on a suggestion by Hans Morgenthau and added a few sections on the subject of civil war.  
370 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab (University of 





constitutes the field of antagonisms and antitheses— be they cultural, religious or 
economic— once the polarisation they create is strong enough to divide groups of people 
into relationships of friendship and enmity.373 The friend-enemy distinction is superior to 
every other possible one and once its generative antagonism reaches the levels of intensity 
necessary for its formation, it takes over all original disagreements and politicises them:  
The real friend-enemy grouping is existentially so strong and decisive that the 
nonpolitical antithesis, at precisely the moment at which it becomes political, 
pushes aside and subordinates its hitherto purely religious, purely economic, 
purely cultural criteria and motives to the conditions and conclusions of the 
political situation at hand.374 
In Schmitt’s political thought every political relationship is therefore a relationship shaped 
by antagonism, and every relationship that can be potentially politicised is antagonistic.375 
 
4.3 THE ANTIPOLITICS OF LIBERALISM 
Schmitt’s political worldview is a worldview of war; the state cannot define itself 
outside the polemical “us” versus “them” relation of conflict— without an enemy, it is 
incomplete and weak: at the heart of it, the formation of the demos is oppositional, not 
positive. The question that inevitably arises is why this worldview of relentless antagonism 
and conflict– a universe where homo homini lupus est— was conscripted in the service of a 
model of radical democracy. Why Laclau and Mouffe, and especially Mouffe as I will 
discuss later on, drew on a theory premised upon man’s need for dominion on the basis of 
humanity’s inescapable evil,376 and a political philosophy that ultimately led to “The leader 
                                                             
373 In Schmitt’s own words: “The political can derive its energy from the most varied human endeavours, 
from the religious, economic, moral, and other antitheses. It does not describe its own substance but only the 
intensity of association or dissociation of human beings whose motives can be religious, national (in the 
ethnic or cultural sense), economic or of another kind.” 
Ibid, 38. 
Michael Marder, rephrasing of Schmitt’s thought, provides some additional clarity: “...the political comes to 
reside in all other domains as the intensity of oppositions peculiar to them.” 
Michael Marder, “From the Concept of the Political to the Event of Politics,”Telos 147 (Summer 2009):.55-
76, 59. 
374 Schmitt Op.cit., 38.  
375 Ibid., 29. 
376 Leo Strauss in his private correspondence with Schmitt summarised Schmitt’s political theory as follows: 
“The ultimate foundation of the Right is the principle of the natural evil of man; because man is by nature 
evil, he therefore needs dominion. But dominion can be established, that is, men can be unified, only in a 
unity against— against other men. Every association of men is necessarily a separation from other men. The 
tendency to separate (and therewith the grouping of humanity into friends and enemies) is given with human 
nature; it is in this sense destiny, period.” 
Heinrich Meier (ed.), Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 125. 
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protects the law” (“Der Führer schützt das Recht”) of 1934.377 Granted, Schmitt as the writer 
of “The Concept of the Political” did not subscribe to essentialised categories as the 
foundation of collective political identity; his “political” is not limited to the ethnic-racial 
politics of fascism and Nazism. Theoretically, Schmittian antagonism as formulated in “The 
Concept of the Political” could even lead to political formations on the basis of a group’s 
production relations, that is, the formation of the proletariat as a political class, rather than 
the Volk of the German Nazi state. This has been pointed out by writers such Andrew 
Schaap, but also acknowledged by Schmitt himself.378 Nevertheless, in practice there is 
always something prepolitical that governs the decision for the formation of the political 
community in opposition to an enemy— there is always something prepolitical that 
influences the “primary tendency in human nature to form exclusive groups,”379 that is, 
political formations in the Schmittian sense. This does not describe a prepolitical opposition 
or refer to a militant prepolitical identity but to the fact that certain “exclusive groups” might 
be more receptive to mobilisation on the basis of certain characteristics compared to others. 
Hence, within one year from the publication of “The Concept of the Political” and with Adolf 
Hitler’s seizure of power now being final, the same writer elevated a racialised concept— 
Artgleichkeit, that is, sameness of species or racial homogeneity— to a fundamental 
principle of his constitutional theory.380 
What Schmitt’s analysis does however provide is an incisive critique of liberal 
democracy. Liberal democracy, as it is founded on the assumption of the existence of a 
unifying social and moral good which can be arrived at through consensus, has historically 
been, according to Schmitt, the political space of depoliticisation par excellence. As he 
analysed in his 1929 essay titled “The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations,” liberal 
polities comprise the constitutional space for the diminution of the political— the diminution 
                                                             
377 This was the title of a pamphlet that Schmitt published in 1934, justifying the Night of the Long Knives 
on the basis of the expanded executive powers of the head of the state.  
378Schaap, .63. 
Schmitt op.cit., 37. 
379 Leo Strauss briefly touched upon this issue in one of his letters with Schmitt in 1932. 
Meier, p.125. 
This still remains a largely ignored question among the proponents of agonistic politics. The problem of 
course lies in the fact that Schmitt himself also overlooked it. For a more comprehensive discussion on the 
importance of the prepolitical see: 
Inna Viriasova, “The Political Totalization of Carl Schmitt: Deciding on ‘the Absolutely Unpolitical,’” Telos 
175 (Summer 2016): 85-104. 
380 Simona Draghici translates Artgleichkeit as “ethnic identity” which is a rather specific concept compared 
to the original German term. 
Carl Schmitt, State, Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity, 1933/ The Question of 
Legality, 1950, trans. Simona Draghici (Corvallis: Plutarch Press, 2001), 48. 
For a survey of Schmitt’s writings during his, short-lived albeit substantial, alignment with the NSDAP see: 
Claudio Minca, Rory Rowan, On Schmitt and Space (London; New York: Routledge, 2015), 129-152. 
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of the distinction between friend and enemy.381 This comes with grave consequences for the 
inner political body, as well as the “constitutive outside.” 
At this point, it is worth pointing out that Schmitt did not regard the depoliticising 
tendencies within liberalism, evident in the prevalence of synthesising, consensual schemas, 
as phenomena which suddenly materialised in modernity, but as products of a centuries-long 
process structurally akin to Weberian rationalization.382 Schmitt understood Western history 
after the sixteenth century as a history of growing distanciation from the conditions that 
allowed the distinction between the nature of order and the threats facing it— a problem 
which corresponds precisely to the essence of the political.383 This long history of 
depoliticisation, or neutralisation, expressed one central impulse: the flight from conflict and 
the desire for a “neutral” state of things. This was in Schmitt’s view a direct consequence of 
the devastating religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the Thirty 
Years’ War standing prominent among them.384 Nevertheless, and despite all concerted 
efforts to create conditions which contain and neutralise conflict, the political has always 
proven inescapable.  Every era has only temporarily managed to suppress or disguise the 
intensity of contradictions before these give rise to new conflicts. For Schmitt then, 
liberalism is fundamentally an ideology of depoliticisation: the survival of liberal societies 
is contingent upon their ability to create of institutions that can successfully subdue political 
enmity into economic competition, and intellectual or ideological conflict into rational 
                                                             
381 Carl Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, trans. Matthias Konzen and John P. 
McCormick in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab 
(University of Chicago Press, 2007), 80-96. 
382 The difference here is that Schmitt’s historical theory of sublimation (or neutralisation in this case) did not 
seek to progressively limit the scope and extent of irrationality as much as to demonstrate that it survives in 
less apparent guises. After all, one of the contributions of his “Political Theology” can be found in his 
insistence on the depoliticised theological principles of liberalism. Schmitt wrote in 1922: “All significant 
concepts of the modem theory of the state are secularised theological concepts not only because of their 
historical development— in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, 
for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver— but also because of their systematic 
structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of these concepts.” 
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 36. 
Despite Schmitt’s early reliance on Weber’s rationalisation theory, Schmitt eventually rejected the one-
sidedness of Weber’s account as it failed to convincingly explain the forms of irrationalism that had survived 
or were emerging in modernity. For a comprehensive discussion on the influence of Weber’s theory of 
rationalisation on the thought of Schmitt see: 
John P. McCormick, “Transcending Weber's Categories of Modernity? The Early Lukács and Schmitt on the 
Rationalization Thesis,” New German Critique75, (1998): 133-177. 
383 Schmitt described the history of depoliticisation in terms of “central domains.” These are hegemonic 
rationalities that determine how the world is interpreted and administrated in every historical era. From the 
sixteenth century onward, Schmitt named the theological, the metaphysical, the moral-humanitarian, the 
economic, and the technical. 
Schmitt, The Age of Neutralizations and Depoliticizations, 81-83. 
384 Ibid., 89 
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debate and deliberation.385 Yet, for Schmitt conflict and antagonism can never be eradicated 
and a truly unpolitical world is the utopia of the end of conflict: modern history is 
consequently revealed to be a movement of failing depoliticisation.386 
In Schmitt’s writing, liberal democracy’s depoliticising tendencies present two main 
complications. By suppressing antagonism, the liberal state is no longer able to make the 
existential distinctions crucial for its stability; it forfeits its ability to define the “enemy” and, 
as a consequence, is unable to create a cohesive political community in opposition to it. Not 
too surprisingly then, Schmitt directly associated liberal toleration with weak and unstable 
government.387 Nevertheless, as Schmitt’s political-oppositional determination refers always 
to external entities, what follows the liberal state’s inability to define itself in relation to an 
enemy is enmity’s inward turn. In his political theory, liberal government— an actual 
metonymy for a weak, disjointed state— ultimately opens up the possibility of civil war and 
total collapse.388 
The second great complication of liberalism, and certainly the one most useful for a 
theory of radical democracy, concerns the self-legitimation of the politics of the liberal state 
on abstract, universal concepts. As the liberal state attempts to suppress the real political 
element of life— its constitutive antagonism— liberalism needs to resort to abstract, 
universal concepts for its own legitimation. But because conflict is simply inescapable, and 
the challenges of liberal societies are not neutral ones— they do not concern an indivisible 
public and cannot consequently be resolved in a neutral, hence non-political, manner— these 
abstractions, the ideas of abstract equality and universal humanity, end up paradoxically 
“theologising” oppositions. That is, the liberal depoliticised state wages war on the basis of 
absolute categories: in the name of humanity, progress, peace. Once ideals of an abstract 
humanity are deployed in conflict, the combatants are completely deprived of their actual 
humanity: they become enemies not in the sense of opposed political entities but of 
humanity. As Schmitt wrote, when an “outlaw of humanity” is essentialised, “war…can be 
                                                             
385 In the words of Schmitt: “Thus the political concept of battle in liberal thought becomes competition in 
the domain of economics and discussion in the intellectual realm.” 
Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 71. 
386 Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and 
Laclau, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 45. 
387Schmitt’s profound disdain towards liberalism and consensus-based political institutions (such as 
parliamentarism) was rooted in his experience of the political instability of Weimar Germany. His “Political 
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Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.; London, 
England, MIT Press, 1988), xxx. 
388 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 32. 
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driven to the most extreme inhumanity.”389 This naturalisation of an essential humanity 
comes with terrifying consequences. Actual political battle, however, is not one based on a 
denial of humanity, hatred and the wish for total annihilation; one can have an enemy who 
is still “the other, the stranger… existentially something different and alien” without the 
relation devolving into utter dehumanisation.390 It is thus important to understand that in 
Schmitt’s political theory, liberalism’s weakness as a depoliticised space is always on the 
brink of escalating into the capacity for unprecedented— total even— violence. 
This desacralising of conflict betrays therefore an unexpected “humanitarian” aspect 
in Schmitt’s political theory: it is the absolute necessity to deny the liberal state the ability 
to resort to the evocation of universal abstractions, such as humanity, as a source of 
legitimation for its actions. If these forces are left unchallenged— if the liberal state is thus 
allowed to wage its wars in the name of humanity, war becomes a mere pretext for 
annihilation:391 
Humanity as such and as a whole has no enemies. Everyone belongs to 
humanity..."Humanity" thus becomes an asymmetrical counter-concept. If he 
discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to 
a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, 
and his life is no longer of the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be 
destroyed. Concepts such as "human being" thus contain the possibility of the 
deepest inequality and become thereby ‘asymmetrical.’”392 
What Laclau and Mouffe draw from Schmitt’s antagonistic interpretation of political life is 
the ability of antagonism to mobilise and reveal actual political and not essentialised 
conflicts. The longer political identity is allowed to be constructed on abstractions with 
universalist pretensions, the likelier it becomes that these will be actively expropriated from 
an “enemy.” And the longer political processes are masqueraded as final, anodyne and 
consensual, the closer we get to their universal and unconditional enforcement. 
                                                             
389 Ibid., p.54.  
390 Ibid., p.27. 
391 This was also, according to Schmitt, the defining characteristic of the unprecedented cruelty of European 
colonialism; it was the unassailable conviction that the European colonists were representative of a universal 
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These are therefore the ideas that Bishop evokes in her criticism of relational 
aesthetics. Bishop argues, that unlike Tiravanija and Gillick, Sierra and Hirschhorn allow 
the artwork to acquire antagonistic characteristics, to acknowledge the exclusionary 
constitution of social formations, and the impossibility of their final, rational reconciliation. 
The forms of dialogue Sierra and Hirschhorn facilitate do not collapse “these relationships 
into the work’s content;” the relations that they produce are “marked by sensations of unease 
and discomfort rather than belonging,” and their incorporation of the labour of 
disenfranchised economic classes challenges contemporary art’s “self-perception as a 
domain that embraces other social and political structures.”393 In lieu of the conviviality of 
relational aesthetics, Bishop finds a radical democratic promise in the abject shock of Sierra 
and Hirschhorn’s adherence to an alienating autonomy. 
 
4.4 PROCESS AND THE POST-POLITICAL: THE CASE OF SANTIAGO SIERRA 
Just as community-based and relational art practices correspond to the need for an 
escape from modern isolation, antagonistic socially engaged practices attempt to disrupt the 
depoliticising normativity of liberalism. And indeed, there is something deeply existential, 
even aesthetic, in the reaction against life in the depoliticised liberal state— the state of the 
“minimal political morality.”394 The unique political-moral hollowness of liberalism is, of 
course, not the result of an inadequate development of its ideas but an intrinsic property, as 
Schmitt highlights. Liberalism imagines itself not as an overarching ideology but as a set of 
principles necessary for the protection from a despotic authority. The success of liberalism 
is thus not predicated upon the survival of an ethnic group, the construction of a workers’ 
state, or mankind’s eschatological salvation; the object of liberalism is the formation of a 
society as the neutral space for the unfolding of individual freedom. And apart from the 
moderation or prohibition of interference with the relative freedom of others, liberalism does 
not procure any specific positive doctrines that can be distilled into practical guidelines to 
live according to.395 The ideals of the liberal state are abstract: mutual respect, responsibility, 
toleration— all ostensibly non-ideological ideas necessary for its frictionless reproduction.  
                                                             
393 Bishop ibid., 70. 
394 I am using Toula Nicolacopoulos’s description of liberalism as a “minimal political morality” in her 
analysis of John Rawls’s ideas on citizenship. 
See Toula Nicolacopoulos, The Radical Critique of Liberalism: In Memory of a Vision (Melbourne: Re.press, 
2008) and more specifically the chapter: “Political Liberalism as a Minimal Political Morality,” 179-194. 
395 In theory, even a top-down definition of collective social goals borders on anti-liberal imposition. 
Judith Shklar, Liberalism of Fear, in Nancy Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press), 21-38, 21. 
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These are nevertheless ideas of complacency, atomisation, and the technocratic 
reproduction of life. If there is little to no substantive content in liberalism, all politics 
ultimately becomes a politics of process— the administration of how things are done and 
how we relate with one another take the place of questions over the meaning of objects and 
social relations. The hollowness of liberalism creates then a life full of surfaces where the 
judgment of value becomes an extension of the judgment of process. This is why Bourriaud 
overlooks the actual nature of the relationships that relational art practices form: conviviality 
and hospitality become gestures of democratic resistance in their own right. Knowingly or 
not, this assumption expresses the central idea underlying the rational construction of 
political life in liberalism; the belief that, because humans are naturally rational, once certain 
processes are upheld, good is made possible. Human collaboration under the conditions of 
relational art practice will therefore produce resistant subjectivities and “better ways to live.” 
The preoccupation with process is both a cause and symptom of the post-political from 
a Mouffean-Schmittian perspective. Because the post-political has removed all political 
decisions from the public sphere— from the sphere of politics— and now appears to govern 
with the characteristics of an institution ostensibly outside the jurisdiction of political 
decision— be that economics, science or morality— the only object left up to contestation 
is the process by which things work. As the post-political derives its legitimacy from outside 
of politics, it forecloses its boundaries and presents itself with the veneer of naturalness and 
objectivity. A political decision will create rifts and mobilise dissent, whereas a scientific 
fact or moral precept will present itself as an embodiment of the order of things. This is one 
of the points where a Schmittian-Mouffean analysis intersects with a more traditional 
Marxian one: as post-political rules and operations are no longer understood as concretised 
instantiations of historical relations of power, they ultimately become abstractions with 
objective and non-contestable characteristics: this is precisely the process of reification.396 
As the post-political world heralds a state of things wherein the only possible disagreements 
concern the process of things, it presents itself in the image of a life wherein “the struggles 
over all of the large issues have been largely settled.”397 The tangible characteristics of 
social, political and economic life become less tangible as they are internalised as objective, 
natural properties of individual life. It is this attachment to a mystified vision of the world 
                                                             
On the other hand, John Rawls’s attempt to produce a liberal universal political theory of justice was strongly 
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that prohibits its comprehension as originating in specific social relations and therefore 
politically subject to change. In the depoliticised politics that sustain any sufficiently 
sophisticated form of capitalism, it then becomes “easier to imagine the end of the world 
than to imagine the end of capitalism.”398 
If in the absence of a real existential enemy the political is bound to its inward turn, in 
the post-political present the political becomes entrenched in the interpersonal. When public 
life is walled off the political, the private sphere becomes politically overdetermined. There, 
the only thing that remains within one’s control is to attempt to administer or reconfigure 
the ways that identity is produced through ways of interpersonal relating. So, while Bishop 
correctly diagnoses the depoliticised character of relational synthesis and its suppression of 
dissent, it is only the second order of its depoliticisation that she is targeting. The first order 
antedates the work and it is the confinement of politics to the sphere of the interpersonal. 
Only there do processes of relating become the centre of human life. Dislodging therefore 
the understanding of the political from the realm of interpersonal relating expresses a specific 
political impulse regularly suppressed. To the extent that Sierra dissociates the moral or 
political judgment of his process from the substantive moral-political reality underlying it, 
his work becomes a protest against the politics of process. In this light, his work assumes an 
anti-prefigurative character— the processes and relations that it is founded on and 
reproduces are precisely those that foreclose utopia; contractual brutality, sexual 
humiliation, the spectacular dimensions of the world of absolute heteronomy. 
Yet, does that make his work what Bishop contends it is? Is it really a radical 
democratic antagonism that Sierra represents? If it is, what would be the political bodies 
constituted though the confrontation of the art audience and the degraded workers of his 
installations? The workers are certainly never realised in this confrontation; Sierra in reality 
goes to great pains to make sure they never are. Nowhere in his work are there any traces of 
their cathartic vindication or signs of their release from a terrible state of being; this would 
most definitely signify the possibility of salvation through culture which would not simply 
reduce his work to a gesture of dreadful condescension and misplaced faith in art’s power, 
but also to the least of Sierra’s own intentions.399 The workers of Sierra’s installations are in 
fact radically unrealised in every possible way: faceless and nameless, forced to turn their 
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backs to the viewer or covered in cardboard boxes, they are utterly non-representable. In that 
sense, Sierra evokes Schmitt’s interpretation of Marx’s ontology of the proletariat as non-
substantive and amorphous— existing in the negative only as the pure contradiction of the 
bourgeoisie. Before its real politicisation against the bourgeoisie, the proletariat exists as 
negativity. It is the bourgeoisie instead that has specific representable, objective 
characteristics, all of which are centred on possession. The possessive individualism of the 
bourgeoisie is so consuming that in fact turns the bourgeois into possessions themselves— 
they are representable because they are no longer human. The proletarian, in contrast, owns 
nothing— not even a body— and through this extreme dispossession emerges as “nothing 
but a person,” and thus negatively defined. Schmitt wrote in “The Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy:” 
The proletariat can only be defined as the social class that no longer participates 
in profit, that owns nothing, that knows no ties to family or fatherland, and so 
forth. The proletarian becomes the social nonentity.400 
In the Hegelian-Marxist dialectic, the proletariat needs to be realised in the “absolute 
contradiction” of its humanity: in class.401 This is the mechanism of the historical process 
condensed in the absolute opposition between proletariat and bourgeoisie. Only after this 
opposition materialises can the proletariat acquire representable characteristics which 
redefine it away from pure negativity. This is the culmination of antagonism, the highest 
moment of political conflict: the moment when class ceases being simply economic, that is, 
“class in itself” in Marx’s terms, and becomes real— a “class for itself,” and therefore 
political.402 
  For Schmitt then, the proletariat becomes a political body only insofar as it is 
mobilised by the greatest antagonism against the bourgeoisie. In contrast, Sierra’s workers 
are trapped in the eternal non-becoming of the “slave,” and will never be realised: they are 
not political bodies and will not be they are “nothing but persons.” Of course, to realise the 
dispossessed and non-representable into a political class in the Schmittian sense is utterly 
unrealistic, and certainly way beyond the power and jurisdiction of the artist. To therefore 
enlist Sierra’s “homines sacri” in a project of radical democracy feels unfounded. And it is 
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unfounded because it implies that in another configuration of democratic rule— one more 
democratic, one which acknowledges the hegemonic, and thus contingent, construction of 
social relations, and therefore does not present these “as dictated by rationality or morality” 
but through “a particular regime of inclusion-exclusion,” Sierra’s workers would not exist.403 
Ironically then, the antagonistic reading of his work turns into the conflict between Schmitt 
and Mouffe. 
 
4.5 AGONISM, OR THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Since 1993 with the publication of “The Return of the Political,” Mouffe has been 
gradually revising her theory of antagonistic radical democracy in favour of an “agonistic 
pluralist democracy.” The concept of antagonism has not been discarded altogether; it is still 
central to her political theory, albeit now understood not as an inevitability that needs to be 
cultivated but as an inevitability that needs to be sublimated. Crucial for this reorientation 
was the recognition that the essence of Schmitt’s antagonism is the Heraclitian “war is the 
father and king of all;” not something to be harnessed for the deepening or radicalisation of 
liberal democracy but the reason for Schmitt’s own original verdict against it. 
“The Democratic Paradox” published in 2000 provides a useful summary of Mouffe’s 
reorientation to an agonistic approach. Mouffe distinguishes between two types of political 
opposition: antagonism and agonism. Whereas antagonism is constituted by the 
confrontation of enemies, agonism describes the oppositional relation of adversaries.404 
“Agonism” and “adversary” therefore represent sublimations of “antagonism” and “enemy.” 
Unlike antagonism, agonism presupposes the existence of a common symbolic ground 
wherein a conflict plays out, and, unlike the enemy, the adversary shares the “ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality.”405 Mouffe’s revised democratic theory 
attempts then to rescue liberal democracy from itself by dislodging it from its consensual, 
deliberative ideologies. As antagonism cannot be eliminated, and the possibility of the 
friend-enemy grouping is ever present, Mouffe’s agonistic approach aims to create the 
conditions that make antagonism less likely to emerge, or rather the conditions that can 
transform it into agonism.406 With the sublimation of antagonism into agonism,  Mouffe 
contends that we can “construct the ‘them’ in such a way that is no longer perceived as an 
enemy to be destroyed, but as an ‘adversary,’ that is, somebody whose ideas we combat but 
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whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question.”407 To accomplish that, 
antagonism needs to be acknowledged— any attempt at its suppression leads to its 
intensification. Universalist illusions need to be therefore abandoned; there is no indivisible 
public sphere and every social configuration is inevitably hegemonic. Democratic politics 
needs instead to engage in the production of hegemonic configurations which nevertheless 
remain open to democratic critique and contestation. This is the essence of Mouffe’s 
agonistic democracy or agonistic pluralism.  
In Mouffe’s attempt “to think with Schmitt against Schmitt” the objective of 
democratic politics becomes the transformation of the “frontiers” of exclusion that every 
political configuration inevitably establishes into porous, contestable limits that are 
continuously subject to progressive change on the horizon of a greater inclusion of 
difference. Transposed onto the level of art’s iconography, the agonistic approach would 
foreground the existence of Sierra’s workers because a democratic polity needs to 
acknowledge and conflictually renegotiate its exclusions.  
For Schmitt however, the exception that produces Sierra’s workers is not an anomaly 
or malaise that can be treated or corrected; the exception is the moment that reveals the true 
order of things, and not the unpleasant reminder of its secondary, rectifiable or dispensable 
characteristics.408 The exception is the very basis of sovereignty, and without sovereignty 
there is no possibility for the formation and survival of the cohesive political community: 
Schmitt is a philosopher of suspicion— the breakdown of the order is the order of things. If 
it is the nation-state that has produced the exception in Sierra’s workers, then this is the real 
face of the nation-state. If it is democracy that is responsible, then this is the nature of 
democracy. No matter how open or “radical” it becomes it will always produce its excluded, 
and thus banish them beyond its “frontiers.” For Schmitt, the moment that the state 
surrenders this power and thus forfeits its ability to produce exception through establishing 
a new order, is also the moment when it is faced with its imminent collapse. This is 
something that Giorgio Agamben understood well when in his own analysis of sovereignty 
he elected the “camp” as “the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity.”409 “The 
nomos of the modern” is not the consequence of an illiberal or undialectical formulation of 
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the state, but fundamentally a problem of sovereignty that has only been accelerated in the 
modern era with humanity’s inscription into a legal entity.410 
The central problem in Mouffe’s formulation of agonism lies therefore in its attempt 
to retain Schmitt’s collective, conflictual understanding of the political and synthesise it with 
the liberal tradition of individual rights. From the moment, however, that the critique of 
liberal democracy aims to simply improve liberal democracy, the horizon of available action 
limits itself to the degree and scope of the faith in the fairness or universality of liberal 
democratic procedures: any action is forced to represent itself through liberal democracy. 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism simply acknowledges that these procedures are not universal 
or transhistorical but produced through conflictual relationships; hers is a discursive model 
of democracy different from liberal orthodoxy in its self-fortification against the facile 
criticism that liberal deliberative models are normally vulnerable to. The difference is, 
therefore, primarily one of definition: with Mouffe we understand a more meaningful 
democracy as the unstable field of agonistic pluralism rather than as a system of rational 
agreement or compromise. Nevertheless, as Mouffe does not offer any paradigm other than 
the liberal democratic one, agonistic pluralism will inevitably materialise in a form of 
consensus— different only in its theoretical integration of the productive possibility of 
dissent. In more concrete terms, agonistic pluralism will stabilise in an inclusive democratic 
model: one that has abandoned its pretensions of unpolitical, or post-political, objectivity. 
Behind the agonistic repudiation of universalist proceduralism lies therefore another 
type of proceduralism, less apparent this time— one according to which the crisis of liberal 
democracy can be absorbed by a less rigid, and epistemically undogmatic political 
framework. Agonistic pluralism becomes then a framework of social relations which 
attempts to integrate the awareness of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction while largely doing 
away with its substance. As Mouffe’s agonistic politics does not procure a theory of 
sovereignty, it produces a disarmed, liberalised Schmittian formulation wherein the subject 
of difference is arbitrarily allowed to survive its antagonistic relation with a political body— 
a protego that is not followed by obligo. This is by and large a corrective to liberal 
democracy’s hegemonic discourse which does not produce a substantively different 
model.411 Once Mouffe’s agonistic democracy is forced to confront the question of its 
survival; once it has to decide on its enemies instead of adversaries, those who seek to 
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suppress its fledging freedoms rather than negotiate them, it will have to revert to Schmitt 
or reaffirm his original verdict on liberal democracy’s unstable constitution.412  
More importantly, this liberal democratic corrective can only fail its programmatic 
declarations to bring about the repoliticisation of social life. Contemporary depoliticisation 
is not the consequence of neoliberalism— although neoliberalism certainly expands and 
intensifies it— nor even of an improperly defined and insufficiently defended liberal 
democratic framework. As I argued in the beginning of this study, depoliticisation is an 
intrinsic force within liberal democracy which originates in its most fundamental ordering 
of governing power: the autonomisation of the economic and the political. 
 
4.6 THE ARTIST AS SOVEREIGN 
If then, the problem of Sierra’s workers is the problem of sovereignty there can exist 
no democratic salvation for them; Sierra appears to leave no doubt about that, after all. This 
realisation should be the starting point of an analysis of the politics of antagonistic practice. 
That is, the antagonistic, anti-consensual model of authorship should be dislodged from the 
rhetorical ascription of a vague, radical democratic character— a direct consequence of the 
reduction of politics into the dialectic of inclusion-exclusion— and become instead 
understood as a mode of exploration of sovereignty, political and artistic. That this 
dimension is not the primary one in the context of Bishop’s polemic is, on the one hand, 
testament to the effectiveness of the obfuscation of sovereignty in liberalism, as Schmitt had 
after all highlighted many decades ago,413 and on the other, a symptom of the critical 
investment of the artworld to rehabilitate artistic activity in the context of an endless 
campaign of democratisation of social and cultural life. This is, as has already been argued 
earlier, a clear reflection of the political transubstantiation of artistic criteria and their 
subsequent inscription in the horizon of democracy, but also the form that claims to artistic 
and critical legitimacy assume.  
That critical frameworks lacking a theory of sovereignty as a constituent power— as 
Mouffe’s and by extension Bishop’s do— redirect analysis to the examination of the 
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particularities of inclusion-exclusion, allows the artist to advance a double claim to truth. On 
the one hand, the artist’s sovereignty is established as a power so fundamental and expansive 
that can represent itself as emphatically surviving the disorder and violence which comprise 
its constituting elements before materialising into the artwork. As this is a work that 
establishes itself as a non-communicative totality, it escapes judgement by existing norms; 
hence its moral ambiguity. At the same time, its interpretative reframing on the basis of the 
conflictual, non-consensual dynamics that underpin it— that is, the work’s reframing though 
the dialectic of exclusion-inclusion— allows the artist to synthesise, or even disguise the 
exceptional gesture with a symbolic power akin to holding up a mirror to the audience. 
Sometimes this is enacted in real time through the encounter in the gallery space between 
the work’s audience and its contracted collaborators, as in the case of Person Remunerated 
for a Period of 360 Continuous Hours (MoMA PS1 New York, 2000) while other times 
exclusively through the work’s alienating documentation, as in Hooded Woman Seated 
Facing the Wall (Venice Biennale, 2003) whose original performance took place absent an 
audience. The artist then embodies a duplicity of roles— both the bearer of order and the 
dissension against it. This is a double gambit: the directorial, morally disinterested gesture 
is reframed as the symbolical dismantling of the space of art as a space of pacification and 
contends to confront the audience with a hidden world, the domination of which sustains its 
cultural habits. 
What this highlights is that if the antagonistic artist performs the impulse toward 
sovereignty suppressed in the diminution of the political in liberalism, then the political body 
which is realised should not be looked for in the dehumanised collaborators of Sierra’s 
installation, but in its audience. It is not the subjects suffering under the absolute heteronomy 
of the antagonistic artist that are realised— it is us. Yet, this raises a crucial question that 
needs to be addressed— what is the form of this political becoming? As Kester correctly 
identifies, to argue for Sierra’s revealing of antagonism, conflict and drudgery as gestures 
transformative of political subjectivity implies that there is a contemporary art audience for 
which all these conditions are still concealed.414 This conceptualisation is in reality closer to 
an ideal type of a late nineteenth or early twentieth century audience of philistines than it is 
to an audience of contemporary art. Or, as Kester suggests, it is premised on the 
universalisation of a “naïve” and “ill-informed” viewer, an “imaginary” viewer who needs 
to be disrupted and disabused of ideological blindness and insensitivity through art— a 
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viewer who is largely not a member of the audience.415 On the contrary, the spaces of 
contemporary art tend to primarily attract these educational and professional classes whose 
certainties “need” to be disrupted the least; despite art’s formal and thematic societalisation, 
the primary audience of a performance or installation remains an initiated one. 
If we were to therefore engage with Bishop’s proposition against Bourriaud— the 
proposition according to which we “must judge the relations that are produced” by the 
work416— and this judgement encompassed the artwork as a site of cultural production in its 
totality, rather than dwell at the level of a semiotics of inclusion-exclusion, we would 
encounter an entirely different picture. As long as the antagonistic act unfolds within the art 
space, it is entirely dependent on the specific context that signifies it as an artistic and 
political experience. The publics most likely to accept it as a legitimate proposition through 
attendance, engagement and discussion are those already largely sympathetic to its 
underlying ideas. For this public, the forms of relations that the work produces are those that 
construct a symbolic space for the performance of sympathy, outrage or a momentary 
dissociation from bourgeois normalcy. The work’s politicising effect becomes then the 
affirmation of the belief system of members of a progressive creative or professional class. 
Once the dimension of the “imaginary” public is removed from the picture, what is revealed 
is that the work’s function presupposes the existence of a common ideological ground among 
the people it addresses, that is, the art audience. As the case of Sierra demonstrates, 
antagonistic works premised upon revealing the unacknowledged public acceptance of 
exception can be recognised as such insofar as the wider public sphere is still structured 
hegemonically in a way that can recognise it as perverse. The work becomes possible as 
critique of the contemporary distribution of sovereignty only due to the existence of a 
generalised agreement on how its exclusions should be negotiated. 
What happens, however, when the common symbolic ground between artist and public 
that grants the former their sovereignty and the latter the perception of political becoming is 
absent or contested? What happens when the parameter of exclusivity that safeguards the 
modicum of agreement between artist and audience is removed? The following two 
examples are enlightening: the events of “Interpol” (Färgfabriken Stockholm, 1996) 
showcase the artwork’s collapse under forces properly antagonistic— that is, forces not 
corresponding to a shared ideological framework— while Thomas Hirschhorn’s Deleuze 
Monument of 2000 (Fig.25) demonstrates the symbolic character of artistic sovereignty. 
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“Interpol,” organised by the Swedish Jan Åman and Russian Viktor Misiano, was an 
international exhibition that sought to bring together art from Western and Eastern Europe 
after the end of the Cold War. Positioned centrally in the main hall of the Färgfabriken was 
Gu Wenda’s installation United Nations: Sweden and Russia Monument by Gu Wenda. The 
work, consisting of hair-knitted sheets collected from Swedish and Russian barbershops, a 
rocket from the Swedish Air Force and the flag of the European Union, attempted to 
emblematise the exhibition’s spirit of international connectedness and unification.417 Even 
though Wenda’s installation was presented as a collaborative project, it was only 
euphemistically so. In addition to its conception and execution without the input of any other 
artist, the work also completely omitted any representations of the Russian side participating 
in the exhibition but instead subsumed it under the universalism of the liberal democratic West. 
Partly motivated by personal antipathy but mostly outraged by the imperialist premises 
of Wenda’s work, on February 2, 1996 the Russian artists Oleg Kulik and Alexander Brener 
decided to disrupt the exhibition. In the brawl that ensued, Kulik ended up getting arrested 
after he assaulted an audience member and got kicked in the face by Jan Åman, while Brener 
destroyed the installation (Fig.26).418 As Igor Zabel later remarked, the incident was 
collectively interpreted as a politically motivated one; a scandal for one side and a gesture 
of resistance for the other.419 In an open letter signed by eighteen non-Russian critics, 
curators and artists, the Russian dissidents were condemned for “an attack against art, 
democracy, and freedom of expression,”420 while Brener defended his actions as a radical 
democratic attack against neoliberalism and a retaliation to the mistreatment that Russian 
participants were subjected to in this exhibition.421 Meanwhile, Gu Wenda attributed the 
actions of Brener and Kulik to their nationalist and communist ideologies, the second of 
which he even associated with Nazism.422 
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While “Interpol” underlines the rhetorical nature of critical invocations of antagonism 
in art practice and how artworks collapse under actual antagonistic forces, Hirschhorn’s 
Deleuze Monument of 2000 underlines the contingency of artistic sovereignty upon the 
sociocultural space of the institution. Hirschhorn’s large-scale public monuments dedicated 
to important intellectual historical figures are among his most characteristics works. His first 
project of the series was the Spinoza Monument in Amsterdam (1999), followed a year later 
by the Deleuze Monument in Avignon. For documenta 11 (2002) he designed the Bataille 
Monument in Kassel, while the last one in this series was the Gramsci Monument of 2013 in 
New York. The monuments are conceived as living socio-political and cultural sites within 
urban environments, hosting performances, discussions, screenings and various other 
educational and leisure activities for the local and general public. Despite the apparent social, 
open and collaborative character of these projects, Hirshhorn is adamant about the centrality 
of his importance as authorial identity for the materialisation of his works; a system of 
principles which he describes as “Presence and Production.” On the occasion of the Bijlmer 
Spinoza-Festival in 2009, Hirschhorn expanded on this philosophy: 
My presence (the artist’s presence) and my production (the artist’s production) 
first of all, because that’s the condition that makes participation possible for the 
inhabitants of the Bijlmer neighbourhood of Amsterdam. Therefore, 
‘participation’ is not the aim of this work; ‘participation’ can only be a 
consequence of my presence and my production. I am the one who must give 
something of myself first, in order to invite the other (the inhabitant) to give 
something in turn.423 
Hirschhorn conceived the Deleuze Monument of 2000 (Fig.26) for the city-wide 
exhibition “La Beauté” curated by Jean de Loisy. Defying the suggestions of the curator, 
Hirschhorn decided to construct the project outside Avignon’s walled historical city centre, 
and move the work to the city’s banlieues so that it could face the social “reality” of the 
city.424 The first option was Cité Louis Gros, which had to be eventually abandoned after the 
rejection of the local residents due to fears that the project would exacerbate issues of 
criminality in the neighbourhood. Hirschhorn’s remaining option was Cité Champfleury, a 
neighbourhood similarly plagued with poverty and violence.  
Nevertheless, two months after the opening of “La Beauté” and two months before its 
originally scheduled end, Hirschhorn decided to abandon the work (25-28 July 2000). There 
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are two events that sealed the monument’s premature death: the theft of a one of the video 
players used in the work’s screenings and an assault against the visiting critic Hervé Laurent 
and his partner.425 Hirschhorn attributed both events to his personal inability to be 
continuously physically present in Avignon. Notwithstanding the rather symbolic character 
of this proposition, it signifies something important about the nature of artistic control and 
the impossibility of the artwork to exist in its absence. The truth is that by moving outside 
the geographical and cultural space and therefore addressing constituencies outside those 
that socio-culturally comprise the audiences for contemporary art, the artwork is exposed to 
the possibility of heteronomous forces against which it cannot survive. Artworks can exist 
only by virtue of a system of belief that artist and public partake in. When this system is 
disrupted, works— no matter their social conceits— fall apart. 
 
Figure 25 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 25 Thomas Hirschhorn, Deleuze Monument, 2000. “La Beauté,” Avignon, France. 
 
Figure 26 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
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THE MORAL COMMUNITY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In 1995 Glasgow hosted “Trust.” “Trust” was a collective exhibition of artworks from 
many future stars of relational art. Visitors to the exhibition could enjoy tea prepared by 
Carsten Höller and food cooked by Rirkrit Tiravanija, while Andrea Zittel’s Pit Bed offered 
a place to rest. Despite the exhibition’s pronounced communal atmosphere, with works 
aiming to inspire intimacy and interpersonal exchange, the public did not respond positively; 
for art critic Clare Henry, the show was in its very conception designed to indulge an inner 
circle.426 In a sense, “Trust” epitomised certain characteristics central to the liberal impulse 
toward community: an imagining of community as a self-conscious, performative cultivation 
of relations, rooted in the voluntary and consensual association of individuals in liberalism. 
The public’s disconnect becomes then testament to the insufficiency of this permutation of 
community; temporary, ineffective, reproducing all the psychological characteristics at the 
heart of community’s own disintegration.  
 The present chapter seeks to juxtapose this rather “homeopathic,” in its frequent 
prescription of solutions inextricable from a problem’s underlying causes, community, with 
artistic explorations of community outside the walls of the institution, as this has been 
conventionally demarcated. Unlike, therefore, the previous chapter which primarily engaged 
with the problems of institutional art practice, this discussion aims to interrogate the more 
community-oriented theory and practice of the “social turn,” with Grant Kester’s model of 
“dialogical aesthetics” as its point of departure. Kester, in his extensive documentation of 
socially engaged art practices that reach outward and engage directly with communities has 
articulated a series of ethical considerations about the nature of power relations between 
artist and participating public, and the pedagogic, transformative potential of such practices. 
These positions will be examined here in relation to their wider implications for 
contemporary community-oriented art practices. 
Claire Bishop famously pointed out in 2006 that a remarkable change that the “social 
turn” highlighted was the substitution of aesthetic judgements for ethical criteria.427 This 
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observation underlines the fraught relationship between the categories of aesthetics and 
ethics. Following that cue, I propose a historicisation of the separation between aesthetic and 
moral ideas in relation to art.428 The rupture between the aesthetic and the moral that can be 
observed in Kester’s theory of “dialogical aesthetics” has its origins not so much in the 
history of art— although art has historically negotiated it— but in the evolution of the 
religious ethic across the centuries. My analysis turns to Max Weber’s theory of 
rationalisation, and specifically his theorisation of the sublimation of religious faith into 
methodical moral conduct. For Weber, this was a process that resulted in the systematisation 
of religiosity and its entrenchment in the sphere of human relations. With the departure of 
morality from its transcendental, non-communicative characteristics and its normalisation as 
conduct, the void of the irrational was gradually filled by aesthetic practice. Then, as all 
autonomous spheres in modernity, rational morality— which adheres to the unity of 
intention and form— and the irrationality of the aesthetic— characterised by the dissonance 
between form and utility— inevitably grew antagonistic. Kester’s “dialogical aesthetics,” 
with its heightened emphasis on ethical considerations and method, presents a vision of a 
rational-moral community in opposition to the non-communicative, irrational utopianism of 
the avant-garde tradition. 
One of the central concepts in Kester’s vision of community in socially engaged 
practices is the “politically coherent community.” The “politically coherent community” 
describes a community whose formation predates the artistic intervention, and is based on 
specific social, economic or political characteristics. The determinacy of this type of 
community comes to balance the power differential between artist and participating 
community as it shields the latter from its potential subsumption by the intervention of the 
artist. This underlies Kester’s insistence on forms of socially engaged art of restrained 
subversiveness; non-antagonistic practices that do not seek to deconstruct or undermine the 
collective identity of the community. This insistence is, however, not as innocuous as it 
might appear, and in fact, carries implications that need to be seriously considered: Kester’s 
preference for social practices that do not disrupt the self-perception of the community, and 
therefore present a vision of community as integral and self-conscious, risks collapsing an 
idealistic conception of community identity into the expedient presentation of community as 
coherent and self-sufficient by the neoliberal state. The neoliberal state, as it 
programmatically deflects its social responsibilities, derives legitimacy from the 
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presentation of social groups as empowered— an illusion which it then reproduces to 
establish its rule over a society broken into self-administering but disjointed communities. 
This opens up a broader discussion on community as a site of political expediency, 
and the role of socially engaged art. Of course, it cannot be denied that all forms of culture 
and art can to some extent function as means of pacification and ideological reproduction. 
Nevertheless, in the context of community the literature of the last two decades suggests a 
more targeted, systematic, and practical utilisation of art and culture as political technique. 
These decades have seen a palpable move toward the instrumentalisation of art for purposes 
of social cohesion— as a substitute for those “intermediate associations”429 of society which 
have not and could not have survived its neoliberalisation. The dimension of political 
expediency casts a different light on the community-oriented tendencies of the “social turn” 
and further complicates their critical assessment.430  
While it serves no purpose to engage in a “rabid criticism of culture,” denying thus 
any material or psychological benefits that such art-communal projects may have on 
vulnerable communities,431 it is also impossible to ignore the central aporia of all 
ameliorative interventions: the risk of legitimising the very same structures that made the 
original intervention necessary. To highlight that social cohesion and pacification are only 
separated by a very thin line is a rather commonplace observation, however. What I am 
primarily interested here is how the moral-ethical conceptualisations of community risk 
buttressing specific strategies of the neoliberal state with unintended political and economic 
consequences for the communities they activate. Akin to the way that Chapter 3 
demonstrated that dematerialisation catalyses the breakdown between production and social 
reproduction in neoliberalism, the moralisation of community in “dialogical aesthetics” 
obfuscates precarious communities’ underlying objective conditions by amplifying 
voluntarist models of self-determination. These, underexamined by Kester, dimensions cast 
a new light on community-oriented practice at large, and should thus be seriously considered. 
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5.2 AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO 
The two tendencies of the “social turn”— the institutional and the communitarian— 
share an at times uneasy co-existence. While the former’s history can be, more or less, 
inscribed in the admittedly adventurous history of fine art, the latter also intersects with a 
tradition of practice that has existed in parallel with institutionalised art (or the art of 
institutions): community art. Community art resists a fundamental transformation in the 
history of art practice that has succinctly been described by Norbert Elias as separating 
modern and premodern artist: the shift from the “employed” to the “free artist.” That is, the 
shift from the artist in direct working relationship with the consuming audience of the 
artwork to the artist producing for an impersonal market. This shift has been a historical 
phenomenon intertwined with sociological changes among the social units who provide the 
framework for artistic creation. In more concrete terms, this shift took place during the 
modern movement toward generalised individualisation concomitant with the 
bourgeoification of social structures and the displacement of the older feudal/aristocratic 
order. The transition to self-employment freed the artist from producing art for a specific 
buyer, social group or social function.432  
To be sure, as we have already seen, this was a liberation mainly in name which thrust 
the modern artist upon a whole new world of anomy. Despite the new uncertainties of the 
market, art’s production for a largely bourgeois audience does nonetheless mean that the 
new consumer of art was no longer in possession of the types of social, symbolic and often 
economic capital that religious authorities or aristocratic elites held in the past. Furthermore, 
art’s escape from subjugation to specific social functions, be that in ritual or the self-
portrayal of courtly society in Bürger’s account,433 meant that the success of the artwork was 
no longer related or reducible to a set of extra-artistic goals. Freed from the reflection of 
divine or worldly authority, the exceptional artwork became a declaration of the 
indispensability of the artist. From that perspective, in terms of the symbolic capital that 
artist and consumer could extract from a successful artwork, the individualisation of 
production and reception which underscored the social disembeddedness of art in the modern 
era improved the relative position of the artist compared to the premodern era. In more 
pronounced cases, this change produced a range of archetypes evoked to describe the 
exceptional artist of modernity: isolated genius, revolutionary, seer, martyr.434 
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434 This proposition should not be interpreted as implying that self-employment brought about the 
improvement of the living conditions for modern artists or that the types of mystique attached to the 
autonomous artist were not under constant negotiation by an increasingly empowered bourgeois public. On 
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Conversely, as a type of practice, community art resists or even attempts to reverse 
this historical transformation. Art production and reception are still collective processes, 
pertinent to the characteristics and useful to the needs of specific constituencies unlike the 
generalised purposelessness of fine art, and often rely on the employment of craft-based 
practices which lift the latter’s elitist barrier. With regard to the position of artist vis-à-vis 
the public, the community artist by definition does not partake in the modern fetishisation of 
artistic subjectivity and, indeed, surrenders some of its privileges.435 This is a position 
underpinned by distinctly moral considerations on the relationship between artist and 
community. In contemporary community-oriented practices this moralisation of the 
relationship between artist and community transcends the problematics of their power 
balance and is, in fact, projected onto the artistic vision of community itself. Consider the 
following hypothetical scenario: 
In 1994, the team around the art space Shedhalle in Zurich invited the Austrian 
collective WochenKlausur to design and produce a work of social intervention. Consistent 
with the collective’s modus operandi— largely focused on implementing strategies of social 
amelioration and empowerment in non-hierarchical collaboration with local populations— 
for the Zurich project, WochenKlausur targeted the dehumanising conditions facing local 
victims of drug addiction, many of whom were ultimately forced into prostitution. After 
renting a small boat (Fig. 27), the collective proceeded to invite representatives of local 
interested parties on a three-hour cruise; these included representatives of local politicians, 
activists, sex workers, journalists. There, free from the prying eyes of the public and liberated 
from the protocols that need to be ceremoniously observed in public life, the unlikely group 
engaged in open, uncompromised dialogue on the issue plaguing the local community. 
WochenKlausur’s hope was that under these extraordinary conditions the concerned parties 
would be pushed out of their entrenched positions toward a satisfactory solution. The plan 
turned out to be successful— this unusual cruise led to a consensual decision for the creation 
of a shelter.436 
                                                             
the one hand, the artistic economy is fundamentally an economy of scarcity exceeding the “numerus clausus” 
of which deflates the relative value of the work. On the other hand, the conformist and contractual nature of 
bourgeois society suffocates artistic megalothymia. These are after all the conditions that we have 
demonstrated as instrumental for the emergence of the historical European avant-gardes of the early twentieth 
century. The improvement that I am referring to here concerns solely the power balance of artist vis-à-vis 
consumer with regard to the symbolic capital that the successful artwork could confer upon each during 
modern and premodern times. 
435 Here I am intentionally painting a picture in broad strokes for the sake of clarity. The politicisation of the 
artwork after the historical avant-garde and the post-Duchampian mode of authorship through its 
renunciation have led to a certain cross-pollination between fine and community artist in relation to the 
object of their practice and its social responsibility.   
436 Kester, Conversation Pieces: Community and Communication in Modern Art, 2.  
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Figure 27 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions 
Figure 27 WochenKlausur, Intervention to Aid Drug-Addicted Women, Shedhalle, Zurich, Switzerland, 
1994-5. 
 
Now, let us return to Zurich— or any other city for that matter. An artist collective, 
not WochenKlausur but a fictional this time, has indeed been invited by a local initiative. 
And their invitation is still directed toward a problem facing a local community. This time 
the problem might be concerning the devastating drug addiction of sex workers or even the 
social integration of newly arrived refugees. This time, however, the concerned community 
is not sympathetic to the plight of these groups but instead driven by different motivations; 
they might feel threatened, unsafe, or resist what they perceive as an unpleasant change to 
their everyday life. In this scenario, therefore, a community has united around the exclusion 
of certain undesired elements. And let us continue this rather preposterous scenario by 
imagining that somehow the artist collective decides to engage in dialogue with the 
community and model a work based on it. Of course, the rhetorical question here is, would 
that still qualify as a community-based artistic intervention? The premise is certainly ugly, 
yet communities can be petty, conformist and normalising. 
So, let us attempt a slightly different scenario, one which does not entail the 
accommodation of explicit enmity. Let us imagine that the aforementioned community is 
organised in the form of a grassroots protest. The motivations of the grassroots protest are 
not particularly noble, but they are not explicitly harmful toward some perceived “enemy” 
either. In fact, the community does not name a “pariah” or target any outcast this time at all. 
They instead fashion themselves after a Tea Party-esque grassroots protest, calling for a 
conservative or libertarian-oriented return to localist politics. And somehow— however 
unlikely— an artist or collective decide to work with them and amplify their voices. Would 
that in any possible universe be accepted as an artistic intervention to be considered 
alongside the dozens of examples that have been discussed in the prolific contemporary 
literature on socially engaged practice? The question remains of course rhetorical.  
The history of Western modern art is undoubtedly rife with all sorts of reactionary, 
and even hateful, politics which did not exist simply in the background of the lives of 
otherwise important artists, as mere disconcerting biographical backdrops to their oeuvre, 
but clearly informed their actual artistic output: Ezra Pound, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, 
Wyndham Lewis, the list is too long to even offer the slightest semblance of conclusiveness. 
In the case of community-oriented practices however, such politics become taboo— and this, 
despite the long tradition of conservative and reactionary visions of community. If, however, 
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there are certain aspects of social life that the realist impulse of the “social turn” cannot 
acknowledge or interact with, if there are therefore certain limits to the social phenomena 
and constituencies that it engages with, then perhaps the dimension of community in these 
practices is governed by specific moral preconditions: it is not sufficient that the artist 
surrenders authority in collaboration with a community, but this collaboration needs to take 
place along a specific axiological system. It is thus very doubtful that a theorist like Kester 
would even deign to think of practices that do not meet certain moral-political criteria, and 
it would be certainly unthinkable to consider the cases of Park Fiction and WochenKlausur 
alongside Tea Party-esque localism-communitarianism and other similar reactionary 
protests and deliberations. Art then becomes dialogical insofar as it is motivated by and 
expresses specific moral and political ideas. Absent these ideas, these projects cannot be 
examined as legitimate artistic explorations of community. Among the proponents of the 
“social turn,” it is only Nato Thompson who has considered the ramifications that follow 
from the inability to aesthetically delimit socially engaged practice— and that only briefly, 
without according the necessary gravity to the question.437 If the community of the “social 
turn” is primarily a moral category I would then like to explore its genealogy and propose a 
historisation of morality’s separation from aesthetics. 
 
5.3 THE AESTHETIC-IRRATIONAL COMMUNITY OF ART 
Community in art is what emerges in the space between form and content, in their 
frictional or harmonious correspondence. This is the space of signification onto which the 
attempt to belong is projected. The Western premodern history of art is a history of art as 
social bond; in its sacral status art functioned as a didactic medium collectively consumed 
and, if the exclusive character of literacy throughout history is taken into account, was very 
often the primary source and enforcement of a unified morality. Sacral art was instrumental 
for the production of a community of values— when medieval laity confronted Gislebertus’s 
tympanum at Saint-Lazare, they knew they were facing a real judgement, and a real call for 
a moral life following the word of the Christian God. In the moral community of the sacral 
status, art was an extension of a top-down dissemination of power; just as unifying as it was 
prescriptive— art did not exist autonomously but was integrated in other moral and political 
institutions. The community of sacral art was enacted through form’s derivation from art’s 
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toward reactionary politics but refrained from exploring its implications further. That this is not considered a 
problem worth seriously investigating is undoubtedly due to the tendency of art institutions toward liberal 
and humanitarian politics.  
Thompson, “Living as Form,” 16-33, 31. 
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content; there, moral-political and aesthetic considerations overlapped significantly, if not 
coincided.  
It was only in modernity that the world of artistic representation and moral community 
were observably separated. Jacques Rancière captured this phenomenon vividly represented 
in Friedrich Schiller’s “On the Aesthetic Education of Man” of 1794 and termed it the 
“aesthetic regime of art.”438 Schiller, Rancière wrote, confronted with the otherworldly 
aloofness and detachment of Juno Ludovisi, saw her majestic disinterestedness in the affairs 
of mankind relieved in “free appearance.”439 The statue was “a completely closed creation” 
that “dwells within itself,”440 incapable and uninterested to reflect or express the human 
world. The work’s complete detachment from any sense of commonality with its human 
environment— the utter disinterestedness of its divinity— made it thus a paradoxical 
figuration of “what has not been made, what was never an object of will.”441 At that moment, 
for Rancière, the experience of art became autonomous— the work of art was experienced 
for what it did not intend to reveal as art: it was art for what it did not convey. What it did 
convey as a work of art however, was the want of the human world; what it conveyed was a 
non-propositional promise of utopia. For Rancière, the aesthetic then comes to embody the 
promise for “the possession of a new world,” one that cannot be possessed in any other 
way.442 The non-propositional promise of utopia is, therefore, the promise of an ideal 
community which cannot be accessed through reason and system anymore, cannot be 
organised or communicated. As such, for Rancière, the autonomous experience of art 
becomes akin to a Schopenhauerian suspension of will:  
It is not the autonomy of free Reason, subduing the anarchy of sensation. It is the 
suspension of that kind of autonomy. It is an autonomy strictly related to a 
withdrawal of power.443 
Once this shift started to take shape, once the viewer learned to “cast an aesthetic gaze” that 
separated “the pleasure of appearance” from utility, art became an “autonomous form of 
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the Aesthetic Education of Man.” 
Rancière, “The Aesthetic Revolution and its Outcomes,” in Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics, ed. trans. 
Steven Corcoran (London; New York: Continuum, 2010), 115-133. 
439 Schiller wrote in the fifteenth letter: “Inspired by this spirit, they effaced from the features of their ideal, 
together with inclination, every trace of volition as well; or rather, they made both unrecognisable because 
they knew how to unite them both in the closest alliance. It is neither charm, nor is it dignity, that speaks to 
us from the superb countenance of a Juno Ludovisi; it is neither of them, because it is both at once.” 
Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man (Dover Publications, 2004), 80-81.  






life.”444 The autonomy of experience in the disentanglement of what art represents and how 
this comes to be represented signalled thus the emerging rupture between art’s form and 
moral content; as art becomes art “to the extent that is something else than art,”445 its actual 
moral truth is one that does not derive directly from its appearance. 
Art as aesthetic representation gradually abandons, therefore, the litigation of practical 
morality; this is a process of dissociation central to Max Weber’s analysis of rationalisation 
in modernity. The reference to rationalisation in this context— the context of art’s 
abandonment of the systematic representation of a tangible, practicable morality— might be 
slightly unexpected, but it is rationalisation that is the root cause of the separation of aesthetic 
beauty and moral value. It is in parallel to the rationalisation of morality, the sublimation of 
the religious ethic really, that the experience of art enters the non-communicative, irrational 
utopianism that Rancière’s aesthetic regime describes. In modernity, Weber highlighted, the 
relationship between morality and aesthetics becomes highly antagonistic; the moral and the 
aesthetic become spheres increasingly self-autonomising, both vying for control over the 
domains of conduct, experience and world-knowledge. Eventually their formerly symbiotic 
relationship collapses entirely, and one can exist only in the negation of the other: 
If anything, we realize again today that something can be sacred not only in spite 
of its not being beautiful, but rather because and insofar as it is not beautiful. You 
will find this documented in the fifty-third chapter of the book of Isaiah and in 
the twenty-first Psalm. And, since Nietzsche, we realize that something can be 
beautiful, not only in spite of the aspect in which it is not good, but rather in that 
very aspect.446 
The rationalisation of morality follows a very interesting trajectory from the evolution 
of world religions and is intimately related to their birth out of the rejection of magic and the 
systematisation of devotional practice. This change unfolded in parallel with the move 
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Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 129-156, 147-148. 
Here Weber was referring to Nietzsche’s famous aesthetic justification of life. Nietzsche had outlined the 
schism between art and morality already from “The Birth of Tragedy” of 1872. Only art can make life 
tolerable because life is not concerned with morality, and “only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and 
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toward what Robert Bellah describes as “intermediate societies:” societies which have 
replaced organisation on the basis of kinship for the more complex structures of patriarchy, 
patrimony and bureaucracy.447 In the Western world the rationalisation of morality led to the 
formation of the concept that Weber described as “inner-worldliness:” a reorientation of the 
religious ethic away from anti-systematic, transcendental ideologies and toward the moral 
ordering of the social conduct of the faithful. This was how the idea of the “calling” came to 
existence: a conception of moral conduct in worldly affairs as "the highest form which the 
moral activity of the individual could assume."448 This rationalising tendency influenced the 
development of religious morality broadly but also had profound impact on Protestantism, 
and more specifically, Calvinism. To clarify: in the wake of the Reformation, the emergence 
and development of ascetic sects within society— that is, religious groups which did not 
abandon social life altogether but were composed of inner-worldly anchorites— was 
founded upon the methodical enforcement of virtuous conduct among their members. The 
reason for the innerworldly sublimation of transcendence after the Reformation was firmly 
theological: it was a consequence of the protestant rejection of the Catholic universalism of 
Grace by the Calvinists; that is, the Calvinist rejection of the idea that God’s plan involves 
the potential salvation of everyone. This rejection of universalism was most palpable in the 
Calvinist doctrine of “double predestination,” according to which salvation has been 
predetermined before time and, as a consequence, individual devotion can have little to no 
impact. 
While one would expect that a religious ethic based on the preselection of the elect 
would deflate the exigency of religious obeisance, what it, in reality, resulted in was the 
diffusion and intensification of moral imperatives in the realm of personal conduct. The 
theological foreclosure of salvation was therefore internalised as a deep existential anxiety 
which pushed people toward protocols of disciplined social co-existence. This was for 
Weber the underlying cause for the emergence of a new rational path toward salvation; the 
transmutation of religious virtue into coherent systems of humility and sobriety in the sphere 
of personal conduct as a psychological counterbalance to the fear of eschatological 
exclusion.449 Of course, Weber’s famous analysis singled out Calvinism as the most 
impactful example of this type of rationalisation but, in reality, this was a process that 
encompassed all organised moral systems in the Western world; liturgical norms, 
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philanthropy, moral codes and so on, are all products of varying degrees of religious 
rationalisation. The rationalisation of conduct in the form of the “calling” might have been 
instrumental for the emergence of the new human type of capitalism, but entering modernity, 
all moral systems were sufficiently developed according to their “rationalising 
potentialities.”450 
Weber’s isolation of Protestant theology as the religious-philosophical substrate of the 
new disciplined, self-reliant human type of capitalism is still productive and provocative to 
this day. The danger that it however faces as a formulation lies in its tendency toward its 
own conflation with the production of the capitalist rationality. This is a problem that derives 
mainly from Weber’s absence of a strong distinction between modernity and capitalism— 
an absence certainly uncharacteristic given Weber’s particular attention to the distinction 
between economic and economically-determined phenomena. Surprisingly, it was Marx, 
famous for tending toward the elision of this distance, who highlighted the more 
economically value-neutral, or even emancipatory, effects of moral rationalisation: this was 
also the reason why Marx would refer to Martin Luther as the first German revolutionary. 
In a passage which evidently anticipated Weber’s analysis, Marx wrote: 
Luther, we grant, overcame the bondage of piety by replacing it by the bondage 
of conviction. He shattered faith in authority because he restored the authority of 
faith. He turned priests into laymen because he turned laymen into priests. He 
freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the inner man. He 
freed the body from chains because he enchained the heart.451 
Marx, therefore, saw the rationalisation of the religious ethic as a necessary step 
toward the liberation from the religious ritualism of what he pejoratively described as 
“Catholic paganism.”452 The new sensibility of rationalisation tore the exteriority of 
religiosity asunder and made it a matter of inner life, fully embedded in everyday conduct: 
the process of rationalisation of religiosity was thus a process of internalisation of morality. 
It is this sublimation which planted the seeds of a secular faith expressed in coherent systems 
of personal morality. Of course, Marx argued, despite its historically progressive character, 
this change was far from sufficient for the project of popular liberation, and indeed, fell short 
of the necessary transformation of the moral impulse into a worldview of collective struggle 
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for social change. The problem lay primarily in rationalisation’s “enchainment of heart;” this 
is the point where Marx and Weber’s analyses are in agreement. Despite, therefore, its 
proverbial contribution to the emergence of a capitalist individualist ethos, the rationalisation 
of the religious ethic was the necessary literalisation of a moral-religious code, which the 
second German revolutionary— the contemporary philosopher— was tasked with turning 
into a programme of revolutionary transformation of life in its totality. 
Weber, on the other hand, eliminating the optimistic overtones of Marx’s analysis, 
focused mainly on the spiritually impoverishing consequences of this process. Weber 
considered the rationalisation intrinsic in the departure of faith away from its focus on 
transcendence, and the subjection of religiosity to moral-humanitarian norms as symptoms 
of the broader disenchanting character of modernity. With rationalisation being a 
fundamentally qualitative transformation which subjected various domains to its pressures, 
the rationalisation of morality was commensurate with the rationalisation of economic 
activity. Rationalisation in Weber’s account foreclosed thus the modes of experience 
necessary for the “escape from the senselessness of work.”453 With the bifurcation of moral 
value into the realms of aesthetics and practiced morality, art gradually became the sphere 
of “an inner-wordly irrational salvation,” claiming a “redemptory function” and directly 
competing with the methodicalness of sublimated religiosity.454 In rationalised modern life 
we are therefore confronted with a fully-developed schism between the moralist and the 
mystic.455 To reframe this observation in artistic terms, as Walter Benjamin correctly 
grasped, the aesthetic regime of art in bourgeois society was in fact historically rooted in 
magic and ritual; the cultic origination of aesthetic art survived in its exclusivity and seeming 
defiance of organisation on the basis of reproducibility.456 What Benjamin failed, however, 
to recognise was that the types of academic and bourgeois art that he lumped in together 
with Aestheticism were by the mid-nineteenth century only vaguely still related to the 
lineage of magic and taboo. Instead, they had become highly systematised and thoroughly 
rational, communicative forms that had to meet specific criteria and fulfilled specific 
functions.457 If we were to extend the distinction between moralist and mystic, these 
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practices would no longer reflect the world of the mystic but that of the rationalised 
moralist.458 
This dichotomy was just one aspect in Weber’s account of modern polytheism: the 
endgame of rationalisation was not the harmonious co-existence of different axiological 
systems but the generalised and irreconcilable value fragmentation across all aspects of 
organised life. The polytheistic character of Western modernity comprised thus a universe 
lacking a stable, unifying order.459 With aesthetic art’s autonomous development as an 
escape from rationalisation— defying the production of morality as deriving from the 
rational analysis of art’s own form— autonomous art denied the possibility of a rational, 
communicative community. There lay the antisocial nature of art for art’s sake, the elit ism 
of the Central European secessions, and the self-enclosure of abstraction: autonomous art 
was now “a cosmos of more and more consciously grasped independent values which exist 
in their own right.”460 
In this history we can therefore identify two very different conceptions of art as 
community. The heritage of sacral art was one of art as the source of communal and 
prescriptive values. The rationalisation of the value systems it represented were eventually 
secularised into the naturalistic impulse of the post-Renaissance history of art. This is the 
era of art as an apparatus of nation building, discovery of the natural world and human 
sociality— the representational and early bourgeois stages of art’s evolution in Bürger’s 
account. This trajectory underlines the gradual shift from theology to pedagogy, and the 
internalisation of religiosity into personal morality; common among all was the belief in an 
ordered universe that can be accessed methodically. Rationalisation, however, as it produced 
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a universe in order, planted at the same time the seeds of its overcoming; as the different 
spheres of life were organised according to their own laws, they established the conditions 
which undermined the world as a totality of scientific, moral, and aesthetic truth. 
Rationalisation, therefore, undercut the conception of life as the pursuit of a universal good, 
or even the possibility of its existence: this is the essence of Weberian disenchantment. This 
epistemological aporia, combined with the alienating conditions of the art market— itself a 
product of rationalisation— formed the foundations for art’s abandonment of a rational 
communicative model and the embrace of moral ambiguity. With art’s dissociation of form 
and utility, art became free but non-communicative; a force of disruption and ambiguity. 
This is the genesis of the avant-garde tradition in the Adornian sense which now did not seek 
to communicate but to radically challenge the “very possibility of rational discourse.”461 
Under these conditions the artwork’s negation of communication became a sign of its critical 
disposition and at the same time the root cause of its inability to realise itself in the world of 
social relations:  
“The acute reason today for the social inefficacy of artworks -those that do not 
surrender to crude propaganda- is that in order to resist the all-powerful system 
of communication they must rid themselves of any communicative means that 
would perhaps make them accessible to the public.”462 
The growing prominence of theory in the twentieth century might have managed to 
translate some of the non-communicative aspects of the tradition of shock, provocation, and 
alienation into a communicative form, but art’s dependence on theory made it a largely 
exclusive experience. Symptomatic of this entrenchment in theory— of the fact that the 
experience of the artwork had become dependent on the comprehension of its broader 
theoretical substructure— was the reorientation from “what is art” to the “how or when is 
art” of the 1960s-1970s analytic turn. Theory has, as Boris Groys points out, the paradoxical 
effect that, even though its purpose is to explain and thus widen art’s audience, it operates 
by narrowing it.463 Kester’s model of “dialogical aesthetics” attempts therefore to dislodge 
the elitist framing of theory by highlighting a conception of the artwork as the experience of 
a democratic collectivity  working toward specific practical outcomes. The “dialogical” 
model can retain certain challenging elements of the avant-garde tradition, but these need to 
become more convivial and less alienating. The art of “dialogical aesthetics” does not 
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challenge or destabilise by foregrounding the impossibility of community but through the 
methodical, rational exploration of the relations that arise from the “dialogical” model. It is 
thus no surprise that Kester begins his analysis from the pedagogical, communicative history 
of the art that preceded the introspective alienation of modernism: the art which preceded 
the schism between aesthetics and morality— Rococo’s sociality, Antoine Watteau’s 
conversation pieces, the communal values of Georgian landscape.464 
5.4 THE MORALITY OF PREFIGURATION 
Kester’s discussion of Rachel Whiteread’s House from 1993 (Fig.28) sheds some 
light onto the moral dimensions of community in the discourse of the “social turn.” 
Whiteread’s work was an artistic intervention in one of the poorest parts of London— in the 
Bow neighbourhood of the Tower Hamlets borough— plagued by rampant unemployment 
and housing mostly provided by the local municipal authorities. The object of House was an 
Edwardian three-story terrace house which was now scheduled for demolition as part of a 
process of urban redevelopment, a house which the artist commemorated through the 
construction of its interior as concrete cast. House represented therefore the negative space 
of a once inhabited domestic environment, the concrete shadow of life that was no longer; it 
was conceived as a pithy and elegiac commentary on gentrification, abandonment, urban 
and domestic memory. Whiteread’s work reflected these overtones of social disintegration 
formally: it was a completely non-communicative, closed-off, disruptive and functionless 
intervention in the shadow of a community. 
House would also ignite one of the great controversies in the recent history of British 
art. On the one hand, critics embraced it— after all, Whiteread won the Turner Prize of that 
year. Whiteread’s vision was praised for its “disruption of... social time spaces,”465 its laying 
bare “the limits of language and expectation which afflict the contentious arena of public 
art,”466 and its defiance of a straightforward, consensual message. In short, the work was 
praised for its difficult, enigmatic character, and its disruption of what we come to expect 
from public art. On the other hand, the non-artist public was visibly displeased by it. 
Residents, local councillors, and protesters formed a camp in protest: the work did not relate 
to their lives in any way, it was incomprehensible, offered nothing to the local community, 
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and ultimately came to symbolise the elitist detachment of the contemporary artworld.467 
The work’s ambiguity even troubled the same family whose house Whiteread’s work was a 
memorial to.468 For the local community House became a scandal of grand proportions, a 
cynical ploy and a symbol of gentrification. The work’s polarisation— its unintentional 
division of the audience into “cognoscenti” and “philistines”469— epitomised for Kester a 
serious pathology of contemporary art. 
 
Figure 28 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 28 Rachel Whiteread, House, October 1993-January 1994. 
 
As expected, Kester’s discussion of Whiteread’s work did not register its divided 
reception as one more episode in a long tradition of artistic controversy. Instead, Kester 
proceeded to assess it in relation to another project, which, this time, did not divide the 
public, and was completed with the collaboration of the local community that it addressed. 
West Meets East of 1992 (Fig.29) was a project by Loraine Leeson in collaboration with a 
class of Bengali girls and their teachers at the Central Foundation School in Bow, London.470 
Through their collaboration, the collective produced a textile and photomontage piece that 
was later displayed as a billboard on the Isle of Dogs, London.471 Unlike House, West Meets 
East was a public project that aimed to explore the complexity of identity in a multicultural 
world. It was planned and carried out through extensive, productive conversations between 
professional artist and public and aimed to cultivate and express a “collective identity.” In 
West Meets East the role of the artist was not that of an “object maker” but of a facilitator of 
“shared visions.”472  
Evidently, Kester’s discussion of the two works reflects the contemporary art critic’s 
peculiar predicament. Although the decision itself to juxtapose the two works insinuates 
their totalisation against a specific set of non-aesthetic criteria, Kester hesitates to assign to 
it the character of value judgment over the works’ quality. Such claims to objectivity, 
however, are in reality unnecessary. The cross-pollination between art and moral-political 
discourses does not in its own right delegitimise art or its criticism but, as has been argued, 
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emerges as a historical tendency that seeks to reverse the perceived cynicism of the 
contemporary artworld and compensate for the inability of aesthetics to encompass the 
general social expansion of artistic activity.473 It is therefore not the evocation of moral or 
political language alone that is important. What is important is the specific content of these 
extra-aesthetic propositions and what they reveal about a work’s relation to broader cultural 
and socio-economic structures. 
 
Figure 29 has been removed due to Copyright restrictions. 
Figure 29 Loraine Leeson, The Art of Change, West Meets East, 1992. 
 
One of the central positions that Kester advocates for in his theorisation of “dialogical 
aesthetics” is the organic and non-hierarchical structure of the interaction between 
artist/artist collective and the involved community. Kester does not simply qualify artworks 
which demonstrate moral considerations about the impact that artistic interventions can have 
on communities, but practices which specifically reflect these considerations in every facet 
of the relations they produce. From this perspective, the insistence on the symmetry between 
artist and community is undoubtedly echoing the prominence of the organising model of 
prefigurative politics in New Left and anarchist circles after the 1980s. Prefigurative politics, 
contrary to the long tradition of democratic centralism in left-wing politics, emerged in 
political organisations during the 1960s and outlined a politics founded on the unity of means 
and end. Unlike the model of the Leninist revolutionary party which sought to capture the 
state through the strategic employment of revolutionary vanguardism, prefigurative politics 
emphasises the necessity of harmony between the social relations developed within the 
political group and the social relations of a post-revolutionary society. Carl Boggs, who 
coined the term in 1977, defined it succinctly as “the embodiment, within the ongoing 
political practice of a movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, 
and human experience that are the ultimate goal.”474 This type of organising philosophy was 
eventually adopted broadly in the anti-globalisation movement of the turn of the twentieth 
century, which was also precisely the time that Kester was developing his theory of 
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“dialogical aesthetics” and, is safe to say, evokes significantly. Later on, prefigurative 
politics would come to characterise the philosophy of international grassroots movements 
such as Occupy and become the predominant methodology for various anticapitalist, 
antiracist, and antipatriarchal practices around the world. The main characteristics of 
prefigurative politics, as summarised by Uri Gordon, are a preference for “decentralised 
organisation in affinity groups and networks, decision-making by consensus, voluntary and 
non-profit undertakings, lower consumption, and an effort to identify and counteract regimes 
of domination and discrimination (e.g. patriarchy, racism, homophobia and ableism) in 
activists’ own lives and interactions.”475 
The emphasis of prefigurative politics on the ethical conduct of the political subject is 
not however coincidental but can be traced in the historical roots of the concept of 
prefiguration itself. Gordon has not only brilliantly associated prefigurative politics with the 
ethics of means-ends unity predominant in contemporary leftwing spaces, but also 
uncovered its history deep in Christian thought: “prefiguration” is in fact a Christian concept, 
originating in the “τύπος” (figura in Latin) of Pauline and Augustinian theology. “Tύπος” 
(or figura) was an exegetic apparatus based on the faith in the recursion of biblical figures 
and events; this is the essence of Christian typology which sought to unify the Old and New 
Testament by creating meaningful links between the figures, statements and events that 
appear in pre-Christ and post-Christ scripture. Throughout the centuries, this precursive 
interpretation of specific events, actions and biblical persons— that is, the essence of 
prefiguration— was adopted by schools of Christian chiliastic thought. In chiliastic thought, 
nevertheless, these ideas ceased to simply reflect the faith that certain actions and relations 
have been anticipated or will reoccur in the kingdom of God, but extended, more 
importantly, to the belief that the egalitarianisation  of communal life could bring about the 
heavenly kingdom in earthly life— in other words, “immanentise the eschaton.”476 
Naturally, such ideas were over the centuries secularised and in the political 
environments wherein prefigurative politics became instrumental, such as the post-1960s 
New Left and anarchist circles, the temporal dimension of prefiguration became generative 
instead of promissory. It was no longer expressing the reassurance that one was participating 
in the making of history but the conviction that the relations created in the present ought to 
reflect the desired organisation of a post-revolutionary future. As Gordon points out 
however, the subtraction of the historically determinist dimension— an inevitable 
consequence of the secularisation of the concept— denuded prefigurative politics of a clear 
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historical vision of the future. This transformed the character of political prefiguration into 
a less end-oriented and more process-focused philosophy: “non-hierarchical social relations 
are to be extended and defended with neither the assurances of historical momentum, nor a 
full determinacy of ends.”477 This “turn to the present” has nearly turned prefigurative 
politics into a tactic devoid of strategy: a political attitude focused mainly on the cultivation 
of an ethics of anti-hierarchical social relations, often dislodged from wider practical 
historical outcomes.478 Ironically, this devolution of prefigurative politics into the formation 
of anti-hierarchical relations as autonomous, moral exercises in micro-politics was 
anticipated— prefigured— in the logic of prefigurative politics itself. Even Wini Breines, 
one of the most prominent theorists of prefigurative politics, recognised its resistance as a 
political framework toward “strategic politics” and “strategic thinking,”479 the 
consequentialist character of which— underscored by the primacy of large-scale political-
economic change— was perceived as endangering the moral integrity of communal 
relations.480 
It is in this political and intellectual climate that Kester’s emphasis on the consensual 
and non-hierarchical dimensions of social practice needs to be understood; the question of 
process becomes of paramount importance because in this climate, it is process that is 
thought to prevent the devolution of a movement into “the iron law of oligarchy.”481 It is 
then not too surprising that Kester, despite his criticism of the more institutional relational 
practices as elitist and out of touch, tends to avoid contextualising Park Fiction, 
WochenKlausur and others within broader sociopolitical movements.  
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5.5 PATERNALISM AND THE “POLITICALLY COHERENT COMMUNITY” 
For Kester, therefore, the crucial question that socially engaged art needs to confront 
is how the interaction between the concerned community and the artist or artist collective 
can avoid replicating the asymmetries that characterise their positions of power outside the 
context of the artwork. Drawing from Bourdieu’s analysis of the symbolic and political 
relationship between the “delegate” and the “community,” Kester recognises that this is a 
problem that even the most ostensibly reciprocal and anti-hierarchical dialogical practices 
cannot escape. For Bourdieu, the act of delegation is a mutually productive process which 
actualises rather than simply reflects the relationship between delegate and community: the 
delegate derives their identity from the community, while the community actualises itself 
politically and symbolically through the delegate.482 As a productive process, the act of 
delegation influences the balance of the political formation between the two parties and 
therefore always carries the risk that the delegate, in speaking for the community, will 
emerge fetishished, with the characteristics of the community objectified into their own 
individual identity.483 
Correspondingly, the dialogical practice as an act of delegation always risks collapsing 
into an irreciprocal manifestation of artistic magnanimity, indifferent to the particularity of 
the needs and identity of the participating constituency; indeed, social practices are rife with 
examples of paternalism of this kind. For Kester, the solution to this conundrum between 
insensitivity and paternalism emerges through the concept of the “politically coherent 
community.” In Kester’s writings, the “politically coherent community” is described as a 
type of community whose identity firmly predates the intervention of the artist-delegate and 
is therefore relatively resistant to subsumption during the process of representation.484 In the 
“politically coherent community,” the identity of the community is neither actualised by the 
act of artistic representation nor artificially formed around the project. This collective 
identity has instead been formed through a “complex process of political self-definition,” 
usually “against the backdrop of collective forms of oppression,” and organically “within a 
set of shared cultural and discursive traditions.”485 Kester underlines, his is not an essentialist 
definition of collective identity; these are communities that have come to existence through 
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“a process of dialogue and consensus formation rooted in specific historical moments and 
particular constellations of political and economic power.”486 With a sense of shared identity 
forged, therefore, through collective struggle against specific forms of oppression, Kester 
argues that the integrity of the “politically coherent community” is cemented.  
Kirsten Lloyd has correctly noted an important contradiction here; Kester’s definition 
of “politically coherent communities” demonstrates a propensity for socio-economically 
precarious populations— “communities marked by precarity.”487 While his model of 
“dialogical aesthetics” is understandably characterised by a certain anxiety about the 
possibility of identity erasure of marginalised communities, his insistence on the integrity of 
these identities is not without problems either; Kester’s advocacy for a model of socially 
engaged art premised on an unmediated communal identity is in fact reinforcing stereotypes 
of “authenticity.” This is an issue that Miwon Kwon has pointed out: Kester’s “authenticity” 
exposes the “politically coherent community” to reification. By highlighting the 
community’s constitution on the basis of a shared identity that has been shaped around a 
dimension of exclusion or hardship, it becomes a vehicle for instrumentalisation: its 
singularity can be abstracted and turned into a prop that simply frames the exploration of a 
social issue around which this authentic identity is conceived.488 The “politically coherent 
community” is, therefore, not impervious to the forces of heteronomy; it can very well 
facilitate the standardisation of the community art project into a simple bureaucratic formula: 
“artist + community + social issue= new critical/public art.”489 On the other hand, while 
Kester acknowledges the danger of totalisation, he counterargues that the “politically 
coherent community” exercises its own political agency in the self-determination of its 
identity, which is categorically different from simply being forced to conform to an identity 
created and imposed from above: the “politically coherent community” corresponds to “the 
difference between naming and being named.”490 
Kester’s response is, nevertheless, completely circumventing the issue. The problem 
cannot be framed as a question on whose agency is being put to action in community-
oriented practices, but to what extent agency exists in neoliberalism, beyond the 
reproduction of capitalism’s contemporary relations and contradictions. While the danger of 
totalisation is real indeed, totalisation already predates the instrumentalisation of the 
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community by the artist or cultural bureaucracy. “Naming” oneself, as opposed to “being 
named,” does not produce authentic, resistant identities; the process of self-determination is 
still subject to the alienation and distortions of ideology whereby all aspects of social life are 
saturated.491 If we assume that certain identities are exempt from the downward pressures of 
capitalism, or that there is a turning point past which the specific intensities of capitalist 
subjectification are reversed into militant and coherent identities, then the only logical 
conclusion remaining would be that proletarisation is a process with limited reach, and 
certain material conditions are somehow afforded the power to exempt specific groups from 
its alienation.492 The problem therefore lies not so much in Kester’s production of a 
materialist, oppositional community, unified through shared opposition, and thus indifferent 
to inner difference as a continuous productive process, as Kwon proposes.493 On the 
contrary, the problem is that Kester does not produce a framework that is materialist enough 
to account for the possibility that the alienation, depersonalisation, frustration and 
resentment that dominate social life in capitalism also dominate identity formation. Kester’s 
insistence on spontaneity and empowerment, as well as his deference to the authenticity and 
epistemological value of community’s self-definition are just a step away from the 
reinvention of community as a self-sufficient social unit. 
In other words, Kester’s vision of community is so attached to an ethics of empowering 
immediacy that loses sight of its political ramifications. Empowerment is in reality the 
leading ideology of the neoliberal state: the sleight of hand deployed in the normalisation of 
the abandonment of precarious communities during neoliberalism’s dismantling of the 
welfare character of the state. By lionising the unique and autonomous character of 
communities, the state is pre-emptively legitimising its abdication of responsibility. The 
assertion of communal identity through processes of self-determination, and the emphasis 
on its lived characteristics render state intervention disrespectful, paternalistic, oppressive 
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and totalising: the integrity of community becomes a metonym for its self-sufficiency. Under 
these conditions, the social role of socially engaged art is reduced to simply providing a 
voice for communities to express their identity and vision— to be recognised for what they 
“authentically” are. The economic considerations that underlie the toleration and 
reproduction of precariousness are thereby disguised as matters of openness, acceptance and 
mutual respect. And ultimately, the bureaucratic subsidisation of a few community art 
projects as platforms for communal assertion of identity becomes testament to the state’s 
progressive, multicultural character, rather than a symptom of its retreat. This is the 
mechanism which cynically subverts a romantic anarchist belief in self-determination into a 
neoliberal “noble-savageism.” The neoliberal “noble savageism” asserts that everyone under 
capitalism is subject to false consciousness except for some abstract “interstitial” 
communities and identities that have managed to retain their connection to authenticity. This 
is the end-limit of neoliberal subjectivation: beyond that point, false consciousness is no 
longer false. Kester’s aversion to the paternalistic artist as the extension of a paternalistic 
state paves the way for the most insidious type of paternalism; one which attempts to trick 
its subjects into the illusory belief that they are coherent and self-administering. 
 
5.6 THE INSTRUMENTAL COMMUNITY 
While criticism of similar romantic visions of community can certainly be attributed 
to different philosophical dispositions toward the social role of art, the moral reimagining of 
community comes with specific, unintended, consequences, which become evident in the 
recent conscription of public art into an ancillary apparatus of social amelioration. During 
the last three decades, the neoliberal state has indeed unleashed an entire machinery 
advancing the instrumentalisation of community-based practices; a move that Bishop has 
attached to a far-reaching project aiming at the creation of “self-administering, fully 
functioning consumers” in the face of the dismantling of the welfare state and the extensive 
privatisation of the public sphere.494 
François Matarasso’s “Use or Ornament? The Social Impact of Participation in the 
Arts,” written in 1997, has been one of the most fleshed out cultural policy proposals that 
directly associated the communitarian and participatory turn in contemporary art production 
to specific objectives of governance. Matarasso’s study— which has to be noted, exerted a 
significant influence on New Labour cultural policies— focused on the multiple important 
benefits that the state subsidy of communal art projects can potentially yield. Matarasso 
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pointed out that a cultural policy which encouraged collective participation in art could 
successfully infuse individuals with a new confidence on a personal level, tighten 
interpersonal relationships— reinforcing thus new types of social cohesion— and, finally, 
strengthen people’s engagement with their communities in a cost-efficient way.495 
Interestingly enough, Matarasso’s study did not qualify or even hint at a particular type of 
art as being the most optimal for the production of these effects; community or professional 
arts’ priority appears to be rather situational and context-dependent. It is “relationship” that 
is important and not “form;” the central feature of his proposition is the act of participation 
itself.496 
The participatory turn of Matarasso’s proposal was indicative of a wider reorientation 
of political discourse toward the culturalisation of social problems. Madeline Bunting, who 
was briefly the director of Demos, one of the think tanks which managed the adaptation of 
community to the neoliberal state of New Labour, underlined in her evocatively titled 
“Culture, Not Politics, is Now The Heart of our Public Realm” article of 2006 the urgent 
need that the political class look beyond monolithic political and economic solutions to 
problems of social cohesion as “the arts inspire collective experience in a way that our 
political languages no longer can.” Inspired by the enthusiastic collective engagement with 
Antony Gormley’s Waste Man of 2006, Bunting highlighted the socially ameliorative 
character of public art. However, Bunting’s positive and optimistic tone quickly took a 
darker turn: 
In key areas such as identity, where emotions are raw and intense, culture of all 
kinds is a vital arena in which to explore hopes and defuse fears before the latter 
take violent or political form.497 
The implication here is clear: no longer limited to rectifying the loss of a unifying social 
vision, art and culture could also be conceived at the level of an intervention in the formation 
and expression of identity. Art can be scaled down and humanised— it can be made to 
proffer attention to particularity and defuse possible tensions before these lead to generalised 
discontent. Art can serve as social armor against the potentially dire consequences of the loss 
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of a unifying social vision, as well as point to ways out of the cul-de-sac of contemporary 
identity fragmentation.498 
While Matarasso and Bunting come from a background in art and cultural policy, these 
discussions have not remained limited to the field. Roughly around the time of Matarasso’s 
publication, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck would contribute his own article on the 
subject titled “The Soul of Democracy” (1997). A central category in Beck’s proposal is 
“civil labour.” “Civil labour” was generally conceived as a means for the democratisation of 
community life and the cultivation of a post-national subjectivity among citizens. 
Nevertheless, “civil labour” could also double as a cost-effective solution to problems related 
to unemployment which, should be underlined, become particularly pressing after the 
neoliberal internationalisation of anti-inflationary economic orthodoxy. Instead of sustaining 
antiquated and costly welfare networks, states were now incentivised to transform welfare 
structures into programmes aimed at stimulating citizen proactivity and engagement. This 
“civil labour” expended in the participation of social activities led by “public good 
enterprises” offered thus the prospect of rehabilitation for millions of unemployed or 
underemployed citizens. The socially engaging activities of “civil labour” ranged from social 
work to participation in public artistic and cultural projects. Under this scheme, the 
volunteering citizens would not necessarily be materially compensated but rewarded in the 
form of distinctions which in turn incentivise proactivity.499 Again, the social character of 
public art figures prominently; art is rebranded as a remedy for social and economic 
exclusion, a form of lifetime training, and a type of welfare. Nevertheless, the link between 
“citizen” and “labour” drawn in Beck’s writing underlines another troubling development in 
recent history: the explicit inscription of citizenship in productivity and employment. An 
even more troubling aspect of this observable tendency toward the relativisation of political 
rights, which is a direct consequence of human capitalisation,500 is that in this process art is 
reimagined as performing a mediating role. Just how normalised this re-interpretation of 
citizenship on the basis of employment is can be surmised from the fact that even allegedly 
critical art practices end up overtly reproducing it.501 
                                                             
498 Considering the gravity that this conclusion assigns to participatory public art, and if these are indeed the 
stakes at play here, one has to wonder about the future possibility of a state-supported art that is not of 
relational or public character. 
499 Ulrich Beck, “Die Seele der Demokratie,” Die Zeit, 49:28 (November 1997), 7-8. 
Cited in Christian Kravagna, “Working in the Community: Models of Participatory Practice,” in The ‘Do-it 
Yourself’ Artwork: Participation from Fluxus to New Media, 240-256, 240.  
500 Wendy Brown writes characteristically: “Nor do specifically political rights adhere to human capital; their 
status grows unclear and incoherent.” 
Brown, 38. 
501 For instance, “Women-led Workers´ Cooperative” (Glasgow, 2013) which was WochenKlausur’s 
contribution to the exhibition “Economy” (CCA Glasgow, STILLS Gallery Edinburgh) aimed to 
184 
 
The reorientation of art toward social amelioration has led to a rearrangement of 
political and cultural roles which, as George Yúdice argues, benefits all concerned parties: 
state, arts institutions and bodies, and artists. On the one hand, the implementation of 
policy— or rather the attempt to substitute it for cultural policy— through the deployment 
of community art projects and programmes allows the neoliberal state to outsource the 
management of socio-economic problems and the oversight of “problem” communities. On 
the other, by pivoting to a different social function, art institutions manage to survive in the 
midst of massive cuts in arts and culture budgets: institutions thereby project their status as 
apparatuses serving public well-being.502 Finally, artists can carve out a new social role away 
from the navel-gazing manipulation of intradisciplinary tropes and signs. This realignment, 
Yúdice concludes, means that art institutions and artists are enlisted as functionaries of 
governance while at the same time improve their public profile of social responsibility. 
This, I would argue, is not an entirely fair assessment of the situation, even though it 
does reflect the rearrangement of roles rather accurately. The advocacy for the communal 
and useful turn in art production does not necessarily always disguise some cynical or 
insidious agenda; adapting to the political expediency of the era has very often been a 
survival strategy for arts organisations and artists. This was made evident with the 
publication of the American National Endowment for the Arts “American Canvas” in 1997. 
“American Canvas” argued that in the present political circumstance— one of economic 
deregulation inflamed by the seemingly perennial American culture wars— the survival of 
arts funding lay in the adoption of social and pedagogic goals, well outside art’s role in the 
traditional context of culture. The new fields that artists were instructed to engage with 
ranged from “youth programs and crime prevention to job training and race relations.”503 
“American Canvas” advised artists that in this environment the survival of any public 
funding for art relied on art’s ability to prove its social usefulness. 
Neither should art’s embeddedness in specific political processes be perceived as 
justification for its blanket dismissal. The central aporia that any critique of social 
engagement in contemporary art is inevitably faced with derives from the occasional 
complicity of artist and neoliberal state; the former in the dissemination of a democratic 
politics of solidarity and cohesion, and the latter in the legitimation of its reduced role in the 
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implementation of these ideas. Yet, acknowledging the potential symbolic and material 
benefits of such projects cannot mean their unexamined idealisation either— this is a 
problem exacerbated when the projection of moral characteristics onto community overrides 
community’s underlying material reality. The task of analysis should therefore be the 
critique of the institutions and ideological distortions which facilitate public participatory 
art’s utilisation as a mechanism of neoliberal governance.  
Nevertheless, this is but an afterthought in Kester’s analysis.504 And one is led to 
wonder, are the implications of the non-communicative and hierarchical work of art— 
“orthopaedic,” to use Kester’s term— graver than the mobilisation of entire bureaucracies 
around the inscription of artistic expression in campaigns of social pacification and urban 
development? The ramifications of the debates emerging in cultural policy since the mid-
1990s are instead hardly considered. And when they are, it is primarily in order to demarcate 
the solidaristic and transformative qualities of “dialogical aesthetics” from practices merely 
buttressing social stability.505 Yet, it seems obvious that if organised state apparatuses 
demonstrate a predilection for specific types of art, a greater degree of suspicion is 
warranted. 
Let us then return to the case of Park Fiction. Park Fiction, both during its planning 
process as well as its completion, was in fact financed with public funds; its construction 
was funded specifically with 2,4€ million by the “Art in Public Space” programme of the 
Department of Culture of city of Hamburg.506 Yet, these details are omitted in Kester’s 
salutary accounts of the project. Only after a long discussion which consciously emphasises 
the radical modern history of St. Pauli and celebrates every practical aspect involved in the 
project as a radical gesture of profound importance, does Kester finally concede that the 
work was in fact funded by the state government— and that, without the exact financial sum 
being disclosed. Even more characteristically, the process of the negotiation over the 
project’s funding is treated as a subversive artistic-political act in its own right, with 
emphasis on the “round table” near the park site and the playfully defiant participation of 
the local community: a framing that explicitly artifies— theatricalises— the deliberations 
between community and authorities in the manner of a political theatre play.507 Any tension, 
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however, during the negotiations was less about the funding per se and more related to the 
insistence of the Park Fiction committee to be given full control over the funds. Which they 
ultimately were.508 
Nevertheless, the most troubling misrepresentation in Kester’s discussion concerns the 
role that Park Fiction played in the gentrification of the district. When the topic of 
gentrification is raised, Kester centres on Park Fiction constituting a hub for anti-
gentrification actions. That might be true on the surface; the park was officially inaugurated 
with an anti-gentrification picnic, and in 2009 collectives associated with Park Fiction 
participated in the emergence of a Right to City movement in Hamburg. Ironically, however, 
at the same time that the park was used to coordinate anti-gentrification actions, the 
transformation of the public, formerly unused land to a colourful hub of “creative dissent”509 
was contributing to the increase of property values in the area and the rapid gentrification of 
St. Pauli, with the project ultimately spearheading the urban redevelopment agenda of the 
city of Hamburg. The park is nowadays an important cultural site in a highly gentrified 
neighbourhood, whose space is even monetised by surrounding restaurants and bars.510 As 
Charles Landry, the founder of the think tank Comedia, had disarmingly asserted in the 
1990s: 
The artist in effect is the explorer and regenerator kickstarting a gentrification 
process, bringing life to rundown areas and generating the development of 
support structures such as cafes, restaurants and some shops. They then attract a 
more middle-class clientele who would not have risked being the first, either 
through fear, the dislike of rundown areas, or pressure from peer groups. Only 
when the grottiness has been tamed and made safe by the artist will this second 
group arrive.511 
Now, even if we concede that some of these details could not have been known during 
the time of Kester’s writings on Park Fiction, it is still important to consider the work and 
its effects in duration as a social entity. There can be no social practice disembedded from 
the examination of the dimension of duration; after all, Kester’s theorisation foregrounds its 
transformative character, and that can only exist in time. If we then accept that the temporal 
dimension of an artistic-activist project is in fact part of the living work, shouldn’t the ease 
by which a work of useful public art is co-opted, or even worse, actively contributes to 
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gentrification and the culturalisation of the economy of a specific urban area be of concern? 
Shouldn’t the work of the artist in the “expanded field of culture” be assessed for its political 
effects precisely there? Shouldn’t then the artwork’s role be examined beyond the myopic 
dimensions of immediacy and organicity? This is no longer the case of the straightforward 
decontextualization of the art object and its re-emergence, for instance, in an advertising 
medium; after all, it is highly doubtful that nowadays an art object would be lauded as socio-
politically transformative and liberating in its own right. The stakes of socially engaged art 
involve actual social formations which in turn generate specific economic relations and 
interact with socio-economic processes. At which point does the facility by which a specific 
social entity become a vehicle for agendas seemingly antithetical to its self-professed ones 
become understood not as the entity’s subversion but as its structural propensity? 
 
5.7 COMMUNITY MUST BE RESISTED 
When dealing with the problem of community, Raymond Williams wrote in 1976 that 
the insurmountable difficulties that any definition of it is forced to deal with are not signs of 
analytic weakness. The problems plaguing its definition are direct consequences of 
community’s own historical development as a concept. Community is embedded in a 
profound ambiguity, as it signifies at the same time the “common concern” and the form of 
organisation that comes to express it. This interlocking of the ideal and the pragmatic 
distinguishes community from other formations that collective human life has developed, 
and makes it resistant to critique: 
Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of 
relationships, or the warmly persuasive word to describe an alternative set of 
relationships. What is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms of 
social organisation (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used 
unfavourably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing 
term.512 
Williams recognised that in community’s interlocking signification, its moral characteristics 
always tend to override its political particularities. The primacy of its moral characteristics— 
or rather its existence as a moral category— facilitates its reception as a universal value; a 
state of human relating that has fascinated political identities ranging from anarchists such 
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as Murray Bookchin to moral philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, and from left-wing 
pedagogues such as Ivan Illich to conservative localists such as Robert Nisbet and, more 
recently, Robert Deneen. 
The moral character of community makes it so that it can truly mean anything insofar 
as it is consistent with one’s idea of “good;” it has become so malleable a category, truly an 
empty signifier onto which whatever is understood as “good” can be projected. The 
artificiality of the concept similarly informs its artistic explorations, despite any realist 
pretensions formalised in organic, non-hierarchical community constructions. In Kester’s 
case, this translates in forms of community that always carry a hint of resistance, a 
promissory element of liberation against all odds— never reactionary, brutal, petty or abject. 
Community’s omnipresence in its conceptualisation as an organic, non-hierarchical 
formation with specific moral characteristics ends up reconstructing a contemporary version 
of a Tönnies-esque dichotomy between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft.513 In Kester’s 
“dialogical aesthetics,” community is allowed to be political only in a rather Arendtian sense, 
and is thus imagined to provide the space for the emergence of a “we” as “a potential 
experience of solidarity in moments of collective action.”514 Community becomes therefore 
a solidarity-forming, adverse but nurturing environment that exists as a locus of truth and 
resistance. Yet, there are clear indications that this is not the case anymore, if it ever really 
was. 
Community is nowadays the site of political power. After the neoliberal state collapsed 
any possibility of a cohesive meaning of society and social relationship, it attempts to 
reconstruct those in community: not as external mediators between state and individual this 
time, but as “aspects of all of us.”515 Once the social gave way to the communal, community 
was inevitably redefined as the site of the administration of individual and collective life; 
there, the state can retain control by casting away any responsibility of consistency and 
universality. To that end, it creates and supports a series of “hybrid mechanisms” which 
modernise and particularise the mediation between itself and society. Residents associations, 
non-profits, focus groups, NGOs, community police, community development programs; an 
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entire industry which resides in the grey zone between profit and contribution is erected.516 
As the responsibility of the state is detotalised from a single-bounded space to the 
heterogeneity of multiple communities, it creates a citizenship of “neighbourhoods, 
associations, regions, networks, subcultures, age groups, ethnicities, and lifestyle sectors.”517 
This process is described by Nikolas Rose as the double movement of “autonomisation 
and responsibilisation.”518 Autonomisation, or devolution in Wendy Brown’s terms, 
describes the decentralising logic of neoliberal governance— the process by which 
previously centralised decision-making powers are broken up and delegated downward. This 
is however only superficially analogous to the expansion of political participation in social 
life. On the one hand, as Brown highlights, the subject of devolution is always in a state of 
precarity: at an institutional as well as personal level, the devolved subject finds itself bereft 
of the necessary resources to make the optimal decisions expected of it, and incapable to 
escape the asphyxiating framework of the market. On the other, by devolving its powers in 
an environment wherein no impactful decision can be made but the reproduction of the 
pieties of actually existing neoliberalism, the state can emerge unscathed out of every crisis. 
Devolution represents therefore a hollow de-hierarchicalisation of power which is always 
enforced through a regime of intensification of responsibility on the level of the individual— 
a “moral burdening” of the subject enlisted to perform in a nexus of ever-competing 
forces.519  
With community’s emergence as the predominant political unit of control, the locus 
of control is redirected to its moral characteristics. This is no mere compensation for the 
neoliberal state’s devolution of control but the state’s exertion of control by other means. It 
is a conscious, methodical process which amplifies the importance of personal responsibility 
in government, accomplished through the formalisation of a new politics of behaviour— an 
“ethopolitics,” as Rose has incisively described it.520 The politics of community reveals itself 
as the post-political politics of morality and responsibility. It is a relocation of political 
control in the moral register; there, where the political can present the illusion of its self-
negation into moral conduct and thus escape critique. This is always a political operation 
which speaks the language of morality: the moralisation of the political is always a political 
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act and so is the attempt to disguise its political character. As Carl Schmitt observed in 1922, 
“any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision.”521 
The new importance of the familial and the communal are not then mere symptoms of 
a nostalgia for simpler, more meaningful times, the yearning for an antidote to metropolitan 
alienation— they are not simple reactions to the brutal disintegration of social ties that “has 
left no other bond between man and man than naked self-interest” as Marx and Engels wrote 
at the dawn of the bourgeois revolutions of 1848.522 It is its continuation in a different form. 
It is the platform through which the neoliberal state makes the promise for a culturally, 
socially, and racially equal brutality, and the administration of life once the relation with 
government becomes a matter of inner life; a question of morality. Community is the aura 
of authenticity that accompanies one’s own government, and the morality of “governing 
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In the first pages of this study I alluded to the double character of the politicisation of 
contemporary art, as always the consequence of an artistic and political decision. It is 
through this framing that the “social turn” emerges and becomes intelligible as a 
phenomenon. What I have attempted to demonstrate is that with the integration of socio-
political categories as art’s subject matter and form, the judgement of art becomes 
inextricable from the judgement of how art negotiates, subverts or legitimises social and 
economic structures. The “social turn” asserts that political discourse is not external to art 
anymore, something that could potentially be considered along a series of other 
considerations, but the language through which art practice distinguishes itself by 
overcoming its aesthetic and post-aesthetic histories to lay a new claim to legitimacy. And 
this is a claim that is advanced through the heightened attention to its social character, 
through the systematic effort to reinstate a character of social responsibility.  
Political critique, or rather the critique of the political, is nevertheless a critique of 
heightened negativity. Unlike art production which has largely abandoned the dichotomies 
and distinctions proper to a transcendental understanding— it has been for decades 
inappropriate to frame art in terms of beauty or as the exercise of taste— the production of 
political thought preserves some of those more abstract external criteria that it always tests 
itself against; justice, progress, prosperity and so on, are always categories to be considered 
in political formulations. While political formulations are always assessed on how they 
position themselves with regard to these signifiers, and how persuasively they can compete 
over them against other political propositions, they also always involve or invite a critique 
of their own mechanisms and procedures: such critiques involve the examination of the 
internal coherence of the premises of a political formulation, of blind spots and 
unacknowledged contradictions, as well as the relations of power its structures presuppose. 
These are also critical processes that art has cultivated throughout the years— art’s post-
avantgarde inscription in the analysis of micropolitical and processual relations testifies to 
that. What art practice has generally lacked since the abandonment of beauty is the concept 
of an overarching purpose that it can align with and test itself against. This sense of purpose 
is rediscovered through art’s politicisation, that is, the moment when art’s advance of self-
differentiation through the critique of its internal relations can progress only through the 
critique of its relation to broader socio-political and cultural structures. This is a dialectical 
process which expands the limits of the critique of art practice from the nature of its 
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processes to also encompass its conduciveness to professed overarching ideals. Under these 
conditions, art is understood in terms of its conceptualisation of political categories, as well 
as the ways it proposes to symbolically, and often materially, represent those.  
Inheriting therefore, in a sense, the structure of political critique which advances 
through the immanent negation of its propositions in relation to the normative standards they 
correspond to, what I have attempted to show throughout this study is that socially engaged 
practice cannot be examined only for its professed successes but most importantly its 
failures. In fact, the failure of the artwork to align its internal processes in a way that could 
allow it to live up to its political claims and commitments reveals more about the social 
character of art, its misconceptions, the limitations it is subject to, as well as the 
socioeconomic and cultural conditions of its production than any possible success. In that 
regard, assertions such as Tania Bruguera’s that “[f]or Arte Útil, failure is not a possibility, 
if the project fails, it is not Arte Útil”524 do not only betray a certain triumphalist spirit but 
also a misrecognition that for art, after its legitimation through the political field of critique, 
the possibility of success is no longer available. To pretend otherwise implies that one’s 
conceptualisation of the social character of contemporary art cannot be coherently articulated 
as distinct from social work. It is only through a narrow, utilitarian perspective that we can 
equate artistic production and the administration of tasks consisting of specific steps and 
outcomes, and then declare the artwork’s success by virtue of its meeting criteria of that 
kind. This does not simply subvert the oppressive Kantian doxa of art’s purposive 
purposelessness, as Stephen Wright would argue.525 This leaves Arte Útil, and perhaps 
socially engaged practice more broadly, unable to justify its unique role and value as separate 
from the various social welfare programmes and NGOs, if not for the vanity of artists 
attached to the idea of being useful.  
The political thought of contemporary art needs to move beyond that. If, as Boris 
Groys proposes, the distinction between early twentieth century avant-gardes and 
contemporary socially engaged practices can be reframed as the distinction between the 
negation and construction of the world,526 and art’s construction of the world aspires to 
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escape the mere reproduction of its current conditions, then any assessment of contemporary 
art’s propositions has to examine them in duration and in relation to a totality of the 
dimensions they interact with. And this entails art’s assessment through processes of 
(self)critique which will always point to art’s failure; this is a consequence of the objective 
limitations of art in capitalism as well as the structural negativity of political critique art 
seeks to derive legitimacy from. Failure is the default state of contemporary socially engaged 
practice and yet this is a beneficial failure: failure ties art to a discourse machine of constantly 
regenerating material. 
The recognition of artistic engagement with the social world as legitimate art practice 
therefore puts art into a new predicament, as it exposes it to a whole new set of problems 
and challenges. This predicament presents art with its material and a horizon of possible 
critiques which seek to refine art’s propositions and at the same time amplify its claim to 
legitimacy. As I have discussed throughout this thesis, we could schematise the new 
problems of socially engaged practice as manifesting along two intersecting axes: 
instrumentalisation and subjectivation. Instrumentalisation, which could probably be 
considered the most discernible effect of art’s social repositioning, concerns the vulnerability 
or even willingness of artistic activity to submit itself to the solution of socioeconomic 
problems. As a development this is not too surprising; with the reimagining of artistic 
autonomy through art’s restoration of social responsibility, social amelioration becomes a 
distinct possibility of artistic production. Yet, in doing so, art without a doubt risks its self-
reduction to a legitimating apparatus of the neoliberal antisocial turn by offering a veneer of 
legitimacy to the state’s abdication of social responsibility, as well as normalising its 
categories. 
Abstracted at the personal and interpersonal level, art’s instrumentalisation manifests 
in its subjectivating function. Subjectivation, of course, is not a problem unique to art but a 
function integral to all sites of ideological production. Different socioeconomic and cultural 
milieus advance different models of subjectivation and, as Foucault had long argued, while 
traditional models of subjectivation tended to be characterised by discipline, the social 
construction of subjectivity in neoliberalism shifts toward the production of self-sufficient, 
non-alienated subjects. The non-alienated subject is the subject that has attained to a relation 
of continuity between inner and outer world and has thus overcome the separation between 
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self-understanding and material action. While Marxist analysis has historically posited the 
overcoming of alienation in the upending of capitalist productive relations, neoliberalism 
advances a different yet similarly radical solution: the internalisation of social life in 
continuity with the inner world of motivations and dispositions— that is, the internalisation 
of social life as a personal-interpersonal matter of expression. While institutional practices, 
such as relational aesthetics, might at times mirror or aestheticise certain characteristics of 
this process, it does not follow that the dissemination of art practices extra-institutionally 
presents a persuasive solution; in fact, works that directly engage with communities often 
end up enacting the same formula but without the overt defamiliarising mediation of the art 
institution. To advocate for art’s critical potential on the basis of its relative autonomy from 
the spaces conventionally associated with the ideological production of culture one would 
then need to demonstrate how these practices do not simply extend and diffuse broadly the 
very same “self-ordering and self-civilising” technologies.527 This is of course impossible as 
this ambiguity is art’s critical horizon. 
Unlike therefore the identification of art’s macroscopic socially ameliorative 
realignment, art’s subjectivating function is rather elusive. Yet, for the mass production of 
subjectivity in continuity with the external world there is always one necessary condition, 
and that is the negation of apathy. The negation of apathy is by definition the form and 
content of socially engaged practice; irrespective of the degree of a work’s socially 
conciliatory or antagonistic qualities, its more or less authorial or non-hierarchical 
construction, the activation of the participant, materially or symbolically, is an ever-present 
dimension across socially engaged practice. In its dependence on the work’s activation by a 
wider non-artist audience, the decentering of authorship in socially engaged practice creates 
the conditions for a participatory and collective production of meaning— and this is done in 
the literal sense and not through recourse to the openness of the audience’s interpretative 
role. 
As a model of resistant political subjectivity, processes of activation and 
resignification of collective social and cultural life correspond to what Baudrillard had 
described as “the liberating claim of subjecthood.”528 In simple terms, to assert one’s 
subjecthood means to aspire to leave an imprint on the world, to create and intervene; 
similarly, socially engaged practices represent an individual and collective life imbued with 
meaning and a rediscovery of political agency. There are two thorny issues that need to be 
                                                             
527 Tony Bennett, “Exhibition: Truth, Power: Reconsidering the ‘Exhibitionary Complex,’” in the Documenta 
14 Reader, 339-352, 344. 
528 Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities ... or the End of the Social (New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1983), 108. 
195 
 
considered here. On the one hand, partly due to the objective limitations that art production 
has to wrestle with in capitalism, but also on account of the thematics that art practices 
themselves negotiate, the resignification of individual and collective life often unfolds 
entirely in the realm of ordinary social life. Relational practices are certainly largely guilty 
of that, but even the more activist-oriented practices discussed in this thesis, such as Loraine 
Leeson’s West Meets East for instance, present a rather modest interpretation of social 
change. Which leads to the second point: the pressure for the work to “succeed” in relation 
to certain outlined goals under conditions which foreclose substantive material change 
imposes an unambitious interpretation of political agency. This is not necessarily a 
consequence of a poverty of imagination but also due to the objective conditions of artistic 
production— that is, the generalised competition over limited resources. What this results in 
is the proliferation and social diffusion of small, modest and particular gestures, 
interventions and acts of creativity, made meaningful as works of art and presented as small 
victories, that amount to very little beyond a vague sense of empowerment. After a point, 
therefore, it does not suffice to frame the problem singularly from the perspective of the 
socialisation of artistic activity but also in relation to the artification of broader social life. 
What this would mean is that, moving beyond the problematics of art’s socially ameliorative 
role, the subjectivating function of socially engaged practice could be associated with deeper 
changes in capitalism’s self-representation and self-organisation over the last decades.  
In their major work titled “The New Spirit of Capitalism” written in 1999, Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello famously argued that a central characteristic of post-Fordism, 
as the prominent productive regime in neoliberalism, is the observable tendency toward a 
generalised “artification” of life. By examining the evolution of business literature from the 
1960s to the 1990s, the writers traced a steady reorientation of economic and managerial 
discourse toward ideas and organisational models which evidently broke with the 
paternalism of the older Fordist model. Since the 1970s the hierarchical, disciplinary 
overtones of corporate language appears to have been gradually yielding to a rhetoric of 
autonomy, flexibility, spontaneity, openness to new experiences, informality and sociality, 
representing thus the emergence of a new, humanised, expressive and communicative 
corporate culture.529 For the writers, this shift was not to be understood as an isolated 
phenomenon but as a sign of an ongoing restructuring of the beliefs, dispositions and actions 
that capitalism qualified as most conducive to its reproduction. This shift epitomised 
therefore a new “spirit of capitalism,” beyond the older model of the small bourgeois 
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entrepreneur, as well as the dyad of the bureaucratised director and expert worker of Fordist 
production.530 Unlike the older regimes of violence and law, the new capitalist paradigm, the 
writers claimed, exhibits qualities which have historically fallen within the prerogative of an 
idealised conception of the artist-type: ideals of authenticity, autonomy, creativity and 
individual freedom. That is, the new paradigm appears to have been structured by ideas 
drawn from a long history of cultural opposition to capitalism itself. We are consequently 
talking about the self-reinvention of capitalism through the integration of its “artistic” 
critique: the critique of capitalism which focuses primarily on its disenchanting, inauthentic, 
and oppressive worldview, rather than explicit issues of material inequality.531 This 
phenomenon— capitalism’s discovery of “routes to its survival in critiques of it”532— 
demonstrates, on the one hand, capitalism’s great adaptability and assimilating capabilities 
but also advances a fundamental expansion of its commodifying grip. Boltanski and 
Chiapello effectively suggest that a crucial goal of neoliberalism is the production of a 
universal “artistic” subject by means of which social and economic life can eventually be 
recodified as disruption, creativity and communication; that is, as meaningful phenomena.  
The new conditions of capitalism as an endless stream of activity and creativity 
dislodge meaning and agency from their historical role in the formation of critical political 
subjectivity. In fact, the insistence to view those as preconditions for a radical 
reinterpretation of life evokes a conceptualisation of resistance residual of older oppressive 
and repressive milieus— only in such socio-cultural environments can the impulse to create 
and intervene be inscribed in the logic of resistance. The contemporary artist, hailing from 
the social milieu where proactivity and meaning are the norm extends this culture outwards 
to engulf all of society. 
If this hypothesis holds and the changes outlined above are signs of an intensifying 
unfolding historical logic, then the historical trajectory of capitalism cannot but end in the 
artification of all social and economic life. The endgame is clear— the reframing of socio-
economic phenomena as artistic can only lead to the reinvention of capitalism itself as a 
work of art; as Stewart Martin writes, the reinvention of capitalism as a “cultural or artistic 
capitalism.”533 At a microscopic level, the effects of this new type of capitalism could be 
made manifest in the convivial and communicative overriding of the objective relations that 
structure processes of work— in the dilution of work into self-expression and sociality. The 
                                                             
530 Ibid., 19. 
531 Ibid., 38. 
532 Ibid., 27. 
533 [Emphasis in original] 
Stewart Martin, “Artistic Communism— a Sketch,” Third Text, 23:4 (2009): 481-494, 482. 
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concealment of the objective conditions of social relations reproduces thus the creeping 
indistinction of production and self-expression in neoliberalism— as an act of resistance 
even. 
This is, nonetheless, only the tip of the iceberg. The existential threat of a “cultural or 
artistic capitalism” consists, in fact, in the prospect of a definitive justification of all life in 
capitalism as the product of a universal and enforced, inescapable agency. Unlike 
Baudrillard’s panoply of signs no longer referring to any “real” or what Bourdieu referred 
to as the “ironic and metatextual” barrages of mass communication,534 the experience of life 
through the prism of active, impactful participation in social and cultural affairs saturates the 
individual with meaning that can no longer be negated. Under these conditions, critical 
activity as artistic event does not find itself simply powerless to subvert the symbolic order 
of capitalism but, on the contrary, feeds into capitalism’s general project of artification of 
life. If this is the direction of history our texts are monuments to failure and future memorials 
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